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# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
## East Europe

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**NOTICE TO READERS:** * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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### Belgrade Press on 'Help' to Albania Criticized

*AU1204084689 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 7 Apr 89 p 4*

[Ymer Minxhozi article: "Spawn of Tsar Alexander"]

[Text] The Belgrade magazine NIN shows that it still has not exhausted its anti-Albanian arsenal. It is always able to surprise the reader, and has done so again in recent days. An article with the routine title "How We Have Helped Albania" adds to the list of kinds of assistance that Yugoslavia has rendered to our country... a king! This bizarre form of help is mentioned in the proper place for a king—at the head of the article. There we read, "Yugoslavia supported Tirana's authority for the first time in the days of King Alexander, who helped and supported the Albanian King Ahmet Zogu."

It is true that there is nothing unfamiliar or inaccurate in this. Even before we read NIN, we knew a little about the history of the kings of those days and, moreover, we have never thought of these pages of history as simply a royal "fairy tale." We have always known that the landowner and tribal chieftain Ahmet Zogu, when expelled by the people following the democratic revolution of June 1924, found refuge in Belgrade and subsequently attacked Albania with the help of the bayonets of the gendarmerie of the Serbian King Alexander and the counterrevolutionary dregs of the White Guard of the Russian General Wrangel, forcibly overthrew the democratic government headed by Fan Noli, and imposed a medieval monarchist dictatorship that cost the Albanian people 15 years of savage oppression.

We knew these facts even without NIN's help. However, we did not know until now that the export of a counterrevolution, the overthrow of a democratic government, and the imposition of a royal dictatorship could be added to a list of gifts and acts of help. We learn this now for the first time, and this is a new contribution the magazine offers its readers.

### Economic Results for January-March

*AU1204101589*

[Editorial Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 7 April carries on page 1 a 1,500-word item reporting economic results for January-March 1989, attributed to "the ZERI I POPULLIT press brigade," and entitled "The First 3 Months—Approaching the 45th Anniversary."

Under the subhead "Place of Honor," the report states that "The metalworkers of the Burrel ferro-chrome plant have exceeded their plan every month. Let us recall a calculation made in January: The above-plan production of this plant earned enough foreign currency to buy seven heavyweight tractors. By February, above-plan production was worth 50 tractors, and 60 by the end of the 3-month period." After praising the successful performance of the Shkoder copper wire works and the chemical fertilizer industry, the report states that "In March, coal miners added 2,000 tonnes to their above-plan production. Calculations made with the aid of the Tirana power station show that the above-plan production of the 3-month period was equal to one-half of the power station's monthly consumption."

Under the subhead "They Met and Exceeded Their Targets, But What Do the Figures Hide?," the report states "All forms of transportation (except on lakes) exceeded their targets by fulfilling their plan in tonnes and tonne-kilometers by 102-104 percent." "However," the report states, "some goods are not transported on time. Irregularity is the 'Achilles heel' of transportation." The report goes on to state that "The construction plan was 1 percent overfulfilled," but that "The rate of construction is not the same in large projects as in small, and some of the latter remained uncompleted because of the absence of doors, windows, and tiling." The report states that the food and light industry sector exceeded its plan by 4 percent, but that "The textile, shoe, kitchenware, and knitwear industries are in debt to the consumer." The report further states that the turnover in internal trade has increased 4.4 percent in the first 3 months of 1989 in comparison with the same period last year, but that "The role of the trade sector in the countryside, both as procurer and retailer, must be better understood. There are districts, such as Mirdite, that did not procure a single egg in the first 3 months of this year."

Under the subhead "When Will They Settle Their Debts of the First 3 Months?," the report mentions below-plan performances of 11,000 tonnes in oil production, 24,000 tonnes in oil byproducts, and 8 percent in gas production. The report states that the fisheries sector fulfilled its 3-month plan by 62.3 percent. The report states that "Nonfulfillment of the enriched chrome and chrome concentrate plan has cost the economy exports to the value of 200-250 trucks," and that there has been a 1,000-tonne shortfall in the production of copper concentrate. The report concludes by citing various districts which failed to meet their targets in milk and vegetable production.

### Development of EEC, CEMA Ties Viewed

*AU1104114789 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 6 Apr 89 p 3-4*

[Professor Arben Puto article: "On the EEC and Its Developmental Trends"]

[Text] The subject of the EEC is one of the most topical in all international politics today. It has attracted the attention not only of official circles, but public opinion as a whole. Discussion of the EEC has become more lively as we come closer to the end of 1992, when a radical step in the further economic integration of Western Europe is planned. This poses problems for the member states as well as others outside the EEC, and explains why such wide interest has been aroused in the trends in the Community's development. Becoming aware of these trends is a way of preparing to cope with these future developments with proper responsibility.

The EEC is an international organization and, as such, acquires rights and obligations (on the basis of international law) toward any state that recognizes it. The majority of states have today recognized the EEC, have concluded international legal treaties with it, and have even exchanged diplomatic representatives with it. The practical recognition of the Community by states who are members of CEMA, in June 1988, has been seen as an important development. However, states are not of course forced to recognize the Community; they have the right to do so or not to do so.

However, bearing in mind future developments, Community circles consider it advisable, if not vital, for states to decide in favor of recognition. Since the end of the transitional period (since 1970), the EEC alone has been invested with authority and responsibility in the field of foreign trade policy (Article 113 of the EEC Treaty). The exclusive nature of these competences has been testified several times by the European Court at Luxembourg (the body entrusted with the interpretation of Community regulations). This means the domestic legislation of every member state in the sphere of foreign trade is now decided at Community level, while treaties with third parties, nonmember states, are established by the Community and in its name, and not by the member states. In this context, there is a single reservation, and a loophole has been left concerning old treaties on foreign trade (signed before 1970), in the case of which the Community may decide (although this is not compulsory) to authorize member states to extend them. However, these states have no right to establish new treaties individually or to change the terms of old treaties. In other words, agreements reached before 1970 remain frozen as they are.

A further matter that attracts attention is that there is a visible general tendency for the Community to expand its rights and competences (all the regulations that make up the Community's legal basis and govern its work) both at a domestic and international level (as always, within the sphere of foreign trade). We are thus dealing with a long-term process by which the Community has gradually extended its authority and has even reached the point of drafting measures of a comprehensive character and introducing them into its basic charter, always with the tendency to extend its competences. Under such circumstances, problems of foreign trade relations come increasingly under the exclusive authority of the EEC. The year 1992 will note a deepening and improvement in this process. This deadline was not foreseen in the text of the treaty, but is the result of an understanding reached by the member states in 1985 to eliminate the many "national" obstacles that still existed at the end of the transitional period (in 1970). The aim of the member states is therefore to give fresh impetus to the Community as a "supranational" entity.

Treaties of economic cooperation (which must be distinguished from foreign trade treaties), even where they make extensive provision for such cooperation, have in Community practice been considered as still permissible for member states, insofar as they do not cover areas of activity that are subject to the competences that have passed to the EEC. Member states are obliged to submit these treaties to a compulsory procedure of consultation with the Community and other member states, yet it is nevertheless accepted that they (individual states) are able to conclude such treaties. The framework and limits of these treaties is gradually becoming restricted in accordance with the transfer of authority into the Community's hands. In this context, it must be borne in mind that the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with a Community member state does not make it possible to avoid the consequences which result from the transfer of competences in favor of the Community. Made conditional as it is by Community regulations, such a treaty gives nothing more than what a member state is able to give. It is even questionable whether this practice will be allowed to continue in the future. In fact, this kind of treaty has been subject to criticism among specialists in the rights of the Community, and it seems that the only reason they have been allowed has been that they have provided an opportunity for maintaining relations at some kind of level with CEMA countries. They are a juridical anomaly, and it is thus expected that they will in practice be eliminated completely when agreements with CEMA are finally concluded. This too, it is stressed, is a reason arguing in favor of recognizing the Community.

However, according to experts, recognition does not necessarily mean diplomatic relations with the EEC. According to them, this recognition can be limited to a particular area of concern and could be combined, it is said, with the conclusion of an international legal treaty on foreign trade with the EEC: Such a treaty would be important and necessary so long as the EEC Treaty expects the obligation of creating a common internal market in 1992. In this way, the Community will from this date become a true economic entity with a single, standardized body of internal economic regulations.

Among the Community member states, it is the Germans whose thinking has come out most in favor of the Community. It seems that there is a reason for this: The German economy is the strongest and is constantly expanding. Whereas, among other countries such as France, Italy, and Britain, hesitations are evident, and often even cries of alarm ("We are late. We must prepare for the great turning point."), the FRG looks forward to 1992 with a feeling of calm self-assurance. At the beginning of November last year, the president of the French industrialists, interviewed on Radio France International, echoed the general chorus of "A united Europe is a wonderful thing," but also voiced concern by saying "We must be vigilant!" In German business circles, it is common to hear talk of the fear of the French that their businesses might fall into German hands. Concern increases all the more when it is realized that German economic supremacy might pave the way to greater political weight in a united Europe.

Of course, other member states will not stand idly by. This means that internal trends within the Community will be complicated and contradictory, and will be marked by capitalist contradictions and attempts by the most powerful members to secure dominant positions; however, there will also be no lack of resistance and countermeasures by smaller members. Apart from this, it is hard to imagine that member states will in the future subject themselves strictly to Community regulations and abandon trade maneuvers of any kind with the world beyond the Community. An economy motivated by profit will always be on the lookout for flanking maneuvers and "back door" methods. Pragmatism will always have its place in the ideological arsenal of the capitalist world. Is this not also clear from last autumn's visits to Moscow by the principal Western European leaders, the FRG chancellor, Kohl; the French president, Mitterrand; and the Italian prime minister, De Mita, who all signed entire packages of bilateral agreements with the USSR at a time when, in their countries, the effusive campaign for the Community was in full swing?

A further dimension that cannot be forgotten is the relationship between the EEC and other countries, the "outside world," involving the superpowers especially, but also Japan. Here, its interests are twofold—economic and political. There is an increasingly pronounced fear that "Europe" (by which is meant its large Western states) is destined to decline to second- or third-rate status if it fails to move toward economic and political integration. Forecasts in this connection are often highly ambitious, even utopian. There is a belief that the states of Western Europe are moving toward confederate and federal forms, and that this is the ultimate goal. It is accepted that this is a long road, strewn with domestic and foreign obstacles, yet it is said that the only solution lies in this idea. Thus, although distant, it becomes attainable. To make it more "credible," its realization has been postponed indefinitely, and for entire decades; some set the middle of the next century as a deadline, others the very end. One thing is certain, and that is that "united Europe" represents an advanced phase of contradictions within capitalism. It has arisen out of the nature of the system itself, with its tendency to concentrate and internationalize capital through multinational companies whose aim is to expand their markets and remove customs barriers. The idea marks a critical point when some of the powers are making despairing efforts to reappear on the stage as primary forces in world economics and politics.

This is also, in the final analysis, the reason for the EEC's existence. It can therefore be expected that, despite inevitable internal obstacles and contradictions, the Community will assume a more tangible form, and will consolidate itself as not merely an economic but a political community with marked supranational features. To what extent it will do this remains a question. However, the outlines of this road are emerging as a reality that cannot fail to be taken into account as an important factor in international economic relations, and one with consequences for the political field as well.

## Dzhurov Interviewed on Restructuring of Military

*AU1104200189 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 10 Apr 89 pp 1,3*

[Interview with Army General Dobri Dzhurov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and minister of national defense, by Gencho Boshnakov, RABOTNICHESKO DELO reporter: "Restructuring and the Bulgarian People's Army"; date and place not given]

[Text] The entire country is restructuring, and so is the Bulgarian People's Army. The dynamic social processes that are taking place give rise to many issues which are also related to the changes that are taking place in the Bulgarian People's Army [BPA], in its present and future role, the reduction of our armed troops and weapons, the publication of data which until now was considered a military and state secret, and in military service in general.

Various aspects of these issues were discussed by Army General Dobri Dzhurov, member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee and minister of national defense, answering the questions of RABOTNICHESKO DELO representative Gencho Boshnakov.

[Boshnakov] Comrade Dzhurov, we live and work in a time of revolutionary renewal. It encompasses all spheres of our society. Restructuring the BPA arouses special interest. How is it taking place, how is it expressed, and what are its main directions and principles?

[Dzhurov] On the basis of the decisions of the 13th BCP Congress, the Ministry of National Defense has developed a long-range program and plans at all levels on implementing restructuring. The program determines the goal, basic directions and tasks, methods and strike force, and decisive factors in achieving the final goal. The following are the main directions vested in our program:

—improving the organizational structure of the troops in accordance with the requirements of the new defensive doctrine, by devoting special attention to the concept of "reasonable sufficiency;"

—raising the technological basis of the units and detachments to a qualitatively new level;

—perfecting the plans, programs, and other normative documents related to the operational, combat, and political training of the troops;

—further improving the plans and programs on training the officer and noncommissioned cadres in the higher educational military establishments;

—enhancing the role and place of the BCP primary party organizations and the Komsomol organizations in army life; and

—raising the style and methods of work of the commanders, political organs, the party, Komsomol, and trade union organs and organizations to a qualitatively new level.

In short, the development of broad organizational, political, scientific, and practical-applicable work to implement the program on restructuring is turning into the most essential characteristic of the life of all Army units.

After the BCP national conference and the subsequent Central Committee plenums, this program became topical. In addition, I must stress that we periodically review our work with a view to asserting direct leadership of the processes of restructuring.

The new realities and tendencies of the restructuring processes in the BPA prompt us to penetrate, supervise, and lead these processes, in order to stress the tasks that have priority in our specific military conditions, and determine and direct the efforts of the relevant factor toward implementing the restructuring processes.

In this context, I would like to point out that a meeting of the all-Army party aktiv took place on 17 March 1989, at which the progress of restructuring in the Army was analyzed in a profound and critical manner. We clarified some of the tasks and forms, mainly, what style and methods of work must be applied by the main strike force of the BPA—the commanders, political organs, the party, Komsomol, and trade union organs and organizations—in asserting and strengthening restructuring.

The first conclusion we reached at the meeting of the aktiv was that we had correctly determined the goal, contents, and basic directions and tasks of restructuring and that we are marching confidently along the road we have outlined. We are successfully solving the tasks of building up and developing the troops with a view to bringing their structure into line with the principle of reasonable and reliable sufficiency, which occupies a leading place in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member countries. In addition, we are actively working to improve the quality parameters in the comprehensive training of the BPA.

The second conclusion was that the pace of the renewal processes in the Army still does not fully correspond to the requirements of the BCP Central Committee and the existing material, scientific-technical, and organizational conditions and cadre potentials of the BPA.

The work of the all-Army party aktiv gave new impetus to the Communists in the Army to work even harder to implement our program on the qualitatively new level of the BPA's combat readiness.

[Boshnakov] Undoubtedly, the new realities in international relations have a strong influence. The USSR's peace initiatives, the steps toward disarmament taken by the USSR and the United States, the efforts to strengthen peace, security, and confidence, the defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, and the unilateral reductions in the socialist countries' armed forces and weapons pose many questions. One of the most important among them concerns the present and future role of the Armed Forces. Similarly, we are interested in the question of how to guarantee the defensive ability and independence of our motherland against the background of this situation and the troop reduction. What problems emerge and how will they be resolved?

[Dzhurov] There are qualitatively new realities in the world, in both East and West, and in relations between them. Our parties and governments are taking these realities into consideration while conducting their coordinated peaceful foreign policy. Their efforts are aimed first of all toward decreasing international tension, achieving general and total disarmament, and guaranteeing peace and security for all nations throughout the world.

However, some people think that under conditions of decreasing military confrontation and the significant and unilateral reductions of armed troops and weapons on the part of the Warsaw Pact member countries, the Army, as an instrument of the state, has outlived its time, and that armed forces must be eliminated in future. If we proceed from the willingness and interests of mankind, militarism really has no future under the present conditions. As a result of the new political thinking, people throughout the world are becoming wiser and more intelligent. Even the most militaristic circles understand that a nuclear war will end civilization and that earth will turn into a dead desert. Furthermore, science shows that even a conventional war, waged with the classical means of armed struggle, can cause the destruction of entire states and continents, if one takes into consideration the numerous nuclear reactors that have been constructed throughout the world, the great number of chemical plants, and the many other nuclear and chemical industry installations. However, this does not mean that the tasks of the Armed Forces have been exhausted. It suffices to say that as long as imperialism and its military doctrines and concepts exist in this restless world that is full of contradictions and surprises, then armed forces will continue to exist. Today and in the future, they will guard our people's socialist achievements and the southern borders of our socialist community.

Proceeding from "reasonable sufficiency," our goal is to reduce the armed forces of countries and coalitions, lower both sides' threshold of military confrontation as much as possible, and remove suspicion and strivings for unilateral advantages as much as possible. However, this naturally does not depend only on our willingness.

Aggressive goals are alien to socialism. The creation and maintenance of armed forces were prompted by external reasons—the danger of imperialist aggression. As long as this exists, our motherland's defensive ability must be maintained at the necessary high level.

The numerical and combat strength of the BPA must be determined—and naturally, will be determined—by military-political, operational-strategic, and political realities in the region, the continent, and the world. In this context, we must again stress that in our comprehensive activity related to construction and training, we give priority to the qualitative indices.

We have made significant reductions. We reduced the number of personnel, tanks, artillery systems, and combat aircraft, as well as the military budget. We expect similar steps from our NATO partners. However, the actions of the Western countries imply something else. They voice appeals for "rearming," adopting "compensating programs," creating "new high-precision weapons," "modernizing" nuclear weapons, and so forth. Many Western politicians and military figures are underestimating the policy conducted by the Warsaw Pact member countries, and show a skeptical attitude toward all measures which the Warsaw Pact member countries are implementing in the military area. Naturally, we can clearly say that such people are still living with obsolete concepts borrowed from the time of the "cold war" and "confrontation." The military-power approach and the mania for "superiority" that are decisively rejected by the people still dominate their thinking. We cannot and must not overlook the statements and especially the practical actions of these figures.

The issue of defense sufficiency is two-sided. We must not allow any of the sides to have military superiority. In order to eliminate the temptation of a regional, continental, or global military attack, each country must only have sufficient armed forces and weapons to guarantee its defense and security and ensure its independence. The Armed Forces must be maintained at such a level and in such a degree of combat readiness that under any conditions they could defend the country from an external attack and deal a crucial blow to any aggressor.

[Boshnakov] Our readers ask many questions related to the announced reduction of the armed forces and weapons of the BPA—are those reductions sufficient, how will the released funds be used, how will the social problems of the discharged officers and noncommissioned officers be solved, and are there enterprises belonging to the military industry that will be directed toward producing goods needed by the national economy and the market?

[Dzhurov] The State Council and Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, proceeding from the general tendency toward detente in the international situation, decided on 27 January 1979 to decrease the country's 1989 military budget and unilaterally reduce the Armed Forces and weapons up to 1990.

What really stands behind the figures that have been published?

First. This 12 percent of the military budget includes expenditures for food, clothing, and other consumer needs of the personnel who will be discharged in 1989, as well as the decreased quantity of weapons, ammunition, and property that our country's industry had previously planned to supply in 1989. The means saved will obviously be directed toward satisfying needs which the government considers purposeful. As to how the means will specifically be used—you must ask the competent governmental organs.

Second. As far as the Armed Forces are concerned, it has been envisaged that 10,000 troops will really be discharged, which is equivalent to the personnel of an under-strength motorized infantry division, a tank brigade, two separate motorized infantry regiments, one military school, one air force fighter regiment, and a naval unit.

We have also planned to reduce the leading personnel of the Ministry of National Defense and the separate armed services.

Third. Some of the weapons that have been reduced will be refitted as tractors for the needs of the BPA and the national economy; some will be used in fire-brigades; others will be used as museum exhibits; yet others will serve the needs of the defense support organization, and so forth.

Fourth. The organizational structure of the troops is to be brought into line with the requirements of the defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member countries. The plans, programs, and normative base of the troops and the military higher educational establishments will be improved.

Fifth. We are successfully implementing the program on the social security of the officers and noncommissioned officers, by paying special attention to those who will be discharged. In this context, I would like to point out that we plan to discharge from the Armed Forces only officers, noncommissioned officers, and petty officers who are socially secure, with pensions, apartments, and so forth. We have envisaged appropriate efforts on the part of the Ministry of National Defense, together with the party and state organs, to settle the discharged personnel throughout the country in accordance with the principles of justice.

Sixth. The issue of conversion is complicated and affects all states engaged in reducing armed forces and weapons in Europe.

As is known, the party is following a course of restructuring our entire national economy. The percentage and pace involved, as well as the issue of conversion, are a matter which comes under the competence of the Ministry of Planning and Economy, where, I think, you can receive more specific information.

[Boshnakov] A new standard and atmosphere are being created in Bulgaria regarding information, in which, as one understands from the party decisions, the press, television, and radio will play an important role. Certain statistical data are about to be removed from the zone of secrecy. For example, RABOTNICHESKO DELO readers are interested in whether the military budget will continue to be a state secret, and whether it will be discussed in the National Assembly. Will other information also be reported on the BPA and aspects of army life that are of interest to the public at large—such as violations of the statutes and laws, negative phenomena in the relations between military servicemen, and other things?

[Dzhurov] Yes. A new standard and atmosphere are indeed being created in our country regarding information, and this is understandable. This new atmosphere and standard are being created not only in Bulgaria, but also in the world as a whole, under the favorable influence of the foreign policy course of new political thinking that is being followed by the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states, which is aimed at strengthening confidence and security and preventing war. Thanks to this policy and the increasing influence of the new political thinking, it has become possible to remove from the zone of secrecy extremely important data on the strengths of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO and on their quantities of armaments. Irrespective of the differences in approaches in assessing this data, we regard this as an extremely positive prerequisite and condition for further strengthening confidence and for the success of the talks on reducing armed forces in Europe that have started in Vienna. Given that these talks develop favorably, one might naturally expect other statistical data to be released from secrecy, including the publication of the military budgets of Bulgaria and other countries that have not yet declared them. Regarding the announcement of other data on the BPA and other aspects of army life, in accordance with the policy of glasnost adopted by the party, this is being done now, and in the future we will continue to publish data within the framework of the principles we have established for building up the Armed Forces. However, I would like to stress this heavily: Everything in its own time.

However, all this does not mean abolishing military secrets and secrecy as a whole. There are a number of topics that will be subject to strict military and state secrecy, and all violators of these secrets will be prosecuted as provided for by the law.

[Boshnakov] A discussion is going on in the Soviet press on whether the Army should be built up on the principle of compulsory military service, or whether one should change over to the voluntary principle. In your view, is such a transition appropriate at present, both in general and with specific reference to our country?

[Dzhurov] Questions of building up the Armed Forces in Bulgaria are very complex, and one should approach such matters with great care, analyzing in depth and taking into account the specific conditions and trends in our country, in our region, on our continent, and on a global scale. I am thinking of the fact that many factors of an internal nature, of an interalliance character, and of an interbloc nature concerning East-West relations, the development and dynamics of the scientific and technical revolution, and other matters, influence the principles relating to building up the Army.

In this context, I would like to stress that the comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the complex of factors I mentioned above, as well as the comparison of the different methods for completing military service, show that, at the present stage of relations between East and West, of the development of human interrelations, and of the role and place of the new technologies in creating new weapons for armed struggle, no conditions exist for a changeover to voluntary principles for building up the Army.

[Boshnakov] Our editorial office is receiving letters in which, apart from questions on whether universal compulsory military service will be maintained, and for how long, readers also ask whether the period of military service will be reduced, whether secondary schoolchildren will be relieved of military field training, how students will complete their service, why are several intakes being retained after the expiry of the set period of service, and so on. We would like your answers and comments.

[Dzhurov] With regard to the length of service, we should start from my answer to the preceding question.

One of the basic principles for building up the Army, which stems from the defensive doctrine, is the orientation toward quality parameters, one of the elements of which is raising the technical level of the weapons for armed struggle. Bearing in mind the exceptional dynamism of this process, caused by the rapid development of new technologies, I consider that there is no place for reducing the length of service at this stage. Some of the grounds for my view are:

—first, the rapidly increasing complexity of armaments and equipment, the creation of the so-called "intelligent" weapons, and the overall computerization [informatizatsiya] of warfare mean that the soldiers require much more effort and time to master them;

—second, in order to achieve success in combat, the soldiers must acquire both appropriate skills and thorough practice in operating these weapons for armed struggle so that their actions become automatic, and this also requires time;

—third, the creation of a modern fighting soldier, one who is capable of fulfilling his duties in the harsh, demanding conditions of a war, is a very complex, difficult, and lengthy process, which also needs time. We should also bear in mind certain other circumstances.

The question of young people's initial military training is covered by Decree No 1923/1984 of the State Council of Bulgaria. This decree aims to promote youth education in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism and to prepare them to carry out their military and civic duty of defending the socialist homeland. Secondary schoolchildren study material presented in the regular classes on initial military training, and during their military field training acquire skills and practical experience in protection against mass destruction weapons, medical and public health protection, first aid, and so on. I believe that this training is necessary for secondary schoolchildren and should be continued in the future.

On 26 February this year, Decision No 30 of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] was issued. This decree states that students accepted for higher education will complete their military service after they have completed their higher education. The Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Culture, Science, and Education are instructed to submit suitable proposals to the Council of Ministers for the completion of military service by young men who have completed their higher education.

The question of the retention of intakes due for release is a matter within the competence of the government. According to Article 43 of the Law on Universal Military Service, "an intake due for release may, at the decision of the government, be retained in active military service after completing the set period of service." On the basis of this decree, in recent years the intake due to be released has been retained to carry out economic tasks of national importance.

[Boshnakov] Comrade Dzhurov, one understands from your words that one cannot manage without an army, and that it is necessary to devote systematic and consistent care to strengthening both the Army and defense. In what directions will this care be shown in the future? How will the country's defense capability be maintained at the highest level? Is there a future for the professional soldier in this respect?

[Dzhurov] At this stage of society's development, the Army is needed to defend our people's peaceful labor and their socialist achievements. Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the BPA is also fulfilling certain international obligations as a member of this pact. We will continue in the future to devote the necessary care to maintaining at a high level the combat and mobilization capabilities of the BPA, its training, educational-material base, and social security, in order to ensure that it remains in a position to carry out, if necessary, the tasks it has been assigned by the party and the government.

Naturally, support in preparing the troops for defense will be provided in the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects, and the formations and units will continue to receive further ample quantities of defensive weapons, including antitank and air defense weapons, engineering equipment, and other equipment that increase the steadfastness of our defense.

In regard to the country's defensive capability, the issues are principally connected with building up the system of state and military management, raising the level of the training of the population, improving training in operations on the territory of the country, and advancing the entire national economy. This is why servicemen's professional training will be continuously improved, and the strictness of the requirements in this direction will acquire new dimensions. In this context, the profession of the soldier will acquire even greater importance and public recognition. Its importance is valued highly, because the need to defend the homeland stems from defending the achievements the People's Republic of Bulgaria has made over these past 45 years, and especially from the requirements of implementing the BCP's July Concept.

[Boshnakov] Under the conditions of restructuring, the training of the military cadres, who possess new qualities and skills, is certainly of particular importance. What conditions are being created to realize and stimulate people's capabilities, and what is the style of work in this direction?

[Dzhurov] It is indeed true that the new political thinking in international relations, the defensive military doctrine of the socialist countries, and the need to quickly restructure society, including the Army, have increased the demands made upon the military cadres to a new, higher level. Alongside the traditional requirements for military and communist confidence, patriotism, internationalism, discipline, socialist morality, and love for the military profession, increasing importance is being attached under the new conditions to in-depth theoretical, basic, and specialist military training, as well as language, legal, and computer training. It is now especially necessary for the military cadres to quickly adjust to the dynamically changing situation, to be able to quickly make the most appropriate decisions, to display a greater sense of responsibility, and to approach the implementation of these decisions with more demanding criteria and strictness. All these qualities are produced by the high standard of professional military training.

Our work is presently being directed toward these ends.

In accordance with our party's decisions on restructuring in the intellectual sphere, we have also further improved the system of military education. The main institutes for training the military cadres—the Military Academy and the higher military schools—are developing into integrated training and scientific centers, with a modern educational-material base and excellent conditions for the training and development of students, course members, and teaching and command staff, and for ensuring the fulfillment of their creative abilities. Many candidates and doctors of sciences, docents, and professors work in these institutes. The modern computer equipment and microcomputers, electronic simulators, and scientific research laboratories provide a good basis for participation in military science work, in inventing and rationalizing activities, and in the various forms of the Movement for Youth Technical and Scientific Creativity. The good creative links established with the civilian higher educational establishments and scientific institutes also contribute to this.

The method for motivating servicemen does not differ from the system of incentives outside the BPA. Numbers of officers and those in the noncommissioned ranks have received orders and government awards. In addition, the statutes of the armed services also provide opportunities for encouraging servicemen to perform their tasks to meet an excellent standard. Outstanding course members are awarded special grants. Every year, the Military Academy and the higher military schools hold competitions for the best development projects, textbooks, and teaching aids in military science. The most outstanding commanders and lecturers are given the opportunity to take up higher posts, work in scientific institutes, and gain scientific degrees and titles.

[Boshnakov] What will you say in conclusion to our readers, to all the citizens of socialist Bulgaria, as a man who has devoted his entire conscious life to the military profession?

[Dzhurov] I would like the RABOTNICHESKO DELO readers, the citizens of our socialist native land, and especially young people, to study and learn about the history of our people and state, to love their people and their native land, and to be ready to sacrifice themselves for its defense, as was done by our forefathers: the revolutionaries of the national liberation movement, who struggled heroically against the oppressors; the soldier volunteers of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, who shed their blood to the last drop in defending Shipka; the heroes of September 1923, who recorded golden pages in Bulgaria's history; the partisan men and women who fought with unparalleled dedication in the ranks of the People's Revolutionary Army of Restoration and made their worthy contribution to the antifascist struggle; and the soldiers and commanders who took part in the Patriotic War of 1944-45, who, side by side with the Soviet Army, routed Hitler's armies, advanced as far as the Alps, and crowned their battle standards with undying glory. I would like them to engage actively in restructuring, multiply our people's socialist achievements, and put all their efforts and youthful daring into achieving the continuous advance and glory of our native land, the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

## Dinner Speeches of Mladenov, Johanes Reported

*AU2903193589 Sofia BTA in English*
*1745 GMT 29 Mar 89*

[Text] Sofia, March 29 (BTA)—Analysing the cooperation between Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, we note with satisfaction our unshakable friendship and highly appreciate the unanimity and the understanding between the leaderships of the two parties and the two countries, said Mr Petur Mladenov, minister of foreign affairs of Bulgaria, delivering his toast speech at a dinner given in honour of his Czechoslovak counterpart.

Defining restructuring, innovation, democratization and openness as processes turning into a trend dominating the development of socialism, Mr Petur Mladenov pointed out that the diversity of forms and methods used in the struggle for a qualitatively new socialism which reflect the specificity and the peculiarities of each country enrich all socialist countries.

He said that the responsibility and the importance of the tasks the countries have undertaken to carry on, require new approaches for increasing the role of bilateral cooperation, especially in the field of the economy.

Mr Petur Mladenov underlined the sameness of the two countries' positions on international problems. The goals we and our allies have set ourselves are perfectly clear: finding solutions to current problems by political means on the basis of balance of interests, in the centre of which stand values common to all mankind. As a proof of this he adduced the initiatives of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community aimed at further development and strengthening of the all-European process.

The leader of the Bulgarian diplomacy spoke in favour of Czechoslovakia's proposal for setting up a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations through contacts between the Warsaw Treaty member states and NATO. As a host to the forthcoming international meeting on ecology, Bulgaria highly appreciates Czechoslovakia's proposal for calling a meeting of the leaders of the governments of the neighbouring countries of Czechoslovakia to discuss problems of environment, Mr Petur Mladenov said.

Mr Jaromir Johanes also dwelled on the successful process under way in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, of deep restructuring and democratization in all spheres of life. Our common aim is the strengthening of socialism, the full utilizing of its humane potential, he said, stressing that the revolutionary changes in the two countries endow the relations between them with ever greater dynamics.

The enrichment and the dynamic development of the Czechoslovak-Bulgarian traditional relations surpass the significance of the bilateral ties, strengthen the socialist community as a whole. Today's talks contributed to development of the cooperation between our two countries in this direction, pointed out Mr Jaromir Johanes.

Expressing the satisfaction over the complete identity of the assessments of the two countries about the present development of the international relations, he said: We understand that we are in the very beginning on the road toward a world without violence, toward a nuclear-weapon-free world. The consolidation of the positive development requires even more active efforts. Only in this way it will become irreversible and continuous.

Further on Mr Jaromir Johanes spoke of the exceptionally big historical responsibility of the socialist states and stressed the need of constant growing of the efficiency of their interaction. There must be accelerated restructuring of the mechanism of the socialist economic integration in the CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] and an improvement of the mechanism of cooperation in the framework of the Warsaw Treaty.

Mr Jaromir Johanes stressed that the ideas and the proposals contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at the UN show the way for the settlement of the most important problems of the present world, they are a new confirmation of the invariable role of the USSR in the search of a common answer to the challenges of time. We assess highly this principle and we want to take part in its realization through initiatives and proposals of our own, said the minister of foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia.

He spoke of the importance for Europe of the Vienna final document.

Mr Jaromir Johanes pointed out that the forthcoming forum in Sofia on ecological problems, the policy of Bulgaria in the Balkans oriented toward turning of this part of Europe into a zone of peaceful cooperation, as well as her active participation in the development of the Helsinki process, speak of the immediate participation of Bulgaria in the chief trends in the development of the present-day world.

## Former Editor on Life at Radio Free Europe

*AU1104145189*

[Editorial Report] Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian in its 7, 8, and 9 April editions on page 4 carries an interview in three installments, totalling approximately 8,000 words, with Pavel Glavusanov, former "controlling editor" of Radio Free Europe (RFE), who recently returned to Bulgaria from Munich. The interview is with a group of RABOTNICHESKO DELO reporters, headed by Ivan Angelov as moderator, entitled: "Onesidedness, Manipulation, and Vacuity of Mind"; date and place not given.

The three interviews deal with the situation at RFE—where Glavusanov and his wife Marusya Stoleva worked for several years after their defection from Bulgaria 7 years ago—with the qualifications of their Bulgarian colleagues, the approach of the U.S. management toward employees, and with the Glavusanov couple's reasons for their decision to return to Bulgaria.

In the first, 2,500-word installment, published on 7 April on page 4, Pavel Glavusanov is asked about specific RFE contacts with the illegal "human rights society" recently established in Bulgaria, to which Glavusanov replies that he is not very well informed about the activities of this organization, but has met a certain Petur Boyadzhiev, a Bulgarian political refugee living in Marseilles who is actively involved in establishing contacts between this society and RFE.

Answering questions on his personal controversies with RFE management, Glavusanov points out that his conflicts with his superiors, both Bulgarian and American, were based on "purely professional" arguments, and not on ideological disagreements. Glavusanov chiefly complains about the professional incompetence and ignorance of his colleagues and superiors. Urged to provide more details on his reasons for leaving Bulgaria 7 years ago, which he attributed to his controversies with a "certain highly placed person," Glavusanov refuses to give the name of this man, because that might offend some of his "best friends, who are close relatives of this person" and reassures his interviewers that "even if some people may be disappointed, I must add that this person belongs to the middle ranks of bureaucracy."

One of the questions on which Glavusanov dwells in detail is related to the "manipulation" of international news, such as the incident with the Korean civilian aircraft shot down by Soviet antiaircraft defense. He adds that numerous interesting materials available in the West which confirmed the espionage goals of the aircraft were deliberately suppressed by RFE management in reporting on the incident.

Dealing with the financial resources of RFE, Glavusanov mentions that management has to struggle for its support and existence, since Senator Fullbright and several other U.S. senators and congressmen consider this institution "a remnant of the cold war" which they would like to close down. For this reason, RFE management, according to Glavusanov, is conducting so-called "polls" with the assistance of a "Vienna-based private firm," interviewing tourists and businessmen coming from Bulgaria—whose answers are subsequently forged—in order to pretend that over 60 percent of the Bulgarian population is regularly listening to RFE. Glavusanov further provides details on RFE's annual budget, estimated at about $200 million.

The second 2,500-word installment, published on 8 April on page 4, deals with the bureaucratization and redundance of the RFE apparatus, the squandering of financial resources for unnecessary facilities, and the lack of opportunities for an "editor" in his position to develop his own original ideas and style of work, since everything he writes is dictated by management. Asked whether this interference by management is related to "political views," Glavusanov replies: "Interference related to political views is not required, since everyone knows what he should and should not do. In addition to this, commentaries represent only a minimal portion of the total production. The overwhelming majority of published materials is compiled from Western commentaries, Western press agencies, Western journalists, American experts within RFE, or its correspondents. Sources from Communist countries are not utilized in this context." Glavusanov adds that telephone calls from Bulgarian listeners are dealt with according to the "established line of policy, which is directed against the existing sociopolitical system in Bulgaria," and everything is subject to this policy. "For the same reasons, if a man in Sofia carries a poster in the street, even with quite harmless intentions, several hours of expensive broadcasting time are devoted to such an event.

Asked about the "freedom of journalists" working for RFE, Glavusanov replies that "he is as free as journalists are all over the world," specifically that he has to follow the line of his employers, unless he is his own publisher. He adds: "If a given journalist does not agree with the line pursued by RFE, he is free to leave the radio station. However, this freedom is quite limited in a different manner due to the salary and other 'benefits' provided by RFE, which represent an exceptionally powerful incentive."

Answering a question about his former activities as a journalist in Bulgaria, Glavusanov answers that his materials, though well written, were somewhat "one-sided" because of the lack of "glasnost" in Bulgaria at that time. He adds: "When Bulgarian journalism began to liberate itself, I was ashamed of the things I used to write in the past." Referring to his activities as an RFE journalist, Glavusanov says: "At the beginning of my work for RFE I felt a certain satisfaction. However, it lasted only until I learned the ropes, until I noticed that ideas and ideals are unknown words in that place and that the attitude toward Bulgaria is chiefly characterized by indifference and hostility." He further elaborates on the total political and emotional passivity of the Bulgarian RFE employees, which extends to the tragic events in Bulgaria, such as the Strazhitsa earthquake, which was extensively reported. "No one ever thought of organizing an assistance committee or collecting money," he points out.

The third and last 2,500-word installment, published on 9 April on page 4, deals with the presentation method of RFE Bulgarian language programs and the personalities of the commentators. Glavusanov expresses admiration for the "professional qualities" of Vladimir Kostov [former BTA correspondent in Paris who defected several years ago] and Rumyana Uzunova [known for her recent telephone interviews with some Bulgarian writers on the illegal human rights society in Bulgaria]. Glavusasnov adds in this connection: "Rumyana Uzunova is a gifted journalist, as I have already said. However, in the case of her interviews, even a less talented reporter would have adequately coped. First of all, many people called RFE at their own initiative. In addition to this, the Bulgarian section knew who belonged to one group or another. It was sufficient to call them and establish which one of them would be ready to speak on the radio, and who would refuse to do so. The fact that many of the interviewees knew Rumyana Uzunova from the past also played an important role." Glavusanov points out: "Please do not misunderstand me, I am far from doubting that some of the interviewees spoke with perfectly sincere intentions. I even deeply respect several of them. I just think that their statements were misused for the goals of the general line: to the benefit of RFE policy."

Glavusanov further elaborates on the strict control of the U.S. supervisors over the Bulgarian personnel and their hardly disguised contempt for the "refugees," as well as on the personnel conflicts, gossip, and intrigues of the Bulgarian employees among themselves.

Dealing with the information sources of the RFE Bulgarian section, Glavusanov describes at length the "system of files and index cards" on journalists and other public figures in Bulgaria, and the vanity of certain defectors now working at RFE who claim to have been "distinguished personalities in Bulgaria," such as Nikolay Kalchev, the present chief of the news section, who made up his own index card, listing his "publications," which consisted of only a few lines each. Glavusanov stresses: "In other words, no files exist in the proper sense of this word, and work in this sector is disorganized, while sources are scarce."

Speaking about his emotional links with Bulgaria, Glavusanov points out that he never forgot his country, his relatives and friends in Bulgaria, adding that "I even idealized those feelings framed in the back of my mind, and we all know where every form of cult may lead to."

He then expresses his gratitude for the "hospitality" he enjoyed in the FRG, and his admiration for this country, which "is a model of organization in every respect, as well as of persevering, purposeful, and successful achievements. It is a country from which we may and should learn a great deal."

Asked, whether he participated in "a certain anti-Bulgarian campaign out of conviction, or out of obligation," Glavusanov answers that he never participated in any anti-Bulgarian campaigns, because he was dealing with factual news. "It is true that in connection with the news, I indirectly promoted the RFE line. I did this until the last minute; this is what I was paid for, and I think it is obvious that one either has to do what he is paid for or leave. I did the former until the moment in which I found the strength to do the latter."

To the question of whether he "possesses enough ethical and factual arguments to engage in a direct discussion with private individuals or informal associations," Glavusanov answers that he is ready to do so, with any "organization, group, or movement, from Bulgaria or from anywhere else."

Asked about his future professional plans, Glavusanov answers that he might work as a translator, or engage in "economic activities." In closing the interview, Glavusanov mentions the Bulgarian public's reaction to his previous statements following his return, by pointing out: "Numerous people here seem to be very impressed by our former earnings. The majority of people are puzzled at our decision in view of our incomes. Such a manner of thinking precisely reflects the American attitude that everything can be bought with money!" Glavusanov explains that despite the "outrageously poor level" of the Bulgarian RFE employees, their salaries by far exceed their qualifications, because "their employers want to be absolutely sure of their obedience and total loyalty."

All three installments are followed by the same editorial note, pointing out that "presumably, the majority of our readers will not share or agree with certain personal remarks expressed by the interviewee. The RABOTNICHESKO DELO editorial board also has its own opinion on some of the questions of principle touched upon in the interview. Nevertheless, for the sake of authenticity, we are printing the answers in their original form."

## Turkish Student Requests Political Asylum

*AU1104140789 Sofia BTA in English*
*1234 GMT 11 Apr 89*

["Turkish Student: The Truth About Turkey"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, April 11 (BTA)—I would like the whole world to know the things I tell you, says the Turkish student Murat Donmez, who has sought political asylum in Bulgaria.

At his meeting with Bulgarian journalists, about which informs today's OTECHESTVEN FRONT, Murat Donmez spoke of his deep disappointment from the injustice and violence in Turkey, from the antihumaneness of the Turkish regime.

I don't belong to any political party because all progressive parties in Turkey are banned. I am an ordinary man who sees, listens, lives his fate and is indignant together with the entire people, says he.

According to Donmez the level of education in Turkey is not good, there are no conditions for research activity, for creative studies of sciences, the access to libraries is difficult. The access to the libraries and to the books which can be used is determined by the Council for Higher Education and by the state. One of the great damages brought about this council, established after the coup in 1980, is the throwing out of the universities of 1,402 of the best lecturers. On the other hand the students are not permitted to be members of organizations they like, they are not permitted to establish their organizations, to express freely their views.... All these is considered an offense, says Murat Donmez. He himself has been arrested once and detained six times. The Turkish student speaks about some of his colleagues who have been submitted to torture by the police because they have spoken about the inequality in Turkey.

In connection with the data issued in a report of the "International Amnesty" organization about the violation of the democratic principles in Turkey, Murat Donmez points out that what has been published is only the pale shadow of the truth, as the data have been obtained from official sources, from some facts which have sneaked in the press, from complaints of separate people. I know people who have suffered from the terror only because they have spoken about democracy and equality, only because they shared some other views different from the ideas endorsed by the authorities. I know that the arrested are more than 750,000, says he.

The Turkish student is convinced that the consistent campaign against Bulgaria carried out during the recent years by Turkey is one of the moves with which the Turkish Government tries to avert the attention of its own people from the heavy socioeconomic situation in the country. The Turkish people are nationalists in principle and may be some of the governing circles think that if they feed up the people's heads with nationalist ideas, for some repressions against the Muslims in Bulgaria, they will forget the starvation and unemployment, explains Murat Donmez.

He says that he has met Muslims, who have emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey, and that most of them regret that they have done so. Everyone of them can compare the freedom of personality in Bulgaria and in Turkey, points out Murat Donmez.

## Leaders' Public Appearances 31 Mar-7 Apr

*AU0804165889*

[Editorial Report] Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian in its newcasts, the Sofia press, and Sofia BTA in English during the 31 March-7 April monitoring period report the following public appearances of Bulgarian leaders:

Georgi Atanasov, with Andrey Lukanov and Grigor Stoichkov taking part, held talks in Sofia on 3 April with Mikhail Kovalev, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, (BTA 1730 GMT 3 Apr 89) and later that same day gave a dinner in Sofia for Mikhail Kovalev, which Lukanov and Stoichkov also attended. (Sofia Domestic 1930 GMT 4 Apr 89) Todor Zhivkov, with Georgi Atanasov in attendance, received Belorussian Premier Mikhail Kovalev in Sofia on 5 April. (BTA 1232 GMT 5 Apr 89)

Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and chairman of the State Council, along with the Politburo of the BCP Central Committee, had a meeting in Sofia on 31 March with the Permanent Board of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. (BTA 1748 GMT 31 Mar 89) In Sofia on 4 April, Zhivkov received Bulgarian Patriarch Maksim. (BTA 1702 GMT 4 Apr 89) In Sofia on 5 April, Zhivkov received the newly appointed ambassadors of India, Girish Dhume, (BTA 1637 GMT 5 Apr 89) and Ecuador, Marcelo Fernandez de Cordoba Ponce, (BTA 1640 GMT 5 Apr 89) as well as Jean-Marie Rausch, minister of foreign trade of France. (BTA 1217 GMT 5 Apr 89) In Sofia on 6 April, Zhivkov received the following: Li Fenglin, the newly appointed PRC ambassador to Bulgaria (BTA 1625 GMT 6 Apr 89); William Somerville Milne, the new Australian ambassador (BTA 1712 GMT 6 Apr 89); and Skold Gustav Mellbin, the new Danish ambassador. (BTA 1909 GMT 6 Apr 89)

In Sofia on 31 March, Georgi Atanasov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Council of Ministers, received Yi Chong-yul, minister of public health of the DPRK. (Sofia Domestic 1730 GMT 31 Mar 89) On 5 April Atanasov toured industrial plants in Sofia and Stara Zagora with Belorussian Premier Mikhail Kovalev. (Sofia Domestic 1730 GMT 5 Apr 89) In Sofia on 7 April, Atanasov held final talks with Belorussian Council of Ministers Chairman Mikhail Kovalev. (BTA 1335 GMT 7 Apr 89)

In Sofia on 31 March, Milko Balev, Politburo member and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, received a group of Syrian journalists led by Turki Saqr, editor in chief of the AL-BA'TH daily. (BTA 1918 GMT 31 Mar 89) In Sofia on 1 April, he met with a delegation from the Belgian Socialist Party (French-speaking wing) led by its secretary, Roger Gailliez. (BTA 1534 GMT 1 Apr 89)

Grisha Filipov, Politburo member and secretary of the BCP CC, departed from Sofia on 2 April for Mexico with a parliamentary delegation. (Sofia Domestic 1730 GMT 2 Apr 89) A number of meetings held by Filipov and his delegation meetings in Mexico City were reported on 6 April. (BTA 1156 GMT 6 Apr 89)

Andrey Lukanov, candidate member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and minister of foreign economic relations, welcomed Belorussian Council of Ministers Chairman Mikhail Kovalev on his arrival at Sofia airport on 3 April. (BTA 1230 GMT 3 Apr 89) In Sofia on 4 April, Lukanov cochaired the 16th session of the Bulgarian-Mozambican cooperation commission, (BTA 1336 GMT 4 Apr 89) and later attended the signing of an agreement on forming the joint Bulgarian-French company "Interstroy." (BTA 1342 GMT 4 Apr 89) In Sofia on 5 April, Lukanov signed cooperation agreements with Jean-Marie Rausch, minister of foreign trade of France. (BTA 1339 GMT 5 Apr 89)

In Sofia on 31 March, Grigor Stoichkov, candidate member of the BCP CC Politburo and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, received Justino Fernandes, minister of industry of Angola. (BTA 1659 GMT 31 Mar 89) In Sofia on 3 April, he cochaired a plenary session of the Bulgarian-Mozambican cooperation commission. (Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 4 Apr 89 p 2) In Sofia on 4 April, Stoichkov received Frederik Altes, minister of justice of the Netherlands. (BTA 1753 GMT 4 Apr 89)

In Sofia on 31 March, Dimitur Stanishev, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, received Manuel Cepeda, member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia. (BTA 1921 GMT 31 Mar 89)

### Husak Greets SFRY's Dizdarevic on Arrival

*LD1204100989 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0905 GMT 12 Apr 89*

[Text] Prague, 12 Apr (TANJUG)—SFRY Presidency President Raif Dizdarevic arrived today in Prague on an official and friendly visit to Czechoslovakia at the invitation of the President of Czechoslovakia Gustav Husak.

Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar, Federal Executive Council Member Dzevad Mujezinovic and other officials arrived together with Raif Dizdarevic.

During the 2-day visit the two presidents will discuss the development of traditionally friendly Yugoslav-Czechoslovak relations and international issues. Dizdarevic will also meet Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee.

SFRY Presidency President Raif Dizdarevic was warmly greeted at Prague Airport, with the highest state honors, by President Gustav Husak. It is expected that the two presidents will begin official talks this afternoon.

### Jakes on Official Visit to Syria

*LD1004203289 Prague CTK in English 1918 GMT 10 Apr 89*

[Text] Damascus April 10 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary and National Front Chairman Milos Jakes today started a three-day official state visit to Syria at the invitation of Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party General Secretary and President Hafiz al-Asad.

Among members of his entourage are Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Lenart, party members—Deputy Premier Jaromir Obzina and head of a Party Central Committee Department Michal Sefanak, Deputy Foreign Minister Jaromir Nehera, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Jiri Nemec and Minister of the Czech Government Karel Lobl.

The Czechoslovak delegation was welcomed at the airport by Hafiz al-Asad and other officials.

Shortly after the arrival, Milos Jakes and Hafiz al-Asad met for the first round of talks. They will evaluate prospects for further all-round development of traditionally good Czechoslovak-Syrian relations, and exchange views on the situation in the Middle East and on other international issues.

Hafiz al-Asad gave a dinner here today in honour of Milos Jakes and his entourage. Also present were leading representatives of the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party and Syria.

On his way from Kampuchea to Syria, Milos Jakes made a stop-over in Calcutta and met with State Minister for Foreign Affairs Natwar Singh. He conveyed greetings from Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Milos Jakes and said that Rajiv Gandhi expects that the highest Czechoslovak party representative will visit India in a suitable time.

Czechoslovak-Syrian contacts have been developing since 1947, when diplomatic relations were established, and have belonged to priorities in the Czechoslovak foreign policy for a long time.

The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries in October 1985 started a qualitatively new period in mutual relations. In 1979, Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary and President Gustav Husak paid a visit to Syria and Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party Secretary-General and President Hafiz al-Asad was on an official visit to Czechoslovakia in 1985. These meetings as well as talks between the two countries' premiers and other officials help promote bilateral relations.

Syria holds one of the leading positions in Czechoslovak economic relations with developing and Arab countries. The 1988 goods exchange turnover amounted to 86 million dollars. Czechoslovakia exports to Syria especially complete plants, technological equipment, lorries, machine tools, textile machinery, tyres, artificial jewellery, glass and consumer goods. Syria exports include mainly cotton and oil, and Czechoslovakia is interested in higher exports of other raw materials.

Czechoslovakia has taken an active part in the industrialization of the Syrian Arab Republic. It helped build sugar factories, thermal power stations, radio transmitters, mills, boot-and-shoe factories, an old refinery in Homs and other projects.

Bilateral cooperation is also maintained in science, culture, education and health services.

### Communique Issued on Talks

*LD1104204389 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1930 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Talks ended in the presidential palace in Damascus this afternoon between Milos Jakes, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Central Committee and chairman of the Central Commitee of the National Front, and Hafiz al-Asad, general secretary of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and Syrian president. Taking part in the talks were members of the entourage of Comrade Milos Jakes and Syrian party and state representatives.

During the talks the two representatives, in the atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, briefed each other on the situation in their countries and the main tasks of the two parties. They assessed the prospects of Czechoslovak-Syrian relations and expressed satisfaction with the standard of contacts between the CPCZ and the Ba'th Party. When talking about cooperation in the economic, scientific-technical, and cultural spheres, Milos Jakes and Hafiz al-Asad expressed the need for their expansion on the principles of mutual advantages. In the economic sphere it is then necessary to use new forms of cooperation in harmony with the possibilities of the two countries.

In exchanging views on the international situation, the two sides noted with satisfaction its positive development recently and stressed the determination to support and aid this process. At the same time, however, they expressed apprehension with regard to the situation in the Middle East whose negative consequences are evident both in the region and in the world. They confirmed that a suitable framework for establishing a just and complex peace in the Middle East is an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of all the interested parties, including the PLO and permanent members of the Security Council. With the conclusion of the talks between Milos Jakes and Hafiz al-Asad, a joint communique was adopted.

### Interior Minister Describes Security Situation

*LD1104200589 Prague CTK in English*
*1547 GMT 11 apr 89*

[Text] Prague April 11 (CTK)—"The security situation on Czechoslovak territory is relatively stabilized," Czechoslovak Interior Minister Frantisek Kincl told a news conference here today.

He pointed out, however, that it is impossible to ignore the fact that there are certain forces in Czechoslovakia which are hostile to socialism and seek to organize activity directed against the socialist system. These forces, the minister said, have already abandoned their original face of human rights defenders and democratic restorers of socialism. Their present methods, he said, include intimidation, psychical pressure and terror. This certainly is connected with the increased number of anonymous telephone and written threats, the minister said.

In the period from January 10 to March 31 this year alone, a total of 334 telephone calls threatening with bomb attacks and break-downs have been registered, among them also 13 threats to concrete persons. A total of 43 authors of these calls have been found to date, Frantisek Kincl said.

At present, the minister continued, illegal groups led by "Charter 77" aim at impeding the positive development in international relations after the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They present themselves as the so-called control groups monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the Vienna final document and organize actions aimed at discrediting Czechoslovakia for alleged violations of this document, the Czechoslovak interior minister said.

Recalling that Czechoslovakia's concrete contribution to the extension of good-neighbourly relations with the countries of Western Europe was its decision to grant entry visas directly on three border crossings, Frantisek Kincl pointed out that some 20,000 foreigners mostly from West Germany used this possibility between January 1 and March 31, 1989.

The minister then spoke about criminal activity in Czechoslovakia stating that the number of criminal acts committed last year was lower by about 5,000 compared with 1987. Almost 80 percent of the total of 264,731 criminal acts and minor offences in 1988 have been clarified. Economic criminal acts continue to prevail alarming is the growth of the criminal activity of youth accounting for about 17 percent of the criminal acts.

Also registered was a further slight decrease in violent crimes which totalled 19,812 last year, 95 percent of them having been clarified. The number of murders dropped from 216 in 1987 to 176 last year, more than 93 percent have been clarified. This year there have been 48 murders or attempted murders registered, the offenders having been found in all but four cases, Frantisek Kincl said.

On the hijacking of a Hungarian airliner of the Malev Air Company at Prague airport last March 29, the interior minister said that necessary conclusions have been drawn after the incident concerning protection of airports. The investigation has not yet been concluded, Kincl said stressing that the case will be sufficiently clarified and adding that the most effective protection against air piracy is coordinated and internationally organized prevention including immediate return of hijackers to the country on whose territory the terrorist act was committed.

### Dubcek Queried on USSR, Socialism

*PM1004110889 Milan L'UNITA in Italian*
*31 Mar 89 p 10*

[Interview with former Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Alexander Dubcek by Luciano Antonetti by telephone from Rome on 30 March]

[Text] Rome—When I telephoned yesterday and said who I was, his wife, Anna, handed me over to him right away. Alexander Dubcek seemed to be expecting my call. After exchanging greetings I got down to business immediately: Did you read or hear about Hungarian leader Karoly Grosz' statements following his meeting with Gorbachev? When he answered "no" I translated for him the essential passages reported by L'UNITA: There must be no repetition of the "tragic experiences" of 1956 and of 1968 in Czechoslovakia; "all possible guarantees must be introduced to prevent any external force from interfering in the socialist countries' internal affairs." I commented: It marks the death of the "Brezhnev doctrine"....

[Dubcek] Yes, last year I frequently had occasion to say that this is a good thing, but cannot be enough. I wrote as much in the message sent to the Bologna conference last July on the 20th anniversary of the "Prague spring"; I said so again in Bologna on receiving my honorary degree; and I repeated it in my message to your 18th congress. Allow me to read you this passage: "We know that the process of Czechoslovak rebirth of 1968 constituted an impetus also to the left and the democratic movement in the West. Not only did Czechoslovakia suffer as a result of the stifling of that process, but the intervention also caused incalculable moral and organizational losses for the entire European left, and for almost 20 years the reform movement in the USSR and the socialist community stood still...."

[Antonetti] I said: There seems to be something more now. There is a commitment to create guarantees against future interferences. There is Gorbachev's appreciation of Hungarian political developments, "including the formation of a multiparty system"....

[Dubcek] Good for them. But there is not only the problem of the future. The fact is that it was not merely a tragic error that was committed in August 1968. Why is there still this refusal to examine the past? Who, if not those responsible for the 1968 intervention, halted the reform movement for 2 decades? Some people complain that the communist movement no longer exists, that all left-wing forces are in a difficult situation, and that the very name and idea of socialism have been discredited. Very well, but who is to blame for all this? And what do people intend to do to remedy it, to restore socialism's original impetus and humanism? There is a commitment not to "intervene" in the future. However, this also applies to the present leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] who, having come to power thanks to the armed intervention of 1968 (in which the Hungarians also took part), can pursue with impunity their policy of repressing any attempt at change in society. Indeed, they permit themselves to accuse L'UNITA and the Italian Communist Party of interfering in the CPCZ's internal affairs. This, merely because you are working for the correction of the distortions, for the elimination of the negative effects of the intervention of over 20 years ago, and for the release of the European democratic and left-wing movement from the burden impeding the renewal and rebirth of socialism.

[Antonetti] Of course I can only agree. I would say that in this regard the results of last Sunday's Soviet elections can be considered a positive sign.

[Dubcek] As far as I am concerned, they confirm a definitely positive trend. The process begun by restructuring is a long, complex, and difficult one: No immediate results and fruit can be expected. It is clear, in any case, that when the people are allowed to speak, they use the opportunity correctly. What has happened represents a consolidation of the restructuring policy. We, too, in 1968—with a view to the party congress—convened a democratic election that led to changes of several provincial and regional leaders. Let us remember that what happened was described by the future interventionists as "confusion, chaos," and an attack by the "antisocialist and anti-Soviet forces." Some people accuse me and my colleagues of 1968 of trying to identify an exact parallel between our own process and restructuring, of trying to put them on the same level. I have never done so, and do not do so, but certainly they do share the same sources of inspiration and their points of contact are becoming more numerous.

[Antonetti] Yes. In the USSR, too, the thrust from the top imparted by Gorbachev is now accompanied by pressure from below, from the voters.

[Dubcek] Yes indeed. But there is something else that must be said. There may be negative phenomena, but they are the result not of restructuring but of the legacy of the Stalinist and Brezhnevian past. Be that as it may, like the froth on a glass of beer, they will subside as the right direction is pursued, and the liquid will again become clear.

[Antonetti] Unless I am mistaken, when you mentioned the Italian Communists' attempts to interfere you were referring to the latest lengthy attack from RUDE PRAVO the other day.

[Dubcek] Precisely. On the one hand they are resuming the offensive with slanders and shameless lies, distortions of the truth and falsified documents. On the other hand I am forbidden from responding, expressing my opinion. I have frequently written in the past to party newspapers and the Central Committee: Nothing of what I wrote has been published and I have received no reply. And they talk about dialogue....

[Antonetti] This really is a strange logic....

[Dubcek] It is what they call logic. And if I address L'UNITA or other media organs I am accused of "being a tool of the Western bourgeoisie."

[Antonetti] Was there no follow-up even to your condemnation of Vasil Bilak?

[Dubcek] No follow-up, despite my requests. Perhaps I will have to turn to the public prosecutor's office, I don't know, but citizens' equality before the law must be observed. And Bilak told a lie about an international document. To end with, let me tell you something: I am afraid that people here could lose not only their trust but their patience, too.

## Slovak Communist Party Session Concludes

*LD1104152389 Prague CTK in English 1352 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Bratislava April 11 (CTK)—A Slovak Communist Party Central Committee session, which ended here today, discussed a proposal on convening a Slovak party congress on April 6, 1990, and, in connection with its preparations, the fulfilment of the resolutions from the 7th, 9th and 10th Czechoslovak Party Central Committee sessions.

Participating in the session was Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium member and Secretary Karel Hoffmann.

A report of the Slovak Party Presidium on preparations of the Slovak Communist Party for the 18th Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium member and Slovak Party First Secretary Ignac Janak.

The Presidium report dealt with economic issues on which attention must be focused in preparing the congress. He called on communists both in central organs and in production to focus on the settlement of the following problems, e.g. higher ratio of products with high technological standards in total production, supplier-consumer relations, supplying of the home market, environmental protection.

The Slovak official pointed out that it is necessary to realize new forms of economic relations with other socialist countries.

The Presidium report also paid attention to the activities of the Slovak National Front in the period of restructuring, to the role of national committees and local authorities of people's power.

The Slovak official stressed the significance of the ideological front which should explain and help settle the problems. It is impossible to ignore the activation and changing tactics of various opposition groups and illegal religious structures which would like to profit from the shortcomings, make ill use of the process of restructuring and destabilize the society.

## Israel Praised, FRG Criticized on Extradition

*AU1104115989 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 8 Apr 89 p 1*

["(hb)"-signed report: "Who Will Try the Terrorists?"]

[Excerpts] Today it will be exactly a week since we returned to Prague from Banska Bystrica where we were looking for traces of the two young hijackers of the Hungarian aircraft. [passages omitted]

Throughout the whole week we also waited in the anticipation that we will be adding further lines to our material, that the appropriate FRG organs will meet the Czechoslovak request for the extradition of the young terrorists. It did not happen, the competent FRG organs up until now have not even clarified whether they intend to extradite the hijackers or whether they will be tried in the FRG.

I recall early December of last year. The Israeli Government did not need even 24 hours in order to make the decision to extradite to the Soviet Union the hijackers of its aircraft. At that time, the whole world valued this as a very necessary step towards strengthening international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. Meanwhile, the approach of the FRG organs is not born out by a similar effort.

## Economic Seminar With FRG's SPD Concludes

*LD0704194489 Prague CTK in English 1746 GMT 7 Apr 89*

[Text] Bonn April 7 (CTK correspondent)—"We have identical or close opinions on basic questions", member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat and secretary of the committee for party work in the Czech Socialist Republic Josef Mevald said in Selb near the Czechoslovak border today at the end of a seminar of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the West German Social Democratic Party [SPD].

Member of the SPD Presidium Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul described the seminar as an important event in the framework of the European policy.

In today's discussion participants in the seminar dealt also with the problems of the environment, economic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Bavaria and the questions of disarmament.

After the end of the seminar representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the West German Social Democratic Party met with journalists. Josef Mevald told them that the two sides agreed that the integration economic processes are a reality and that they must be considered in the framework of the political development.

The seminar dealt also with the extension of relations between Czechoslovakia and Bavaria, with economy, cultural exchange and establishment of direct contacts between neighbouring areas in the spirit of the Czechoslovak initiative.

## Adamec Receives Polish Central Planning Official

*LD1204013289 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1600 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Federal Premier Ladislav Adamac received in Prague Minister Franciszek Gaik, chief of Poland's central planning office. He briefed him on the economic reform process in our country and characterized foreign economic relations as significant. He said that Czechoslovakia and Poland have good opportunities in this area. The Polish guest briefed Ladislav Adamec on the current political and economic situation in Poland, saying that the country's economic policy is aimed at promoting entrepreneurial initiative.

### 'Undiminishing Tension' After Warsaw Roundtable

*AU1104123189 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 7 Apr 89 p 4*

[Ivo Bartik commentary in the "We Comment" column: "Roundtable Talks Reach (First Leg Toward) Destination"]

[Text] After 12 months of dramatic negotiations, the roundtable talks in Warsaw have ended with the adoption of common stands on such issues as political and trade union pluralism, the economy, and social policy. This marked the end of negotiations which were extremely important for Poland. They were primarily aimed at leading the constructive opposition out of its negativist stands, at involving it in the process of the country's renewal, and at granting it an adequate share of power, demanding in return that it, too, adopt its share of responsibility. It is obvious that, essentially, this effort was successful and the roundtable will probably be declared a success, particularly from the long-term viewpoint. The conclusions drawn during the negotiations—C. Kiszczak, minister of interior of the Polish People's Republic, called them a "symbolic social treaty"—can represent a fair stage in the transition to practical pluralism in the country, as was discussed at the 10th Central Committee session of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR].

The role played by the roundtable was primarily an ideological one—its participants had no authority to adopt practical measures. The Polish Sejm will now have to elaborate the conclusions drawn by the roundtable, after which the Constitution and other legal norms will have to be appropriately amended. An independent coordinating commission will observe and aid the implementation of the adopted principles.

The first speculations on who actually won at the roundtable have already appeared. The prevailing view is that the two main partners—the government and the opposition—were the winners, and that their common prize is cooperation in the solution of the country's economic situation, this most important issue of the present. Actually, most conflicts in the discussions concerned economic issues, for the need to normalize the economy clashed with the need to halt the deterioration of citizens' living standards.

The roundtable talks will naturally enter the history of Poland's further development by virtue of their two results: First, because they permitted the return of legal status to Solidarity, Farmers Solidarity, and the Independent Students Union (no practical details are known yet); in other words, to quote L. Walesa, because they did the "necessary minimum" to embark on the road of democratic transformations. And second, because the opposition agreed to the way the coming parliamentary elections should be conducted. According to the Polish press, the elections should be "free of all confrontation" and the deputies' mandates should be divided in advance between the PZPR, its allies, and the opposition, the obvious ratio being 6:4. Thus the representatives of the opposition would enter the Sejm without an explosion of election passions. Of course, the situation in the trade unions will be far more complicated: Although Solidarity expresses its willingness to cooperate with the legal National Trade Union Confederation [OPZZ], their cooperation will certainly always be that of two rivals. OPZZ Chairman A. Miodowicz has declared that the roundtable talks have ended with far greater conflicts than marked their beginning, when one had far greater hopes. His words could naturally be interpreted differently, as meaning that the ruthless realism of the roundtable talks had filtered out the hopes and separated them from illusions. Even now one can notice a certain reshaping of the country's domestic political scene. However, one can also note the undiminishing tension in the society—in fact, despite all appeals, even by L. Walesa, dozens of strikes and wage conflicts accompanied the roundtable talks....

### CSSR-U.S. Group Discusses Humanitarian Issues

*LD1104192589 Prague CTK in English 1545 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Prague April 11 (CTK)—Already the 6th round of talks between experts of the Czechoslovak-U.S. working group for humanitarian issues took place at the Foreign Ministry here today.

The two sides discussed particularly bilateral attitudes to the solving of humanitarian questions concerning the uniting of families, visas and consular practice.

In the spirit of the Vienna follow-up meeting statements, they discussed concrete cases concerning the observance of human rights in both countries.

It was stated that an active attitude to the solution of these issues creates further preconditions for the development of mutual relations.

### Brazil Minister Discusses Trade, Cooperation

*AU1004141989 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Apr 89 p 2*

[Text] Prague (CTK)—Roberto de Abreu Sodre, Brazilian minister of foreign affairs who is also in charge of his country's foreign trade policy, was received by Ladislav Vodrazka, CSSR first deputy minister of foreign trade, in Prague on Friday [7 April]. Issues pertaining to further deepening trade and economic cooperation were on the agenda of their working meeting.

### Statement Issued on Visit

*AU1104122589 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Apr 89 p 2*

[CTK report: "Fruitful Negotiations"]

[Text] Prague—Our negotiations in Czechoslovakia have been most successful and fruitful; they were focused on those aspects of our mutual relations which we would like to raise to a higher level in the future. This was said by Roberto de Abreu Sodre, minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Brazil, during his meeting on Saturday [8 April] with Czechoslovak and foreign journalists in Prague. The Brazilian minister called his talks with CSSR Premier Ladislav Adamec, oriented toward Czechoslovak-Brazilian relations and toward issues of international politics, most stimulating. On Saturday [8 April] morning Roberto de Abreu Sodre saw the sights of Prague. Later Carlos Eduardo de Affonesco Alves de Suoza, ambassador of the Federal Republic of Brazil to the CSSR, gave a luncheon in his honor in Prague. The Czechoslovak side was represented at the luncheon by Jaromir Johanes, minister of foreign affairs, and by other figures. On the same day the Brazilian representative met Jan Sterba, CSSR minister of foreign trade, who gave a dinner in his honor at Zbraslav Castle. Yesterday [9 April] Roberto de Abreu Sodre concluded his official visit to Czechoslovakia. A joint statement was issued on his visit.

### Scientific, Technical Meeting Held With SRV

*AU1104123489 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Apr 89 p 7*

[CTK report]

[Text] On Friday [7 April], in Hanoi, the 23rd session of the subcommission for scientific and technical cooperation between the CSSR and the SRV was convened. At the head of the CSSR delegation is Karel Lobl, chairman of the Czechoslovak section of the subcommission and minister of the Czech Socialist Republic. The session is oriented on the results which were achieved during the recent discussions between Milos Jakes, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee, and Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee. Henceforth, Czechoslovak-Vietnamese scientific and technical cooperation will concentrate, first and foremost, on the spheres in which there are prerequisites for the development of direct links and the establishment of joint enterprises.

### Government Views Plans for Importing Gas

*AU1004135089 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 7 Apr 89 p 2*

["(pp)"-signed report: "Step Toward Increasing Air Purity; News Conference About CSSR Government Deliberations"]

[Excerpts] Prague (by our reporter)— The sets of measures for developing conversion to gas and improving living environments in Prague and the North Bohemian region were the main items on Thursday's [6 April] agenda of the federal government session. [passage omitted]

The measures currently adopted in Prague guarantee the following reduction of emissions in the air strata at ground-level in the year 2010: emissions of fly-ash should be reduced 9.2 percent, emissions of sulfur dioxide 4 percent, and emissions of nitrogen monoxide 45 percent, compared with 1985. The path toward these goals primarily lies via heat deliveries from the Melnik power plant to Prague, and via an expanded use of natural gas. Apart from all other facilities, the Michle, Malesice, and Veleslavin heat plants should also be converted to this gas. [passage omitted]

In addition to the considerable investments which will be involved, the two sets of adopted measures will also require a striking increase in imports of natural gas. Antonin Krumnikl, federal minister of fuels and power, stated at his news conference that, although gas deliveries from the Soviet Union would increase, it would still be necessary to increase imports from other countries, too, in order to provide for all needs. Possibilities exist for importing 2-4 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Iran, and imports from Algeria are also being negotiated.

### 11 Citizens Flee to FRG Embassy in Prague

*LD1104191989 Hamburg DPA in German 1742 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to information from Second German Television [ZDF] 11 GDR citizens have fled into Bonn's embassy in Prague to try and get exit permits for the West. ZDF did not give any further details in its news program this evening. In reply to questions from the German press agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn could not confirm, deny, or comment on this news. A statement is not expected this evening.

### Border Guards Install Alarms, Increase Security

*LD1104194989 Hamburg DPA in German 1523 GMT 11 apr 89*

[Text] Kassel (DPA)—Apart from the border protection fence along the German internal border, GDR soldiers have installed four additional alarm wires. The Border Protection Central Sector Command within the Federal Border Protection Force announced in Kassel today that the fence now has a total of 30 alarm wires. The GDR's border surveillance has also been characterized recently by increased helicopter reconnaissance.

### FRG Completes Observation of Army Excercise

*LD1104133689 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1253 GMT 11 apr 89*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—In accordance with the rules laid down in the Stockholm document for the observation and control of military activities, four officers of the FRG Army inspected actions by the troops of the National People's Army within the framework of the exercise "Zyklus 89" in the areas of Gardelegenb, Wittenberge, Sternberge, Waren, Mirow, Stackelitz, and Seehausen from 9 to 11 April.

By agreeing to the inspection and facilitating the activity of the inspectors, the GDR strictly fulfilled its obligations entailed in the Stockholm document.

The inspection group had land vehicles and aircraft made available to it. During their stay on GDR territory the members of the FRG Army were accompanied by officers of the National People's Army.

As the inspecting state, the FRG is now obliged to send an inspectors' report to all states participating in the Stockholm conference.

### Municipal Ties Discussed With FRG Official

*AU1104132489 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10 Apr 89 p 2*

[Text] Saarbruecken (ADN)—With goodwill, reason, and realism on both sides, complicated questions can be solved. Heinz Eichler, secretary of the GDR State Council and member of the People's Chamber Presidium, and Reinhold Knopp, state secretary and chief of the Saarland State Chancellery, stated this at a meeting in Saarbruecken. The two partners in the talk agreed that a positive contribution to further developing GDR-FRG relations and cooperation can be made on a municipal level. During the meetings between Heinz Eichler and the president and members of the Saarbruecken City Association, at whose invitation the GDR guest came to the Saarland capital, the variety of the development of GDR-Saarland relations was pointed out with satisfaction. It as stated that Erich Honecker's official visit to the GDR in September 1987 provided new impetus to this.

### GDR, FRG City Officials Discuss Peace Work

*AU1104141989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10 Apr 89 p 2*

[Text] Bielefeld (ADN)—Representatives of the Lemgo and Stendal city assemblies emphasized the necessity of joint peace work at a panel discussion in the Northrhine-Westphalian city. Stendal Mayor Juergen Mielke stressed that in the GDR peace is a state doctrine laid down in the Constitution. He referred to the GDR's various disarmament measures. However, appropriate steps are still expected from the West.

Reinhard Wulfmeyer, spokesman of the Lemgo SPD Group, stated that peace work is necessary at all levels of social activities. Jochen Stobeck of the Greens Group stressed that it is possible and important to solve all existing conflicts without military means.

### Youth Delegation Visits PRC Youth League

*AU0704140689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 6 Apr 89 p 2*

[Text] Beijing (ADN)—Song Defu, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Youth League, received a delegation of the Central Council of the Free German Youth [FDJ] for friendly talks in Beijing on Wednesday [5 April]. Delegation head Jochen Willerding conveyed cordial greetings from the FDJ on the occasion of the forthcoming 70th anniversary of the Chinese youth movement.

The partners in the talk had a comprehensive exchange of opinions on the positive results of the recently concluded fourth meeting of the International Preparatory Committee for the 13th World Youth and Students Festival in Pyongyang, and agreed on the holding of a friendly meeting between the delegations of the two countries in Pyongyang.

## Central Committee Meets; Grosz Delivers Report

*LD1204082589 Budapest MTI in English*
*0727 GMT 12 Apr 89*

[Text] Budapest, April 12 (MTI)—The Central Committee [CC] of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party started a session on Wednesday morning in Budapest. Karoly Grosz, the party's general secretary, is presenting a report by the work team of CC members commissioned by the Central Committee to study its own work and that of the Political Committee.

## 'Panaroma' on Incidents at Romanian Border

*LD1104225289*

[Editorial Report] Budapest Television Service in Hungarian at 1900 GMT on 10 April, in the "Panorama" program, broadcasts a feature on Hungarian journalist Alajos Chrudinak, who was refused entry into Romania on 4 April because he had made programs hostile to Romania.

[Presenter] "The staff of 'Panorama' were stricken by a sobering slap on 4 April. It emerged that we are personae non gratae in a 23 million-strong neighboring country, which supposedly is allied to us and which supposedly is socialist. After the incident, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry protested with praiseworthy promptness. This was reported in detail by all of the Hungarian press and, in its wake, many foreign papers as well. But since the Hungarian television 'Newsreel,' who knows why, accorded the matter only a few words, I consider a somewhat more detailed report to be necessary, since, according to an old saying, the devil is in the details. Neither is it insignificant that beyond our borders, in Romania, it is primarily television from which people can be informed about the reaction of the Hungarian Government."

The presenter outlines the Hungarian Foreign Ministry's protest and says he spoke with Chrudinak after he returned home. He asks how the incident at Bors happened.

[Chrudinak] "We set off for Soviet Moldavia in order to report on events there, since nationality stirrings are under way. At Artand we crossed the border, and the procedures began with the Romanian border guard. They took out our baggage onto the concrete tables, and then they took away our passports. We waited and waited for quite a long time. An hour passed. Then the Hungarian border guard officers, the Hungarian customs officers, quite a large group gathered there. We were standing in front, and behind us was a line of cars a good few hundred meters long.

"Then suddenly, after an hour had elapsed, the commander of the Bors Romanian border crossing, who, as it later emerged, was Maj Gavril Ardelanu, appeared in the company of some officers. He came over, stopped, and started to speak in Romanian, and he said that at Bucharest's instructions, or orders—I can't remember exactly—he was telling me that 'You, Alajos Chrudinak, are an undesirable person, persona non grata, in Romania.' I asked him why, perhaps he would tell me. 'You know this better.' Well, I know many things, but I do not know why I have received such a message from Bucharest, he should tell me. To this he said that 'you make programs that are anti-Romanian and criticize Ceausescu's policy, and that is why you cannot enter Romania.' To this, I told him that I took cognizance of this, but that he should please allow my colleagues, who were setting off for Moldavia, Soviet Moldovia, as transit-travelers, to further continue their work. To this, he stated that they as well were undesirable persons; indeed, he added that not one member of Hungarian television's foreign political editorial staff could enter Romania, and they all were undesirable persons.

[Presenter] "This is very complimentary for all of us, but have you brought a film report of this entire scene?

[Chrukinak] "We did not bring any, although it was our intention, because every piece of baggage, even the cigarettes the smokers had, was put onto a concrete table, bench, and they were lying there while the customs examination took place. When the border guard major related all this, I told him he should tell Bucharest that my colleagues would, in spite of everything, get to Moldavia, and they would make the film. Then I looked at my watch, it was 2200, and I told him that, by the way, I, as well, in an hour's time would be in Romania and Transylvania. He was a bit surprised at what I said; I then told him that in an hour's time, Hungarian television would repeat 'Panorama,' so that if he had a set and time, he could see me in Transylvania."

The presenter then notes that in January of this year, Romania accepted the Vienna final document that states journalists cannot be expelled as a consequence of the legal exercise of their professional activity; adding that in a week a European information forum will be held in London to discuss an improvement of journalists' working conditions, which will be attended by a representative from Romania.

[Presenter] "After the Bors incident, it emerged, again, by the way, that life sometimes produces dramatic situations, to which only a Shakespeare fantasy is comparable. In the editorial office of 'Panorama' we met the one-time officers school instructor of the border guard commander who announced the expulsion, Maj Gavril Ardelanu. Vasile Lucar, military prosecutor, not long ago escaped across to Hungary, precisely over the broder which is controlled by his one-time student, Maj Ardelanu. Pal Bodor speaks with him.

[Bodor] "In your opinion, what would have happened if they had managed to get into Romania?

[Lucar] "The militia and secret police would not have [word indistinct] from brutalities.

[Bodor] "What do you base this on?

[Lucar] "The case of the mistreatment of the (?British) diplomats. The sole country which, in a time of peace, has not respected the inviolability of diplomats is Romania."

Lucar continues by saying that in his view, the Hungarian television staff were fortunate in not getting into Romania, since they would have risked their freedom and lives if they had managed to enter the country.

[Presenter] "Mr Mirce Bejan, head of the Free Romania emigre committee in Budapest, also has an opinion.

[Bejan] "A few days ago, we received from the Budapest office of the REUTER news agency a letter written in English, which bore the title 'Why Are the Romanian Refugees Leaving Hungary?'" All of the Romanian refugees are meant by this. My name and another name figure below the letter. This letter is a falsification. In our opinion, its style indicates the Romanian secret service."

Bejan takes the final sentence as an example: according to this, the refugees are accessories to maneuvers by Hungary against Romania, which, Bejan says, is not true. Contrary to the letter's allegation that the Romanian refugees have escaped for economic, and not political, reasons, Bejan says that he and the others left Romania because they were chased out by the Ceausescu dictatorship. Bejan goes on to deny that the signature at the bottom of the letter is his own; nor is he acquainted with the alleged cosignatory of the letter.

Bejan's opinion is then asked regarding the Romanian refusal to allow Alajos Chrudinak and his associates to enter the country.

[Bejan] "Yes, I know that all four of them were declared personae non gratae. But who did this? This was done, in fact, by the undesirable person named Nicolae Ceausescu, who has been qualified by the Western democracies as a persona non grata. So, in the final analysis, who is the undesirable person?

[Presenter] "Vasile Lucar, former military prosecutor, wrote a book about international legal knowledge related to border defense, and numerous poems by him have been published in Transylvanian periodicals. His sense of justice placed him in opposition to his commanders, and then in 1984, he sent a letter of protest to the chief commander himself, President Ceausescu. He demanded that the president's son, Nicu Ceausescu, who according to the prosecutor's evidence had in the vicinity of Brasov run down and killed two children, be taken before the law. Is it a wonder that the protesting prosecutor was immediately discharged? He left the Romanian Communist Party. He spent 156 days in the prison of the securitate; he was beaten."

Pal Bodor begins the conversation by asking him about his days as a college teacher. Lucar recounts that he was a college teacher until June 1983; then he was appointed military prosecutor and transferred to the Romanian-Hungarian border. He was mainly responsible for cases of border crossings attempted or carried out to or from Romania. Lucar describes the nature of teaching at the college, where he had taught before his transferral to the border, as chauvinistic and nationalist. As military prosecutor, Lucar's jurisdiction extended to part of Krasso-Szoereny county, to all of Arad, Timis, Bihor, Satu Mare, Maramures, and part of Suceava, Bistrita-Nasaud.

Lucar talks about some experiences which created an internal conflict for him. In Kis Szanto the soldiers tortured someone, then let him go and shot him dead from behind. They tried to cover up the incident with a decree issued in 1970, which regulates the use of weapons against border violators. According to Lucar, there was no logic in the victim trying to escape across the border in Kis Szanto, since his own home was in another village near the border, where his movements were unrestricted and he would have been able to flee by merely pretending to go to work on his fields and then running. Lucar goes on to describe how a soldier who was rowdy and stole things was protected by General (?Diaconu) from being taken before the law. The general was paid 40,000 lei by the soldier's parents to do this.

Lucar recalls the letter of protest he sent to Ceausescu in 1984, his subsequent firing, and later periods he spent in prison at the hands of the securitate.

[Bodor] "There is much debate over whether the Romanian border guards shoot at people fleeing over the border after they have crossed the border. What is your opinion on this?]

[Lucar] "I remember four cases that I together with General (?Caremla) and some other colleagues investigated on the Yugoslav border. In four cases, Yugoslavia used diplomatic channels to raise the prospect of letting world public opinion know that the atmosphere had deteriorated on the border and that the Romanian border guards violated Yugoslav sovereign territory and airspace. There were cases when armed Romanian border guards went in several hundreds of meters. It happened that they went in even more than a kilometer into Yugoslav territory." Lucar goes onto give further details.

[Bodor] "Mr Lucar, beyond the concrete examples already mentioned, do you know of cases where dead bodies, corpses, have been found in the border zone?"

[Lucar] "North of Macsa village, south of Szentmarton, in September I was scouting the area; I was doing some reconnaissance in preparation for our escape."

[Bodor] "Last year?"

[Lucar] "In 1988. Only children were taken to the fields to harvest jute. According to the militia, the secret police, and the border guards, men are dangerous; they could escape across the border, while children could not. I was some 400 meters away from the place; when the piles of jute sheaves were taken apart, so they could be placed onto the cart behind the tractor, corpses emerged, six dead bodies." Lucar continues by saying that the matter was kept secret and the world never learned about it.

[Lucar] "The border guards ought to understand that they belong to the people. We have lived through real tragedies. In (Ermihalyfalva), a mother, with a baby in her arms, a father, and the Roman Catholic priest of (Ermihalyfalva) were shot to death and then they were torn to shreds by Alsatian dogs. This is a tragedy which perhaps has not yet been equaled in history on any of the world's borders. Any kind of killing is possible now on the Romanian-Hungarian border.

[Bodor] "When did this happen?"

[Lucar] "In May of 1988. The funeral was overseen by more than 200 secret police in civilian clothes. They were afraid that the burial of the four deceased would have even more tragic consequences, that the people would rebel. Thus, secret police stood at every corner, ready to intervene at any time, if necessary with arms." Bodor concludes by thanking Lucar for the interview.

### Romania's 'Isolation' in Europe Examined

*AU1104172489 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG*
*in Hungarian 6 Apr 89 p 2*

["s.a."-signed article: "Isolated"]

[Text] Bucharest has recalled its ambassador from London who, prior to his departure, handed the Foreign Office a note of protest in connection with a "British-Hungarian conspiracy against Romania."

Bucharest is in an increasingly difficult situation in the international political arena. Following the open letter of the six former Romanian leaders—which shows that there is no difference outside and inside the country concerning the people's opinion about the policy of the Romanian leadership, a policy that has alienated the people and has developed the family clan cult to almost an unparalleled level—the nations of Europe are now voicing their condemnatory opinions one after the other. At this year's meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, a convincing majority of participants voted for a decision condemning the forced assimilation of national minorities, the violation of basic human rights, and the deliberate impoverishment and humiliation of a nation in Romania.

Europe is protesting this policy, which shocks civilization and which also violates Romania's international obligations, by using all the diplomatic means at its disposal. Some countries express their opinion by issuing condemnatory declarations, while others recall their ambassadors or close their diplomatic missions. Some people also have not recoiled even from advocating a complete break in economic and trade contacts with Romania.

We are witnessing a rare phenomenon of isolation in the modern history of international relations. In the atmosphere of a deepening dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in many respects, it is an extremely serious decision when a country is forced to close its foreign diplomatic representation or to recall its high-ranking diplomats in the wake of the repeated, self-destructive acts of a policy in Bucharest which fails to consider the total reality and which violates the elementary rules of logic. Where can all this lead?

What a tragic change this is since General de Gaulle praised Romania's development in Bucharest! True, that was long ago, in 1968.

### Draft Amendment to Constitution Drawn Up

*LD1104214489 Budapest MTI in English*
*1933 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Budapest, April 11 (MTI)—The legal, administration and justice committee of the National Assembly worked out a draft to amend the Constitution at its Tuesday session in Budapest. The review of certain provisions of fundamental law was initiated by a proposal to introduce the motion of confidence and no confidence and a vote of confidence.

The amendment draft is to endow the legislative body with wide authority in issues of confidence connected with the government or a particular member. The draft imposes no restrictions on MPs either in the scope of the no confidence motion or the government officials involved. At the same time, the motion is considered a collective right, requiring the support of a certain number of MPs.

Should a vote of confidence go against a government, it would stay in office until the election of a new Council of Ministers but with a confined scope of action, losing, for example, the right to make international contracts. No agreement has yet been reached on how long a Council of Ministers that has lost confidence can retain its post, but the legal committee holds that it should be the shortest possible time.

In addition to the constitution amendment, the body also discussed the outline of the modification of the house rules of the National Assembly. A new feature will be the introduction of a new office, that of a legal expert who would be responsible for the practice of regulations and the smooth running of sessions under the supervision of the speaker.

### Szuros Interviewed on Reforms, Soviet Ties

*PM1204085689 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 18 Mar 89 p 16*

[Interview with President of the Hungarian National Assembly Matyas Szuros by Andrea Tarquini in Budapest; date not given]

[Text] Budapest—"A neutral Hungary? It is a possible prospect, not for tomorrow but in the medium term—a goal to be achieved not against the Soviets but with them, repaying their respect for our options with respect for the superpower USSR's legitimate security interests, and within a Europe moving toward disarmament and the breaking up of blocs. Within the Warsaw Pact, within which we now remain, the coexistence of several political models is nevertheless possible. Future scenarios? Multiparty and capitalist Finland has for decades had an understanding with Moscow that works very well. We are even more encouraged by the example of Austria—a country divided into occupation zones after the end of the war and and whose status as a sovereign state was restored by the 1955 Belvedere treaty, whose major signatories were the United States and the USSR." This was said by Matyas Szuros, the Hungarian government's "Mr Neutrality."

Tall, elegant, and a youthful 50, Szuros is a key man in the transition. A former ambassador to Moscow and later party foreign policy chief, he is now president of a National Assembly that will in a few years' time be the expression of free elections. In his inaugural speech he hailed "the death of the Brezhnev doctrine" and promised that "relations with Moscow will never again be those of master and servant." Here is the interview that he granted us a few days before communist party leader Grosz's Kremlin visit.

[Tarquini] Dr Szuros, are you really sure that the Brezhnev doctrine is dead?

[Szuros] The Brezhnev doctrine is totally dead thanks to Gorbachev. Together with him, we want to eliminate the painful consequences of the Brezhnev doctrine from the common European home. It is in the interests of all—including you Westerners.

[Tarquini] What are these painful consequences?

[Szuros] Look, Stalin died physically in 1953, but the consequences of the huge tragedies imposed by Stalinism still weigh on life today. The same can be said of the Brezhnev doctrine. Our job will be to refound and thoroughly reappraise relations between Warsaw Pact and CEMA member countries on the basis of complete equality, sovereignty, and mutual benefit. This part of the world is moving toward vast changes, just as you in Western Europe are approaching the 1992 turning point.

[Tarquini] What kind of changes are you hoping for?

[Szuros] Equal rights for all to pursue a foreign policy fully in line with national interests, complete sovereignty in domestic decisions, and the right to an omnidirectional foreign policy based on diversified interests. Last, but not least, we want foreign trade to be governed not by ideology or politics but by business rules. Our trade with the Soviets will soon be reckoned in convertible forints.

[Tarquini] Do you believe the Kremlin is willing to accept such demands?

[Szuros] We believe that Gorbachev sees the benefit to the Soviet Union of relations with stable allies. The question is not how far we can trust the USSR but how much trust we can gain from a USSR that has changed, that has remained a superpower while abandoning the discredited Brezhnev doctrine, whereby the interventions in Prague and Kabul were regarded as victories.

[Tarquini] Last Thursday's demonstrators, however, shouted: "Soviet troops out." Nevertheless a Soviet withdrawal from Hungary and Czechoslovakia seems a long way off, though such troops prevent past wounds from healing....

[Szuros] Precisely: The Brezhnev doctrine and Stalinist models still play a part on the international scene. But in our country on 15 March those huge, peaceful crowds were able to celebrate the national day and shout their support for a policy to build a future independent, democratic, and socialist Hungary. Passions must be vented, but they must be prevented at all costs from influencing diplomacy.

[Tarquini] So where does that leave the hopes of neutrality?

[Szuros] I stress that it will be a negotiated process to be conducted slowly and cautiously. I agree with Helmut Schmidt when he recommends that our countries be prudent. The most difficult thing will be to harmonize the timetable of negotiations with the pace of domestic political processes. Our foreign policy must always take account of the fact that the Soviet Union has a genuine desire for disarmament in Europe, but also that in a Europe without military blocs the Soviet Union will remain a superpower and retain its right to want neighboring countries that are not anti-Soviet. We must proceed to a new order in constant accord with the Soviets, coordinating the pace of diplomatic action with the growing aspirations of the Hungarian people and other peoples.

[Tarquini] However, the demonstrations and increasing freedom are creating an atmosphere of impatient euphoria. Is this not dangerous?

[Szuros] It will not be, as long as we bear in mind the historical lessons of the many—too many—tragedies suffered by Hungary, of the struggles for independence crushed by the military superiority of foreign powers. At the same time independence will be strengthened by economic recovery.

[Tarquini] But economic recovery will require painful sacrifices. Will this not cause disorders in an atmosphere of freedom?

[Szuros] The old political system has certainly not shown itself capable of averting economic crisis or explosions of dissatisfaction. The decline in real living standards is hitting all socialist countries. The economic crisis merely confirms that traditional socialism, the dictatorship of the party, has been left behind by the course of history.

[Tarquini] What if Gorbachev were to be overthrown?

[Szuros] We do not believe in such a hypothesis. The process begun in the USSR seems to us irreversible, and that country has vast resources that can facilitate the reforms. We consider equally irreversible their new approach to foreign policy, marked by respect for geopolitical realities—even in the case of us small countries of central and Eastern Europe—and no longer by ideological priorities. I repeat: Austria and Finland also demonstrate the Soviet willingness to maintain alliances and understandings with multiparty systems such as that emerging in our country.

[Tarquini] So do the Hungarian reforms mark the collapse of another section of the iron curtain, whose disintegration was denied by Shevardnadze at the Vienna conference?

[Szuros] No iron curtain separates Hungary from the rest of the world. Our borders are now open, and all our citizens are entitled to passports.

[Tarquini] Your citizens, yes—but certainly not the Czechoslovaks or East Germans....

[Szuros] We hope to facilitate reforms everywhere through our own example and believe that reforms will take place throughout the socialist camp. The Hungarian path is a contagious example. With the 15 March processions we showed the world the face of a stable, dynamic, European, and tolerant country wanting no enemies on its borders.

[Tarquini] Is Ceausescu's Romania not an enemy?

[Szuros] The Romanian people are no enemy. The Bucharest government's policy is anti-Hungarian but this choice of theirs is leading them solely into international isolation.

[Tarquini] Are you satisfied with the Western stance?

[Szuros] The Americans support our reforms, as do the Soviets: The two superpowers are of valuable help to us. Bonn has for some time had a consistent ostpolitik, and London is pursuing one with increasing conviction. I cannot say the same of other West European countries. I am not sure that by 1992 the EEC will have formulated a consistent ostpolitik, whatever form it may take. I wonder whether our friends in Western Europe realize that Hungary's reform concerns the whole of Europe, that the security of the entire continent depends on our security, and that a coordinated Western commitment to economic, political, and cultural cooperation with our countries will be perhaps an expensive and risky investment but in the long-term a profitable one for your own security.

## Lukacs Addresses Central Committee Session

*AU0504154289 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Mar 89 pp 4-5*

[Unattributed report on speech by Janos Lukacs, member of the MSZMP Politburo and Central Committee secretary, at the session of the MSZMP Central Committee held on 29 March: "The Will of the Membership Is the Source of Party Policy—Janos Lukacs Submits Report on the Debate on the Reform of the Political System"]

[Text] After reviewing the 400 summaries resulting from the debate on the reform of our political institutions, and after making use of the proposals, we submit this draft bill to the Central Committee for debate and for formulating a position, Janos Lukacs said in his introduction. The party debates in recent months have provided many political and organizational lessons. The real need for these debates was clearly justified, and they also expressed our efforts to create genuine opportunities for every party member to participate in formulating party policy. No doubt, this has been a positive change. However, we cannot keep silent about certain negative lessons either, lessons that lead to consequences. The first such lesson is the fact that because our party is a large organization, except in especially urgent cases, it needs slightly more time to honestly review the issues and to formulate rational positions. The second lesson is that we should have more respect for the principle of voluntary party activity, including participation in debates. This means that we should give a free hand to the party organization in the way it chooses the forms of debate. Both the Central Committee and the local party committees should refrain from stipulating compulsory forms. The third lesson refers to our internal information and knowledge, and to the level of our general and political education. The debates show that in the current situation we need considerable improvement in all these areas to be able to successfully participate in the political and intellectual efforts to promote the reform of our society.

### People Expected Our Initiatives

As early as 6 months ago, many people manifested their lack of understanding when we declared that the party's intellectual sphere should come to the forefront. Well, social debates and the exchange of views within the party show that this conclusion was correct. People who are interested in world affairs and who are increasing their knowledge are capable of conducting debates, arguing, and taking a position. Lack of information and erudition only leads to defiant and passionate reactions.

The draft position submitted for debate has caused great reactions within the party, within society as a whole, and in the international sector as well. The initial reactions displayed great surprise. This position has brought relief to many people within the party and has revived the spirit of competition among a smaller part of the party organizations. At the same time, other people had fears and concern for the fate of the party as well as their own. However, the decisive majority of party members noticed and approved the fact that the Central Committee had taken a stand consisting of initiatives on a fundamental political issue that basically affects our society.

These people expected us to continue to carry out our initiatives and also to cover other areas of political life. They especially demanded an urgent formulation of the party's action program. In the meantime, the Central Committee fulfilled this demand. People demanded, and demand today, initiatives aimed at accelerating the economic reform, and subsequently, at creating a harmony between the political and economic reform, as well as at changing the party's organizational and operational order.

The party debate shows that the decisive majority of the party membership has recognized and accepted the fact that our society is advancing toward a multiparty system, and the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] has to find the opportunity to assert its socialist policy under such a political order, too. This is not a surprise if we remember that—also according to public opinion surveys—some of the party members did not reject, nor did they call for, a multiparty system even before the national party conference. A considerable minority firmly requested such a multiparty system. We also have party members who do not approve of a multiparty system and regard this as a defeat for the MSZMP; they feel uncertain about preserving socialist values and achievements and are afraid that events will take a strong anticommunist and antisocialist turn. However, most party members are interested today in knowing how the MSZMP will be able to hold its ground amid the differences resulting from the multiparty system, a market economy, and from intellectual processes.

### Missed Opportunities

A considerable number of people claim that the MSZMP missed a great opportunity in the past 10 years, namely, to create democracy within the one-party system by encouraging the organization of a civil society and by guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of public organizations. People are justified in pointing out that the political parties cannot be the sole guarantees of expressing the citizens' interests, views, and efforts in the future either. This is a spiritual residue of the debate which should be taken into consideration during our further measures within the framework of reforming our political system.

Great emphasis was placed in the debate on the relations between the political and economic reforms. It is a phenomenon worthy of our attention that reform, taken in a stricter sense of the word and dealt with as a value in itself, is beginning to lose ground in the debates, and, at the same time, a simple and generally understood concept—work—is gaining ground.

### Focus on Qualitative Work

It is not so much indifference toward economic and political reforms that lies behind this phenomenon, but that people increasingly consider the extent to which reforms contribute to man's peaceful and qualitative work and his honest living. An increasing number of people are discovering that the developed commodity-producing economy and market economy are not at all characterized by easy money, trickery, and fraud, but are the result of rational and diligent work performed with perfection. In the debates, this approach is voiced with particular strength among highly qualified skilled workers and modern intellectuals. They support the reforms and are calling for the elimination of irrational, bureaucratic, and arbitrary measures and regulations, and for the appointment of intelligent, educated, and honest enterprise, cooperative, institutional, state management, and political leaders who are prepared to come up with initiatives.

It shows the realistic sense of most of our party members that, with the passing of time, the debates increasingly focus on the following question: How should the MSZMP reorganize its entire internal order in a way suitable to the conditions and requirements of a multiparty system? Several positions have already emerged in connection with this, and many local party committees have already begun independent work on this. What is needed today is that, considering the experiences and tasks, the Central Committee should work out its ideas on essential issues and take initiatives in the coming months.

What lessons can be drawn from the organizational activity of the MSZMP so far? Generally speaking, the lesson to be drawn from this is that the MSZMP organizational order—its organization and its internal substance—is no longer suitable for the creation of a unity of action based on a democracy with the broadest possible membership. The party is too centralized and has become a mechanism of power interwoven with the state bodies, in which the strength of a lively movement cannot assert itself properly. Compared with the efforts expended, this organizational centralism and overregulation led to inefficient party activity that often produced sham activities. Mechanisms in charge of correcting subjective distortions did not emerge and did not function. The lack of supervision and the inability to supervise led to arbitrary measures and serious mistakes.

## Widening Independence

We need an organizational system that includes guarantees for its own renewal, has an organizational mechanism of self-correction, and which will abolish the present hierarchical operational methodology. Organizational efficiency requires above all the consistent presence of self-regulating cycles both in the party as a whole and in its relatively independent units. The election mechanisms, the decisionmaking procedure of leading bodies, and the activity of organizing and guiding the activity are major stages of these self-regulating cycles. The will and actions of the party members are the fundamental source of the party's political activity. In order to release the creative forces inherent in this activity, we should encourage any political initiative and readiness for action that serves the common cause. We can achieve this only if we increase the independence and autonomy of various types of party member organizations and use them to develop the regulation for the establishment, sphere of activity, and operational methods of leading bodies.

We should also deal with the question of the main functions that the MSZMP should fulfill in a multiparty system in order to promote a socialist-oriented development, and the tasks on which the MSZMP should focus its organizational strength. First: Taking into consideration the fundamental importance of legislation and of the local bodies of people's representation in the new conditions, we should make sure that the party does well at the elections for National Assembly deputies and local council members. Second: We should provide political support to make sure that the country and the local communities are governed successfully, in the spirit of democracy and to the benefit of the citizens. Third: We should contribute to the revival of the business and economic life, and promote the prosperity of the country, of local communities, and of individual citizens. Fourth: We should participate in the main intellectual processes and increase the intellectual basis and influence of the socialist movement. These are closely related and mutually pervasive tasks. However, the program is first among equals, namely the gathering of forces, winning the people over, and, subsequently, a successful stand at the elections.

What could be the principles on which one could base the renewal of the MSZMP organization and operation? The voluntary principle could be one of them. The MSZMP is a voluntary political alliance of party members who believe in common values and strive for common political goals. Subsequently, joining the party is a completely voluntary decision, including the possibility of leaving the party, the establishment of party member organizations, and joining existing organizations.

## Practical Norms

It would be expedient to treat the right to autonomy as a starting point of principled importance. This means that the party organizations are party member entities with full rights and considerable political independence. Their independence covers the development of their own internal administration; the election of their own leading bodies, leaders, and members who represent them in higher bodies; the creation of their working order and working methods; the acceptance of new members and dealing with all the issues connected with the relations between members; cooperation with other party organizations; as well as the use of their financial and technical means, including the opportunity for ventures.

Finally, the consistent and careful implementation of the principle of majority could also serve as a basis. The principle of majority reflects the requirement to guarantee the expression of the will of the majority of the party member organizations in all the leading forums of the party. For this, we should build mechanisms into the system of operation which create conditions for free political initiatives and for the individual or group positions to become the majority. Among other things, the institutional freedom of platforms and the introduction of the direct expression of opinions, the party elections, serve this goal.

We also propose to debate on the possible practical norms that every Hungarian party—including the MSZMP—should respect.

First: Political work is a voluntary activity, one carried out on the basis of the right of the citizen and not of the right of the employee. Therefore, the parties should fully respect their members' working hours. The parties should organize their events, meetings, and instructions for after regular working hours. Neither one's working schedule, nor the distribution of jobs or other reasons should be cause for exemption from this rule.

Second: The parties should not use enterprise and institutional funds for their organizational functions, except for cases and ways which will be allowed by the future law on parties. The MSZMP should also function in accordance with this.

Third: The political parties should finance their independent officials, apparatus, and their employees. Guaranteeing an adequate transition, the MSZMP should also shift to this system.

The factors outlined in the second and third points require the reorganization of MSZMP management and its budget system. Within the framework of this reorganization, the party should consider the proposal of its members according to which a determined percentage of the funds originating from membership fees should be left with the party organizations.

Fourth: The parties should not integrate themselves into the leadership of economic ventures and state-financed institutions. We propose to put an end to all those management forms that do not reflect this view. At the same time, we support the worldwide trend that focuses partly on turning employees into owners, and partly on encouraging cooperation between owners and their representatives and the employees, through varied collective forms of the decisionmaking process. In order to avoid the unjustified integration of political parties and the local leading bodies in work places, we propose that the Central Committee should call upon the Council of Ministers to eliminate all those legal regulations that guarantee opportunities for the political movements to influence personnel decisions. We consider it natural that, to the extent of their power, the parties will provide candidates for the representational bodies and their executive organs, as well as for the new constitutional functions. The MSZMP will also make use of this right, which is also an obligation toward its members. It will continue to nominate candidates for important public positions, and, through organized efforts, it will try to gain the support of the majority of people eligible to vote or eligible for nomination on a given issue.

Fifth: We propose that the Central Committee should take a stand in favor of the basic principle according to which no member of any public institution should be denied membership in a political party or opportunities of political activity in any party because of his profession and position. This is also part of the citizens' equal rights. As to the parties' equal rights, these are guaranteed, among other things, by the fact that, along with a strict observation of the aforementioned norms, the organization of political parties should be able to function freely in all public institutions, and no legal party should be denied this opportunity. This principle equally refers to economic ventures and public services, including public administration, justice administration, and the armed forces and bodies.

### Debate on Organization

At the same time, we firmly oppose internal party struggles disturbing the functioning of any work place and party requirements directing the decisions of the leaders and employees of any institution. Market factors should influence economic leaders in decisions making. In passing judgment, a judge should be guided exclusively by the law. Public officials should act according to the laws and regulations and prove their loyalty to the representational bodies and their elected officials which represent public opinion and which are guiding them. Members of the armed forces and bodies should be led in their activities by orders and by their pledge to observe the Constitution and to defend their country.

Taking into consideration past experiences and the main tasks ahead, a debate is currently underway on how to develop the organization and functional order of the MSZMP. We can start from the premise that local public life is the area of political struggle with the greatest risks in a multiparty system. It is a major task for our party to encourage, develop, and partly organize this public life. Therefore, the MSZMP organizational order should focus on the levels where, according to the election law, occasional elections have to be organized in the local or national representational bodies and in areas with directly elected local representational bodies.

### Focus on Local Party Organizations

The debates showed that the important thing for our party is not where to be present but how to be present in as many places as possible within a community of people, and how to formulate this variety into a rational organizational order. This recognition leads us to think that it would be expedient to operate one basic structure and several so-called supplementary structures within the MSZMP. Local party organizations should be placed in the center of this basic structure. The local party organizations would consist of party members living within the administrative boundaries of a given town or village and having voting rights in this area, according to the election law. Irrespective of the basic party organization in which they carry out their party activity, these people would have a right guaranteed by the organizational rules to participate in the party nomination of council members and parliamentary deputies to be elected in these communities. For this basic structure to function properly, it would be desirable to call upon the party members to register with their local party organizations so that these organizations could guarantee the conditions for exercising their rights.

Some of the aforementioned local party organizations are small basic party organizations today. Others—like organizations in larger cities, particularly in Budapest—are divided, complex and large party organizations. Therefore, the smaller local party organizations could merge into a common party organization on a voluntary basis, primarily within the natural regional areas of gravitation, and perhaps within election districts for the National Assembly. In larger towns and other larger party organizations, the local party organization would break up into smaller units—into party organizations named according to their characteristics.

Focusing on the local party organizations would modify the role played by the county bodies. They would play an independent political role in preparing county elections, in maintaining relations with representational bodies in the county on settlement-development issues that cover the entire county, and in maintaining contacts with the mass media and the intellectual life. At the same time, these county bodies would have the important task of guaranteeing political services that can be efficiently concentrated at the county level.

The tasks facing the party make it necessary to deal more emphatically with further existing and future operational frameworks within the existing organization, in addition to the basic structure. What could these frameworks be?

First: the platforms that will obviously emerge within the party. We propose that, keeping in mind the lessons of the party debate, the Central Committees should decide on the principled and practical issues of the role of these platforms at its coming session in May.

Second: the group of parliamentary deputies representing the party on a national level and the groups of county and local council members on the county and local level. I think there is no need for particular justification concerning their increased political importance.

Third: We could organize the functioning of structures within the party which would create conditions for a national and local influence on our business life under the conditions of the emerging market economy. We do not want to withdraw from shaping the country's economic policy. Other organizations also try to participate in this activity. However, it is our elementary duty to adjust to the circumstances which we have mostly created ourselves. For example, on a national level, we could talk about systematizing the relations between the Central Committee working committee in charge of economic and social issues and the party member deputies in Parliament, particularly figures playing a leading role in parliamentary committees. The implementation of a similar task at the level of local and county party committees also seems to be desirable. It seems to be a sensible thing to develop various structures that promote the opportunity for economic experts to develop an exchange of views and a common position, economic experts who work in the party leadership, the parliamentary committees, and alongside parliamentary deputies, ministries, bodies that represent economic interests. A different approach to understanding economic issues would also justify the establishment of groups of party members within the trade unions—both on national and local levels—and their integration in the party's organizational model.

### Intellectual Workshops

And finally: For understanding and influencing intellectual processes, it would be desirable to encourage—also from an organizational viewpoint—the cooperation of party members and their party organizations active in various intellectual workshops, research institutes, universities, and artistic institutions. Practice shows that, concerning the intelligentsia, there has always been a need for so-called horizontal cooperation and for the creation of such structures. It would be worthwhile to deal with the idea of how these things, as organic parts of the organization, could contribute to enriching the intellectual strength of the Central Committee and of the local party organizations, as well as their readiness for initiatives, both on the local and national level.

The equal handling of various organizational opportunities within the basic structure, and their deliberate integration will not be an easy task either. This could be solved primarily at the level of local party organizations, the Central Committee, and partially, at the level of county party committees. At the same time, this would require, among other things, the considerable modification of the character of the party bodies, the way they are established, and of the mechanisms of consultation, decision, and guidance. This would also demand the preparation of a comprehensive program of applying computer technology within the party, in order to radically simplify and modernize the entire system of administrative work and registration.

Circumstances make it necessary to accelerate this activity and to submit the prepared proposals to the Central Committee in the coming months: The concepts on the principles of party organization are expected to be submitted to the Central Committee by the end of April or beginning of May, and the issues of the freedom of platforms and in-party elections are expected to be discussed in May. This would make it possible to submit the new organizational concepts to the Central Committee session in June, following the clarification of basic issues, and thus, we would provide a general framework for the possible directions of change. The current political situation, the tasks facing the party, and a large portion of our membership equally demand this.

## * Zoltan Kiraly on Need for Multiparty System

*25000156d Budapest MARCZIUS TIZENOTODIKE in Hungarian 15 Mar 89 p 10*

[Article by Zoltan Kiraly: "Ornamental Loops on a Coat?"]

[Text] I belong to the generation whose members know political public life between the two world wars only from history books, for we were born after the great cataclysm. I belong to those whose budding adult awareness was not overshadowed by the cold war spirit of the 1950's and who were not worn out by the everyday existence of crippled intellectuality, fabricated showcases, kulak lists, personality cult, internment, humiliation, and death. And yet I also belong to those who did not have a chance to know or learn or experience the meaning of a democratic society, constitutional rights, political pluralism, or a multiparty parliament.

This observation by way of introduction is necessary because there are millions of us citizens who have been employed since our youth as intellectual laborers in the making of a monolithic society. I, myself, was already in my thirties, a student of journalism, when I first heard genuine, expert and objective speeches on the parties, election clashes, party programs, party squabbles, frauds, salami tactics, coalitions, and the stormy parliamentary sessions of the post-1945 years.

I was pretty much in the dark even with regard to the definition of "parliament" as I arrived there in 1985. But after the first wonder it became more and more obvious to me what "parliamentarism" meant in the one party system. (Let us keep the quotation marks, for parliament has always been a necessary evil or, at best, ornamental loops on a coat for the Communist Party, whether it was called the Hungarian Communist Party, the Hungarian Workers Party, or the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. And it was a necessity: It served to give the appearance of legality to an extremist or moderate but nevertheless dictatorial exercise of political power.)

At any rate, after leaving behind the first months of awe which I lived through as a representative, I realized in the current political situation that I, too, had been given the role of a mere kibitzer in parliament: As a particle of the "voting machine", I was supposed to vote with a raised hand for everything that had previously been decided somewhere else and by someone else. Because, as in the past several decades, this was no different now: A political decision is made from above, debated within a narrow circle, with the public excluded, and, in many cases, the interests of small groups to the rank of social interests), elevated. From there it follows a one way road, well equipped with signs of caution and prohibition, leading to a parliamentary sanctioning of the decision.

This could not happen in any other way because the government and its institutions have done nothing but explore the way in which political decisions could be implemented with as much humility as possible. And it can not happen in any other way because the employees of the government offices are almost exclusively committed members of the party, the only party. Officers of the party state, and the government function as an executive organ of the elected bodies of the party. (The latter is corroborated also by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the 1987 Grosz administration were members of the Central Committee, the prime minister and his two deputies were members of the Politburo, while the third deputy prime minister had been secretary of the Central Committee just a few months earlier.) However, I can also say that a government responsible to parliament existed only in name because the Politburo was the real government: It regulated the status, role, and composition of parliament. And the fact that more than two-thirds of the representatives were party members guaranteed the smooth functioning of this political mechanism. For the majority, its legitimacy was affirmed by the principle of democratic centralism or perhaps even more by the fact that the counterproductive cadre policy placed even the most outstanding subjects of servility into the nation's house with a firm hand.

By the end of 1987, through my own enlightened Utopia, I had only gotten as far as the possibility of the institutional representation of the pluralism of interests. In other words, the possibility of allowing the parliamentary groups and factions to be the bearers and representatives of rival interests but not as party formations. Because it is evident that the MSZMP is incapable of integrating rival interests: Its endeavors of this kind are governed by daily political considerations. And besides, it is an impossible task for a single party to represent the interests of every stratum and group of society with equal concern and empathy. Especially when this party proclaims to be a party of the working class and a champion of its interests.

Consequently, let other groups also be organized in parliament, alongside the already existing and rather formally functioning MSZMP faction. This could be a church group, a group representatives, or perhaps a trade union faction. I know now, a year later, that even if party factions were to function and a group of independent representatives or an agrarian section were to be established; this would only be in theory. Really a Utopia. [It would be] a Utopia because the present prevalence of party members can obstruct any kind of a minority initiative and because no new group can exhibit a mass base that has a vested interest in cooperation and support, let alone an apparatus, an institutional system, or a press.

Thus, nothing is accomplished without a party or parties.

The multiparty system is a sociological fact in today's Hungary: an acknowledgement of this is the end result of the MSZMP's 10 February debate. But the fears are still around. The party in power is afraid of suffering a devastating defeat in a democratic election; and the alternative groups that have been established and the rebuilt parties are afraid of becoming victims of the salami tactics known for so long. Therefore, what is needed is a party law that clears the situation and relieves the cramps and fears, and parties are established as soon as possible, i.e., with political, economic and social programs, a political arena, personalities bearing a new political culture, and a representative democracy instead of a one-party system.

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## * Official on Reform Efforts Within MSZMP

*25000155a Budapest MARCZIUS TIZENOTODIKE in Hungarian 15 Mar 89 p 6*

[Interview with Ivan Szandtner, MSZMP first secretary for Budapest's 20th district, by Mihaly Nagy in Budapest; date not given: "The Challenges Come From Within Our Ranks...; Ivan Szandtner Discusses the Chances of Reform, Regional Political Activity, and the Reform Wing"]

[Text] Manufacturing plants and family houses with gardens, intermixed with rows of apartment towers and scattered blocks: We are in the 20th district of the capital city. Traces of the time when this neighborhood was part of such independent communities as Pestszenterzsebet and Soroksar still exist. One senses a small-town atmosphere and expects intimate and straightforward relations. But is this the case? I am talking to Ivan Szandtner, MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] first secretary for the district.

[Szandtner] A year or two ago we would have said: This is a district on the edge of the city, so our atmosphere is more tranquil. Most of the people who live here are workers. Many of them work in the district, others work in Csepel, but we also have residents from elsewhere. During the past 15 years, there has been a genuine and dynamic development taking place here, and people remember that. That is why the current hesitation is noticed. After all, we do run out of capital. As of today, a significant amount of "pioneering" work is still being done; work that was created as part of the local council's activities, its real service functions. It is a good thing that we have this, now that we can no longer provide much of anything else. The council of today is not the same bureaucratic machine it used to be.... There are 4,800 party members in this district. Last year that number decreased by 500 individuals, which is a 10-percent reduction. Most of those departing our ranks left us when the membership books were changed, and some quit more recently, but at an increasing rate. Most of them are middle-aged fellow-travelers, but there were some very valuable individuals among them. Two-fifths of the members are retired, the others are active workers, which means that they are members of party cells at their plants or institutions.... In this district, it was last fall when we started to discuss the meaning of pluralism. What will it bring? We began to think in terms of district affairs because (and this should not be forgotten) the elections are conducted on regional bases.

### We Maintain A Dialogue....

[Nagy] Before we proceed, let us examine what kind of political forces have surfaced in the district. What kind of organizational forms have they shown? Does their proportion imply a theoretical or practical challenge?

[Szandtner] At this moment, we can still only surmise the political diversity. It was the Hungarian Democratic Forum that first appeared in an organized manner, represented by a few dozen people. We maintain a dialogue with them. The Alliance of Free Democrats established a local chapter, and there is movement among the Smallholders and the Social Democrats as well. Looking at the number of their followers, their level of organization and their influence, I would say that those new political forces still do not present a threat to us. Rather, the challenges come from within our own ranks, our past and our internal conditions.

[Nagy] One of the MSZMP's major problems is that, as a leading force of society, it is attached to the world of work, the principles of the shops and institutions, while the organs and executive bodies of the state are constructed on a regional basis. As for political and organizational pluralism, and the activities of the multi-party system and of the parties and unified movements, they will be realized in the residential districts, which is the real sphere of political life! We know, for example, that during the period between the wars the social democrats based their organization on parliamentary electoral districts. On the other hand, what is the composition of party membership in these districts today? How can they be "redeployed" to the party cells in the residential areas? And what effect would such a redistribution have on the party?

[Szandtner] The crucial questions are, what is the condition of the party, and, based on its present condition, can we reach a desirable situation with this party? In this regard, I have my doubts. As of today, the political character of party membership is still, by and large, hidden from view. This is a party of masses, the product of a successful period, including many more fellow travellers than fighters. During the previous decade, the party organizations at the work sites used to be the means for sharing political power, and in this decade they have been more like a certain kind of super trade union. Their role as transmission belts to effect production has paled; what remained is the protection of positions and interests, more for today than for the long run. A large portion (I repeat, a large portion) of party members still hold a grudge against the world. They feel that we are taking away their past, their prestige, as well as their present and their future. After all, if we remove the party organizations from the factories, the members would lose that little advantage that party membership still represents. They are attached to the party; some of them in a political sense, while most of them on moral grounds, but they want to retain something from the past. If we introduce sudden and tactless measures, we can easily drive them into the camp of our political opponents....

[Nagy] Yes, that is true. Nevertheless, such considerations as being challenged politically and using acceptable means in trying to retain power compel the party to shift its operation to this sphere. But what could convince the membership to make the same shift? An organizational decision? Or a genuine political program?

[Szandtner] In November, there were still those among us in this district who proposed that we need a cavalry charge. That would mean dismantling the factory party cells and reorganizing the party along regional lines. There is great resistance to this proposition, and that may lead to the disbanding of the party. As for myself, I doubt the existence of initiatives and personal circles that would represent genuine values and ensure continuity and guarantee the party's future strength in the event of such a radical move.

### Mere Rhetoric?

[Nagy] There are other problems here, as well. In my opinion, there is a great difference between a party member who participates in political activities at the work site, during working hours and as an employee, that is, a dependent wage earner, and one who is involved in political life in his neighborhood, in his leisure time, and as a citizen. Of course, I also feel that once the party is in a competitive situation, striving to protect its authority position, this is exactly the kind of membership it will need.

[Szandtner] Yes; however, we are talking about a community whose members have been educated to accept the fact that collectively they are not responsible, who are used to having political decisions made by those above them, and who are, by and large, not personally interested in the recently developed competitive situation. We have a small group of reformers among us, who recognize the freedom derived from necessity, but even its members lack the political and tactical training; they are prepared to formulate their will only at the rhetorical level and, as of now, still unable to organize themselves.

[Nagy] I bring this up only as a conjuncture, but it is something worth considering: If the MSZMP shifts its operative focus along regional lines, this will alter the political and age composition of the local organizations, and a new electoral atmosphere will come into existence. The party's apparatus will come under closer and more direct control, the introduction of methodological and budgetary restructuring will be inevitable, as will be the creation of a controllable management of party affairs.

[Szandtner] The most important question of the transition is how much time do we have? Since there is no answer to that question, we have started working: To begin with, we are creating the freedom in which to bring about the transformation. Within the larger enterprises, we have created cells for party members who reside in the 20th district, and these forums deal primarily with issues of residential policies. As a second step, members of the district's party organization were convened by electoral districts. In the near future, we will seek out all party members who reside in the district. There are already some people who wish to shift their membership, and some of them have accepted substantial responsibilities. However, we are also trying to limit this kind of movement, because in the beginning (having failed to reckon with reflex-like actions) we had this plan: Taking our 14 party cells and 65 council districts, we planned to create a closer similarity among those by increasing the number of party cells and reducing that of the council districts, thus establishing a certain parallel. We were hoping that as a result of our youth movement and the "transferring" of active members the local political collectives will change in a favorable manner. Reality turned out to be different: Few active members transferred to our organizations, the work site party cells are being protected, and resistance is particularly great on the part of senior members.... Following this, we created three residential party precincts identical to the parliamentary electoral districts. In these committees, members and functionaries will be elected by the younger members (instead of just the older ones), along with the work site cells and the district's enterprises. The process of reapportionment will be accomplished by these committees. As another compromise that we will make, within each district there will be separate cells for new members (those who have recently transferred) and the old members. Another important matter is the management of the district's party facilities, since these will have to be turned into centers of community life open to everyone. However, there is no provision for this in our present budget. We are already realizing that the infrastructure of political life will be a very important issue.

**Crippled Autonomy**

[Nagy] And the apparatus? Earlier, you did not address that issue....

[Szandtner] And, of course, it should be addressed. There are 13 of us working at this party cell that has 4,800 members. Four of these 13 are secretaries, and many people feel that this is too many. It must be realized, however, that the situation would be much worse without this apparatus. In the past, our operation was based on executing decisions. In the present atmosphere of autonomy, we need guidelines, otherwise we will frequently be lost. The interesting contradiction is that under the old system the role of members and basic cells was so de-emphasized, the autonomy was so crippled, that now it is difficult to remedy this without the assistance of a supporting apparatus. Even this way, we are facing great dangers. There is a tremendous wave of opposition to the leadership. During the recent elections, and I have seen this also in other districts, people voted for "their kind of people," and, let us be honest, this often meant a decline of quality. We have elected an organization without an executive committee, and next year will have another party conference. In my view, the threat of being overpowered by authority or the apparatus is not something we should worry about.

[Nagy] Finally, are you optimistic? Are you frightened or distressed by the problems?

[Szandtner] I expect a great deal from the changes within the party and from the freedom to write our platforms. I feel that these will assist us in our reforms as well as our attempts to purify our ranks. I also hope that these will reveal to the reform wing, how much mass support it has. It is my opinion that it is relatively small, when compared to the support enjoyed by the center, which is also for reforms. However, this does not distress me: Why should negotiations and compromise within the party be easier than those among the parties? A break today would signal immediate anarchy, followed by a leftward turn. Another aspect of today's situation is that the government's enforcement agencies identify themselves with the left wing of the party; and that is not the direction from where we can expect development.

## * Possibility of MSZMP 'Split' Assessed

*25000156e Budapest MARCZIUS TIZENOTODIKE in Hungarian 15 Mar 89 p 11*

[Article by Csaba Gombar: "Secession Is Tantamount to Withdrawal: Must We Be Afraid of a Split in the Party ?"]

[Text] In 494 B.C., 18,000 plebeians, displeased with the patricians, marched out of the city and went to the foot of the holy mountain, a walk of an hour and a half, to found a new Rome. That was the historically famous secession. This is probably what the members of the artists' associations from Berlin, Munich, and later from Vienna, buried under the rigors of empty academism, may have remembered at the turn of the century when they saw that a revival of art was not possible anymore within the old organizational framework. For this reason, they broke away and departed, and to identify their activity as an epoch in the history of art, the new art of those times has been called secession in our region ever since. Although it is possible that those giving the name did not even reach so far back in time. For in the lives of the European parties of that time, separations and associations were very frequent one could say, everyday events. And this was called secession and fusion at that time.

The concept of secession bursts out today with perplexity. Secession, meaning departure, separation, breakaway? A split of the party?! Last fall when a speaker at the New March Front's debate raised this question, it still seemed to be such a farfetched idea that no one responded to it. But after a few months, the question was began to acquire more and more meaning. Before long, it is going to become a declaration.

Secessionist movements follow one another nowadays in the parties that are being formed or reorganized. Some of them are hardly formed yet and already various separations encumber their formation. Or is it possible that, instead of encumbering it, they facilitate it? Perhaps. It is very possible.

Looking at it from the angle of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party's [MSZMP] colossal conglomerate of institutions that are linked with the state, the tiny primitive and backward parties, i.e., the party initiatives that are for the most part still clinging today to the future or to the remembrance of the past, are often little more than objects of amusement for the beholder. But the fable is probably also about us.

It is also about us because of the following. On our way toward the end of the century, the highly charged issue of class and ideological struggles seems to be decreasing significantly. In the western half of Europe it has become quite depleted. For a long time, there were not a few people in our country who were nursing this fire. It could be said that no classes, no ideologies exist! The phenomenon called crisis of the future is a concept which has been covering the crisis of Hungary's official ideology for more than a decade. Today, when we have already reached the period of openly admitted economic and political crisis, the party state, which had been created as a mechanism to maintain the mobilizing ideology, has also come to a crisis. As a cure, the state is separated from the only party under the pretext of being a constitutional state, and if the MSZMP is going to be one of the competing parties, then secession from it will not directly raise the menacing separation of the state organization. But the fable is about us primarily because the internal conflicts of this party are greater than those between the party as a formal whole and the independent or opposing political factions.

The creation of a constitutional state through the state organization is somewhat easier nowadays than the renewal of the MSZMP as a party because up to now the latter has included the state itself and has clung to its habits for decades. For the former, relatively clear objectives, historical examples, and an international warehouse of impressive constitutional models exist. But the making of a party out of a nonparty while at the same time maintaining its organizational unity may be considered not only more difficult but almost hopeless.

### Internal Conflicts

It is being said more and more often that, due to its Constitution that goes back decades, it is not possible to reform this party. In its present form, the party, they say, is running on the treadmill of conservativism. Or that the reform wing within the party is capable only of kamikaze actions. All this is being said within the party. For there are wings that are not soaring.

The explanation for the success of last month's internal party compromise included the statement the the party's unity had been preserved. But the momentum that elicited the debate was much more than a mere statement regarding the evaluation of the socialist period of our history; the latter was only a pretext to cover up an internal party conflict about the question of the party's future role. The compromise did not encompass this. There is no unity in this. There is instead a moment of inertia that can be detected in this question. We could say perhaps, to quote an old saying, that "this is that splendid and wise torpidness which preserved" the country for a thousand years, i.e., that often mentioned "inherited national inertia". However, in our historic political culture, these truly existing attributes brought benefits, if at all, exclusively for the opposition's political position. In the position of leadership, this always brings only trouble.

Of course, a split in the party can be avoided. Through great efforts, its formal unity can be maintained. But this would be hardly anything but the prolongation of the 2d 15 years of the Kadar period with its own ambling party democracy which, under the present circumstances, haunts us already with the danger of accelerating disintegration. For the number of people is growing today who find it increasingly hard to understand how it was possible for us to agree with one another within the party to begin with.

This is why the fable is about us, too. This is why the word secession could emerge. And, fortunately, the meaning of party split assigned to it is gradually losing its threatening character. Both international political changes and party and sociological facts, as well as renewed changes in our domestic structure will facilitate a possible occurrence of secession. It will never be easy, of course, but it will not be as shockingly dramatic. Secession will become more and more only a natural opposite of fusion, i.e., a reciprocality of a normal party cohesion, the reverse of an important political process. A civilized separation.

### "Rancid" Freedom

The discussion of all of the above is not meant to inflict speculation on public opinion, namely, that if there were, here and now, a split within the MSZMP for the attainment of some kind of an ideal party-transforming management, then it would also serve as a vehicle for distributing governmental experience and expertise for the attainment of a more efficient party competition. Although such speculation is good for making one think, it is not the reason that the need for a civilized separation is felt by many people. This is not a stray idea of some sort of a surgical separation. All of this has become a problem to be solved by virtue of the fact that, we repeat, the conflicts within the party are more irreconcilable than those that exist between the present, formally unified, party and the parties-to-be that are getting ready for the race.

There are, of course, counterarguments as well. According to one, for instance, the platform freedom that is being created and institutionalized will provide, even within the party, enough room in the future for the various alternatives for the future colliding with one another. And those party members who do not like the present developments will become separated both from "this" wing and from "that" wing. And the reformist endeavors will thus have a chance to be evaluated and to forge ahead within the party. But, we could answer, while two years ago platform freedom would have meant a great possibility, presently it has become as lusterless as part of the dragging party democracy, surrounded by the prohibitions of faction freedom. But the greater difficulty is the fact that most of those leaving the party are exactly the open-minded, younger and better educated persons who are dissatisfied with the unfolding of democracy and reform; while the conservative groups are quite resolute in their attachment to their accustomed positions. There is no balance between the conservative and liberal party members who are leaving. Politically this leads rather to a decline of reform thinking. Then there are other counterarguments, more lively than the one above. According to one, it is a strange paradox that those who have been long critizicing the monolithic unit, are speculating now, when opinions are more varied within the MSZMP, about a split in the party so that they can create some sort of more unified parties. In other words, the party's reformists now want a monolithic reform party and a monolithic counterreform party. With due recognition of the intellectual edge of this argument, we must also see that those deliberating with a willingness to accept secession are not lead by the logic of monolithism but by the fact that their position in the party has become hopeless; that with decades of failures behind them, they are trying to stay afloat with relatively little power. Mostly because of the party's stance they feel more and more the disillusionment with their supportive base, both within and without the party, for having assisted in making the wrong decisions. As a consequence of all this, the party is disintegrating to the advantage of the conservative cadre protectors. And let us add, we are not talking about the hundreds of thousands, about the great silent majority, but about the more important ones, about the active groups which want a political change, about those who are capable of a moral stance and who both in the past and partly in the present ould even take existential risks by taking a stand. That is to say, compromises are developing more for the benefit of a mythical party unity than for the country's renewal. However, self-serving party unity, even if it would be created through future platform freedom, can lead today only to a semblance of stability and to self-deception.

The arguments against secession presented here are, of course, to be carefully considered. But we must not forget that not only do counterarguments exist but there are many who consider the subversion of party unity that has been mandatory for decades a sacrilege. They are the ones who call those who resign from the MSZMP because of its ambiguities and procrastinating indecisiveness, rats fleeing from the sinking ship, with absolutely no qualms. And the hard, cadre-protecting group organizations of these old-fashioned orthodox people are the things that really give us some food for thought if we want to find a reason for a possible secession and if we want to arrive at a more decisive and more democratic policy.

### What Is Our Worth?

Yet, we have seen for 2 decades now that the reformists—and explanations are not needed at this point—have never organized themselves within the MSZMP. And now, are they organizing themselves? Is it not more likely that, to many people, individually, what comes to mind is this: What is one's worth if one is a party member? But individual solutions of moral dilemmas will not entail a better policy either.

The question mark following the word 'secession' has not yet straightened itself into an exclamation mark. But is there a reason why it could not?

## * Role of New People's Front Examined

*25000156e Budapest MARCZIUS TIZENOTODIKE in Hungarian 15 Mar 89 p 11*

[Article by Istvan Kukorelli: "Our Age is Crying for Coalition"]

[Text] There are many similarities between March 1848 and March 1989. Reform programs and 12-point demands are being prepared, and we are living again in the fever of reforms. Constitutional debates, reminiscent of the laws of March 1848, are resounding through the country; today, too, the slogans 'Country' and 'Progress' could apply; today, too, the nation's goal is to come abreast of modernization, of Europe.

Today's lesson of 15 March includes the concept of national unity. Among our national holidays, 15 March is the most national one, almost having a religious flavor, reminiscent of the spirit of Christmas. Under the symbolism of the pinned-on rosette of the national colors, the nation including even those people who celebrate by themselves is capable of becoming one and of leaguing together.

### Revived Ideal of a People's Front

Was it not a historical accident that the March Front, one of this century's first experiments in a democratic national union, unfurled its flag on 15 March 1937? The holiday of 15 March, as the holiday that rallies the most massive people's front, invokes posterity to reevaluate and regularly maintain the people's front. We have a great need, here and now, for this reevaluation because, in Ady's words, "we live in a perfect Babel and, although we hope that the hullabaloo will become a whisper, we also must act."

Modernization, democracy, constitutionality, and human welfare will have a chance only if we are able to implement radical reform without a social explosion and if in this constituency we dismantle and rebuild the existing power structure in a peaceful and evolutionary manner. A prime condition for this is to bridge the true and crude social segmentation with a form of coalition and people's front. It is in the country's, the nation's interest to create forms of coalition and to update and, if necessary, eliminate old institutions, e.g., the Patriotic People's Front.

Thus the ideal of a people's front does have a future even in a multiparty political system. It is another issue whether the present organization and conception of the people's front has only a present but no future or, as some would hold, is already a "dead" organization. But ideal and reality can be reconciled, and this would be in the interest of society. The people's front policy of the recent past would provide a chance for a rapid renewal because after the eighth congress the people's front represented the "ancestry" line and, true to the people's front ideal, served the national ideal and social progress even if only through the power of words. Economic reform was coupled with political renewal in the message of the people's front which had an indisputable role in the political turning point of last May.

For both objective and subjective reasons, the people's front movement subsided and began hesitating in the past single year. One reason for this hesitation is that the newly formed people's front organizations deprived the people's front of its history except for the history of the last 40 years, i.e., of the post-1949 period. It is indisputable that, in its present form, the people's front is part of a power structure which is being criticized and which stands in the way of progress. This political organization, which is a necessary concomitant of a one-party system, was created from above and, consequently, it was a suitable means of putting and end to parties and civil society, observing events as a obedient fellow traveler and letting itself be heard only during the times of elections.

Until 1985 the people's front was defined by the statutes as a framework for the party's federative policy. The thought that this people's front was for the party and not for the people has much truth in it; even the name 'front' expressed a view of class struggle rather than that of a peaceful coalition. Although the slogan "He who is not against us is with us" changed this basic view considerably, opening up the horizons, it did not change the notion that the people's front was the framework of the federative policy. In a multiparty society, the renewed people's front should have an allegiance, not to this heritage but to the origin of the people's front ideal.

Our changing times have brought about a significant transformation in the political medium in which the people's front is active. Up to the present day, the people's front had been unable to adapt to this new social environment, getting only as far as an emphasis of its independence from the party. Even this was done verbally by people who used to consider such ideas a blasphemy; hence, words have lost their trustworthiness, they have little value today.

In the one-party structure, the people's front had a monopoly in being the sole depository of federative policy. Today, there is competition, and it is not possible to monopolize either the coalition or the federative policy. In this transitional period, public consensus demands much more dynamic and varied forms which cannot be appropriated by any single, old or newly formed, organization. Thus the people's front cannot demand monopolistic rights, and cannot insist on being included in the constitution and on having the exclusive right to recommend nominees in elections. In this competitive situation, the people's front must become a better organized and more streamlined political movement if it wishes to maintain its position.

In the political system of the future, the people's front is expected to be organized in several, but at least two, directions. One direction would be the mechanism of party coalition and bilateral or multilateral interparty conferences and conciliations. The post-election government coalition and opposition coalition could be part of a separate political form.

**"Party" of Mugwumps**

Evidently, the parties would not, and would not be able to, encompass the entire circle of politicized citizens. This is especially characteristic of this region where, as a result of the dictatorial policy of corrupting subsystems and of eliminating civil society and the public, there is a significant lack of trust and an enormous lack of knowledge. The number one problem for the great majority of people in today's Hungary, in provincial Hungary, is not the multiparty system. These citizens have no difficulties of orientation, not even in this exhilarating transitional society! And, most importantly, even in a multiparty system, these citizens, not wishing to remain second-class citizens, will hold on to their right to participate and to intervene. This circle of citizens is the basis of the future's renewed people's front. Therefore, the people's front can be, first of all, the political organization of nonparty citizens who wish to take part in politics, and the principle of individual membership can also be exercised in this competitive situation. In addition, as a member organization, it can encompass citizens' communities and organizations which have less power than parties (people's colleges, associations, circles of friends) and which have been and wish to remain participants of this historic movement. The churches and national unions, which have expanding civil relations, can continue to be people's front bases. Precisely because of these facts, the people's front can be a regional characteristic in a multiparty system, especially in the period of transition to this system.

The people's front cannot be independent from the existing parties and the ones being formed. The people's front should assume responsibility for initiating a large coalition, both nationally and in local communities which had often been ravaged by civil wars. Every political system has its own national characteristics. Being a political organization of a large coalitional character, the people's front could be as a national committee system a national characteristic. Under such a large coalition, a dialogue could be established between the parties and the mugwumps and between the various ideologies and views.

**Actively With a New Chapter**

It is expected that for the Hungarian who is awaiting a constitution, the institutions of political participation such as, first of all, the principle of representation, and direct democracy will appreciate in value. Social progress demands a departure of political organizations from the workplace. The separation of professional issues (work) from matters of policy in every subsystem as well as in the world of public power must be made unequivocal in the reform process. Thus the citizens can organize themselves and form groups, not as employees but as autonomous citizens. This process objectively increases the role of political institutions that are organized according to the principle of regions. The principle of regions is a traditional people's front principle of organization: to have a people's front committee functioning in every area of the country; this is another argument for the inclusion of the people's front as a longer range regional characteristic.

Making tasks more specialized and political is part of the renewal of the people's front. Working in the shelter of the party and state organs has made the creation of an independent people's front profile impossible. Historically, a situation arose in which every task to be performed publicly was, at the same time, a task of the people's front as well. Not disputing the results, this was a state of having everything and nothing and, at the same time, a period of celebrating the working man and of action according to the principle of vestige. Making use of publicity, the people's front must as an independent political factor be present in the future primarily in central and local decisionmaking, in self government, and in the institutions of direct democracy.

In order to implement a reform of the people's front and to have it accepted by the public, personnel changes in its institutions and leadership—almost 100 percent of which is committed to the party—are absolutely necessary. New and trustworthy faces are needed in addition to the persons who were able to preserve their decency despite being forced into the role of fellow travelers.

The new perception of the role of the people's front also means a beginning of a new chapter. A new name and an initial congress would be needed because the name 'front' does not imply a peaceful and evolutional transition and because the people's front must not tied exclusively to the heritage of the years 1949-54.

The renewal of the people's front is a social exigency, and it cannot take place without organizational and personal conflicts. Those familiar with the movement from within and from below know that its institutions and its people committed to the cause do have the strength for a rapid transformation and renewal. The only thing needed for this is an explicit impetus and no stone left unturned. The economic infrastructure, which belongs to society and not to the organization, can serve as a sound foundation for the renewal. Let us then not mourn for the people's front; instead, let us actively adapt it to the challenges of our times! There is a great need for a strong people's front that is able to operate in current Hungarian society which is expected to be in a state of transition until the turn of this century.

## * Szokai on Restoring National Self-Awareness

*25000156c Budapest MARCZIUS TIZENOTODIKE in Hungarian 15 Mar 89 p 10*

[Article by Imre Szokai: "They Did Not Leave the Country ... The Cultivation of National Self-Awareness Is a Commandment of Life"]

[Text] A cardinal point in Hungary's domestic and foreign policy today is the huge blocks of Hungarians, living against their wishes, outside the present borders of Hungary today, most of them in the neighboring countries. Referring to Gyula Illyes' expression: They did not leave the country; rather another state's authority was imposed on them. Although the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries became citizens of other states, they did not separate from the nation: the borders may have "abandoned" them, but the mother country did not.

Europe's largest national minority was torn out of the Hungarians as an unjust punishment in the course of great historic cataclysm. At present it constitutes 40 percent of our continent's national minorities. Even by international comparison, this is an unprecedented situation!

### Minority: Guaranteed Rights

Yet for many, with varied reasons, this is still not enough cause for our country to pay special attention to the situation of the Hungarians beyond our borders and assume an active part in assuring the enforcement of their individual and collective rights. They imagine some ill-willed intentions behind our attested attitude of the last few years, "uncomprehendingly" asking why we must talk about this question so much in the midst of our present pressing concerns.

The answer is rather complex and far reaching but, in any case, unequivocal: The creation of democratic socialism is unimaginable without the guarantee of the minorities' individual distinct rights, secured in unassailable laws. There is no socialism without democracy, and there can be no democracy without minority rights! Shouldering the interests of all Hungarians will help strengthen our national self-awareness, and in the competition of European nations that is indispensable for Hungarians in order to start with equal chances, and not from a disadvantaged position. For the formulation of this pledge we must reach back to the democratic traditions of 1945-46 when the coalition parties, including the Hungarian Communist Party, unequivocally accepted the representation of all of the Hungarian people.

There are other reasons as well, why the existence, and the materia-spiritual growth of the minorities like Hungarians living in other states has great significance. Namely, the prevailing majority may obtain important self-knowledge through an ethnic group living in the same state with it and thus at least partially bonded to it, but different in several essential aspects, having its own characteristic attributes. It sees itself and makes itself seen from "without" and still from "within". Dealing with ethnic colorfulness requires much sensitivity, patience, tolerance, understanding and national introspection. Without these, neither the Hungarians can free themselves from the guilt that was beaten into them. And another thing: There is no internationalism without nations either. But only those nations can be internationalist which recognize the value of the "differences" between them and do not change these differences into discrimination. Only in the event of such a political attitude can the nationalities foster better rapport between nations and fulfill their role as bridge, only thus can a minimum of internationalism be created.

On the basis of all this, maintaining relations with Hungarians abroad is such a responsibility, indeed, a commandment of life, for prevailing Hungarian foreign policy which should be unequivocally laid down in the new constitution. It would be important to reinforce in the proposed supreme law of the land that in the spirit of national responsibility and international friendship and on the basis of a common historical past and spiritual heritage our nation considers every person living abroad—who identifies himself with the Hungarians—a member of the Hungarian community. As a result of the dismemberment of the Hungarian nation, it also must be made evident that fostering relations with Hungarians abroad is an indispensable component of our international cooperation. We consider the minorities' triple attachment a possibility for promoting an understanding between Hungary and other states, between Hungarians and other peoples. But a guarantee both in theory and practice of minority rights, which is inseparable from human rights, is a fundamental condition for this. It is necessary, therefore, to put on record that we will do everything on our part to make certain that all Hungarians living abroad are able to practice their individual and collective rights, to preserve their national self-identity and to freely strengthen ties with their mother nation.

The inclusion of these statements in the new constitution would mean a constitutional obligation on our diplomacy. And not only on state diplomacy!

The entire Hungarian community, the various parties, organizations, movements, churches, and alternative organizations have their own roles and responsibility to strive, through their particular means and possibilities, for the preservation of national kinship and spiritual integrity of Hungarians living in all parts of the world. An efficient intervention to prevent that the bearers of Hungarian culture and mentality irrevocably break away from the nation as a whole could be achieved through a broad national social alliance. This is the only way to elicit the much needed solidarity with Hungarians living all over the world, and the best way for international public opinion to hear our protest against the various often brutal manifestations of adverse discrimination and denationalization.

In many respects, the conditions for the entire society's collaboration and for active and collective thinking are favorable today. With our society becoming more proportioned, the institutionalization of interest relations, and the broadening of democracy, the demand that institutions and associations and individual persons accept a direct role in the dialogue between Hungarians and Hungary, and in a broader sense in the cooperation of the peoples of the Danube basin, is perceptible.

It is becoming more and more evident that Hungarian foreign policy, beyond its self-renewal, can lay open significant reserves primarily by strengthening its social base, by "socializing" and further democratizing its activities, and by carefully examining the respect-deserving experience and knowledge accumulated in the most varied areas of life.

### Belonging to the Hungarians...

This endeavor places, in concrete terms, the intention of unfolding democracy into a segment of social existence, i.e., into our network of international relations. Socialization is possible primarily in those areas where human relationships and humanitarian factors play a larger role. Such an area appears to be, among others, following with attention and care the fate of minorities. This kind of approach yields multiple benefits for all interested states: it can enrich the arsenal of the "official foreign policy" with the underground stream network of human relations, and it can contribute to the alleviation of the mutual mistrusts and prejudices that have accumulated as a historical burden, to the effort of common action, and to the release of national energies that point to the right direction but are still dormant.

A non centralized but still reconciled coordination of the social forces, an increase in the openness of foreign policy, and the modernization and expansion of the institutional framework are to be included among the indispensable things to be done. All this would do away with the present parallelisms and dispersions. It is the coordination of democratic forces through which we can develop a system of bilateral and multilateral international agreements which could guarantee the individual and collective rights of minorities and nationalities without regard to alliance affiliations and social systems.

### A Responsible Presence Dignity

The other condition for stepping forward is the "cultivation" and regular "maintenance" of national awareness. An integral part of this is an open and active solidarity with national minorities and a responsible and sensible discussion of the concerns if only to keep superfluous, unfruitful and unwittingly detrimental passions at bay. Democracy of action, a responsible presence, the introduction of an institutional framework of inclusion, equal participation in the discussion and solution of fundamental national questions this is what the main "disciplining" force is. We must strive for inner strength and cool headedness even when fulminating and overheated passions are sizzling in some of our neighbors. We should not retort with insult to insult, to nationalism with nationalism! For this, too, there is an absolute need for a modern national awareness, built on self-knowledge based on real and authentic international comparisons, on self-respect and national dignity without the wish to show off, on the acceptance of inner colorfulness as a value, and on patience and understanding toward multiple attachments. A Hungarian will hardly promote today the cause of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries by thinking in terms of border revisions or by relating to Germans, Gypsies, Jews, Slovaks, or Serbs like some countries relate to their own national minorities.

We can have only a single objective: that free and democratic development, economic affluence, and unhindered cultural self-expression be guaranteed for all Hungarians. We must, therefore, stand up for the rights of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries so that life without fear and destitution will be internationally guaranteed for them.

## * Restructuring, Economic 'Time Bomb' Viewed

*25000156b Budapest MARCZIUS TIZENOTODIKE in Hungarian 15 Mar 89 p 9*

[Article by Laszlo Lengyel: "Our Past Glory... Waiting for the Last Train"]

[Text] "Our past, our past, our past glory, glory, where are you, going by way of Adacs, Karacsond and Ludas, our past glory..., will be half an hour, I repeat, half an hour late" (Gyorgy Gomori, announcement) [Parody of the first line of the classic epic, Mihaly Vorosmarty's "Zalan Futasa" (Zalan's Flight), written in 1825. The line reads: "Our past glory, where are you in the darkness of night?"]

The Hungarian economy's "past glory, past glory," I repeat, has been years late now. The year 1988 caused only additional delays and backlogs. Although we succeeded in staying afloat with regard to foreign countries, inflation did not take off disastrously, the shortage of goods did not become intolerable, massive unemployment stayed within limits, strikes still remained manageable and confined, and the government was able to conceal the budget and state management deficits. Everything is very well and good, except the train of structure transformation was unable to pull into the station.

All the pain and agony the population and the businesses went through in 1988 high taxes, increasing prices, deteriorating public health care and education, the hopelessness of everyday living is made meaningless by aimlessness. We did not get drenched and chilled at the cold and inhospitable station to have the train pull in sooner and finally get us going, but to keep being drenched and chilled to stay in place. This squandered year is like 1984 when, with great success, we forced enterprises to produce capitalist exports, held back imports, cut down on consumption, raked in political stakes from western politicians, but changed nothing in the old, and unacceptable, structure of the economy.

### Ticking Like a Time Bomb

Time passes. Governments come, governments go. The incoming [governments] promise that they will subordinate everything to transforming part of their revenues. The outgoing governments, however, declare: What an accomplishment! We succeeded in staying where we were. Bankrupt enterprises may continue to vegetate on state money, for the government writes off most of their debts. Revenues continue to flow, not toward the manufacturing industry, the enterprises, and the infrastructure that represent the future, but in the direction of the raw material and energy sector that looks to the past. The construction of the uneconomical Nagymaros and Tengiz projects, which will determine the state of the economy for decades to come, and the planning of the Paks-2 nuclear power plant are being continued. We continue to be tied to the CEMA's revenue-depletion mechanism, and to its economic and technical structure that is moving away from the market, while conditions for financial credit are getting stricter by the day.

The year 1988 is ticking beneath us like a time bomb as we defer the inflationary pressure in the budget deficit to 1989 and as we continue to subsidize enterprises and industrial sectors that do not produce any goods. The price increases resulting from the early 1989 subsidy cutbacks are not affecting the structure, are not forcing the enterprises to halt uneconomical manufacture and production and to cut back on overhead expenses. They have a monopoly in the domestic market where competitive imports cannot enter, where they are able to constantly blackmail the government and the consumer with shortages of goods and with problems of supply. On the other hand, the present price increase is nothing but a postponement from 1988 to this year, the filling of last year's partly concealed, leaking budget deficit; therefore, some enterprises will not receive any part of the price increase at all and thus it cannot affect their activities. The government has already openly abandoned the monetary control that it superficially and only in theory applied in 1988, in favor of administrative budgetary control and redistribution. If this is continues, our past glo[ry], past glory will never reach the station, or there will be no station at all.

And if there would be a change after all? Can there still be one? Perhaps yes. But, for that, a breakthrough must happen on several points. Indirect methods, i.e., the creation of a so-called market environment, have proved to be unsuitable for changing the economic structure. Enterprises owned, wholly or partly, by the state as well as powerful monopolies do not respond or do not respond in a manner appropriate to the market to competitive prices, to price deregulation, to changing rates of exchange, to the modern tax system, and to the fluctuation of interest rates. Bargaining over regulators, prices, taxes, and cancellations of debts creates an oligarchic, lobbying, and corporate environment, not a market environment. The enterprises are not in the hands of their real owners! A change in ownership is a prerequisite for a decrease and halt in wasting assets and labor because decreasing costs and the return of capital are in the owner's long range interest.

### Instead of Gigantic Programs

The change in ownership should take place in four main areas. A program of reprivatization would be needed to encourage private capital accumulation and to make private savings more profitable for the national economy. Within the framework of this program, conditions should be created for an increase in private ownership both through selling part of state and cooperative property as asset or capital and through a program that encourages enterprises. The latter would include credit, access to imports, a freer flow of foreign currency, and a new bidding system.

The expansion of private ownership partly because of limited internal resources of capital, partly as a result of an understandable mistrust would not make private ownership a prevalent form; actually, its scale would probably not even rise to 20 or 25 percent. It would be advisable to begin this "experiment" in the areas of trade and services and then to spread it as rapidly as possible to the area of industry. No policy can expect public support when, in the interest of the green barons of large enterprise, it rejects the possibility of private farming without any serious investigation, and when it refuses to relinquish land to private owners or to issue long-term land leases. The "new land distribution" would not simply be a kind of reparcellation but would mean the possibility of a modern farming enterprise and a new kind of owner's interest for producers, distributors, consumers and farm creditors; not the hitherto destitution on closed and abandoned strips of land at the mercy of large industrial monopolies, but the foundation of a surpassing organization of enterprise.

And this brings us to another form of ownership. It is precisely in farming where nonnationalized, Western European-type production, distribution and consumer cooperatives and credit unions are needed. The present cooperative property that "belongs to everyone and to no one" should be transformed into company capital property. Similarly, in industry and services, small enterprises and units and shops separated from larger organizations could be run in the form of self-managing "cooperative" capital property.

The third level of property would be the property of autonomous regional units. This would have two consequences. One of them would be the true public supervision of the councils and their transformation into autonomous units; the other would be the linking of local taxation and the maintenance of property. This includes not only the already existing local budgetary institutions but also the properties of the state and public organizations—which were built with the money of the nation's taxpayers and not with membership dues!—should be given as property to the autonomous units. Regional party, trade union and KISZ [Communist Youth League] schools, guest houses, hunting and fishing camps and other similar establishments should be taken over for making use of them as schools, kindergartens, or centers for health and social care, and tourism.

Finally, the fourth level of property would be the establishment of public asset centers and banks (e.g., retirement banks) under the supervision of the National Assembly; these would forward the public assets held by our enterprises to the banks, financial institutions and development societies, in the form of bonds for sale. Thereafter, they would be responsible for efficient returns on public capital.

In short, a change in economic policy is needed. Our large investment projects must be reexamined. The blueprints of power plants, which are irresponsible in terms of both energy and economy, must be scrutinized with the help of international and domestic experts; the future must be based on economical and less risky hydrocarbon power plants that can be built in two or three years instead of high risk huge investment projects with long range commitments.

We ought to gradually withdraw from the CEMA's technologically and economically outdated large programs; the CEMA's business and mechanism stand in the way of our modernization and increase our external imbalance.

For a change in domestic economy, an economic policy package is necessary. This consolidated policy package must include the interrelated programs of budget and public finance reform, economic constitutionality, and sociopolitical reform, as well as a precisely defined model for enterprise promotion, together with the basic concepts for an inflation and unemployment policy.

### Democracy Package for Regaining Trust

So far, the government has proved incapable of structural transformation. And today there is still no guarantee of any sort that it could implement a transformation, that it would dare, that it would want to oppose the large interest lobbies. This is why a change in economic policy is inconceivable without a change in the political organizations. The government ought to publicize the main issues of structural transformation for the parties, movements, and the public; arguments and counterarguments, parties and movements, government and independent experts must encounter in the mass media over cutbacks on large investment projects, subsidies, and crisis-ridden enterprises and industrial sectors. Only a well-informed society, able to intervene, can affect a structural transformation, only such a society's trust can be regained; only such a society will take things in hand, turn sensible savings into production, and assume solidarity with separatist social groups. Otherwise a mistrusting society will "keep its seat" in the bad structure and will close the door on itself to lock out the crisis while it at the same time uses up its reserves.

The train may still come in 1991-92. After that, under the already accumulated burden of our debts, our enterprising vitality destroyed, our faith and confidence incapacitated, and our having been locked out of Europe, we will have no strength left to board the train.

## * MSZMP's Tabajdi Views Foreign Policy

*25000155c Budapest MARCZIUS TIZENOTODIKE in Hungarian 15 Mar 89 p 8*

[Article by Csaba Tabajdi, deputy director of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) Central Committee's International Party Affairs Department: "Change of Model in Foreign-Policy Orientation: Which Way Can We Turn?"]

[Text] One of the basic problems of today's Hungarian foreign policy is expressed in this dilemma: Does the change of model, commonly accepted as necessary, also imply a need to change orientation in foreign policy? To put it another way; If we reject the Stalinist model of socialism and strive to develop a new kind of socialism, would not this also mean turning away from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries? Is a radical change of orientation possible: If yes, why, and if not, why not?

In order to answer, first of all we must determine the extent to which we can make a sovereign decision on this issue. Nowadays, one of the great paradoxes of Hungary's system of international contacts is that, even though our country has not had this much freedom in its foreign policy since 1948 (with the Soviet Union using only the criterion of stability in social development as a guide, and not involved in ideological measuring to ensure the building of of faithful socialism in other countries) in almost every area we are facing a peculiar lack of sovereignty. This applies to our relations with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the West alike. The restrictions are represented not only by our dependency in the area of energy supply, industrial and military policies; our sovereignty of political decision making is infringed upon to at least as great an extent by the fact that we became captive to borrowed capital. While our socialist partners have neither the resources that would stimulate our development nor the models that could be adopted in the service of our innovative efforts, our present situation is such that we can only be a pseudocolony or periphery of the West. As a result of this dual dependency and bind, our numerous other problems are complicated by the fact that we are seriously lacking sovereignty.

When it comes to the change of orientation alluded to in the title (which, in fact, means turning to the West instead of the socialist countries) a segment of our public opinion nurtures many illusions concerning it, and we should clarify the invalidity of these beliefs. One of them is that loans would help us stop a further lowering of our standards of living. A noteworthy consideration is that the West is no longer willing to provide credit to finance such efforts, and we can obtain leans only for the purposes of undelayable structural modifications or rational investments.

A change of orientation is hindered primarily by external limitations. As for internal consideration, it is not so much whether Hungary needs Europe but much more whether Europe needs Hungary. In other words, the question is not merely which way should we orient ourselves, but also whether there is a "receptivity" on the part of potential partners. After all, our opportunities are also limited by the readiness of our partners to collaborate with us; which, of course, is a direct consequence of our ability to become genuine partners and offer the talent and readiness to cooperate and become integrated. What this means that we must develop conditions within Hungary that make this country an attractive partner (and, beyond stability, this also implies a disposition to develop and innovate.)

The issue of a change of orientation should be raised primarily from the point of view of economic reforms, and specifically of considerations involved in changing markets. For Hungary (and in this regard we cannot avoid discussing politically taboo themes) we must thoroughly examine our various major contacts; those with the CEMA, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Soviet Union and Western Europe, as well as our relationship with China, Japan, the North American sphere, and the developing world. We must determine the degree to which these spheres, groups of countries and nations represent alternatives to each other: To what degree could China be substituted for our CEMA markets, or how well would new ties with the Pacific region or the North American economic area replace our collaboration with Western Europe?

In the course of sober examination, we must also ask: Does Hungary have the freedom to leave the CEMA? It has become evident to economic experts, as well as the public at large, that the CMEA has not only lost its energizing function it used to fulfill during the 1960's and the 1970's, along with its stabilizing role, but by now it has come to operate as a retrograde force. Nevertheless, calls for us to withdraw from the CEMA are invalid, because, after all, that organization is not functioning. It is certainly not functioning as a diverse organization; therefore, it is futile to mention integration in connection with it. On the other hand, the CEMA is functioning as an umbrella or frame organization for a system of bilateral contacts. Consequently, instead of considering withdrawal from the CEMA, we should thoroughly study the advantages and disadvantages our country derives from bilateral contacts with individual countries that are maintained within the CEMA.

We must also acknowledge that it is economically unrealistic to expect that within the next 5 to 10 years we could replace the energy and material imports coming from the Soviet Union with those coming from the hard currency markets. This is especially true when a large volume of debts must be serviced, such as the one currently faced by Hungary. The other fact we must keep in mind is that (even though it exerts a certain conserving influence on the structure of our industries) the CEMA provides employment for 1,000,000 Hungarian citizens. Today, when the Damoclean sword of unemployment hangs over us, this has great significance. It should also make us think that the idea of withdrawing from the Soviet market occurred to us at the time when Western partners are trying to gain entry to the same market. Obviously, this is another of those situations in which shortrange considerations should not make us sacrifice longrange advantages.

What all of the above means is that we have no realistic chance to implement a radical change of orientation. However, it is equally clear that we cannot hope for a renewal and a closing of the gap without becoming integrated in a unified, and Western oriented, global market. In simplified terms, we could express our narrowly interpreted economic interests by saying that we have to maintain our current contacts with the socialist countries in order to ensure the day to day operation of our national economy, while we must develop cooperation with West in order to stimulate our development.

Raising our Western contacts to new qualitative levels is also prompted by posing the question: Which of today's political forces can furnish a practically proven concept that would also work for us? The first logical answer is social democracy. However, the potential for adapting that concept is limited, influenced by such considerations as the disparateness of concrete circumstances, starting points, heritages and cultures. Nor should we forget that, when it comes to economic policies, social democracy was also unable to provide solutions during the past decade and a half. What could be very important for us, however, is the model of democracy offered by the social democrats. In the sphere of economics, especially in view of our tasks in modernization, it could be more profitable to study the strictness of bourgeoise parties in their experience with structural transformation. Even these random examples reveal, however, that when it comes to using adaptable models (whose applicability is limited to begin with), we cannot limit ourselves to the study of one country or one political force; we must consider a variety of factors, using discernment, and always start from the givens and realistic needs of our own country. When it comes to our foreign policy, this underscores the importance of adopting and developing an optimal openness, free of ideological reservations, and of striving toward a special dual orientation.

This dual orientation, along with balancing our system of contacts in accordance with our dual commitment, presupposes a transformation of our relationship with the socialist countries. This is prompted also by the fact that if the domestic practices of socialist countries is de-Stalinized, it will make it inevitable to de-Stalinize the relationship among us as well. Inferior and superior status must be eliminated not only within countries or within regions and political systems, but also within blocks. In other words, democratization implies not only the rejection of the Stalinist model, but also that the entire relationship among socialist countries must be placed on entirely new foundations. Of course, this is only possible within a lengthy process; after all, de-Stalinization is taking place in only certain socialist countries, while others maintain the old model, with only minor variations. It is already clear, however, that the Brezhnev Doctrine (or, to be more precise, the Stalin-Khruschev-Brezhnev Doctrine) has lost its force, ideological loyalty, the "validity" and authenticity of building socialism ceased to be strategic political factors, and that a new partnership, based on mutual confidence, is being developed between the Soviet Union and its allies.

This new approach is also evidenced in certain foreign policy moves made by sovereign nations: the right to be "the first to pronounce" certain theses, or the right to undertake experimentation. These are not only permitted, but necessary. There can be only one limit to endeavors of this type: The sovereign moves must not harm the interest of other socialist countries, and they must be in accordance with the spirit of principles contained in the Helsinki closing document. In the course of developing sovereign foreign policy, national interests must inevitably be formulated and represented. After all, if the leadership of a country wishes to ensure its credibility and legitimacy before its own people, it must find it imperative to shape its foreign policy in accordance with national interests.

## Ikarus Factory 'Blackmailing' Government

*LD1104122589 Budapest MTI in English*
*1028 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Budapest, April 11, 1989 (MTI-Econews) — Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry officials are expected to agree today as to how to settle the dispute between the Ikarus bus-building works and its chief subcontractor.

As a result of an earlier price dispute, the Csepel car works have recently stopped delivering the chassis required for the building of Ikarus buses. Csepel car intends to raise chassis prices by 10 per cent, but Ikarus is not willing to accept more than 3 per cent, because this is the highest price rise it can transfer to Soviet importers.

Of the 13,000 Ikarus buses to be manufactured this year, the Soviet Union is expected to import 7,500. (75 per cent of Ikarus' production will be marketed in the Comecon [CEMA] countries, 10 per cent in Western countries, and 15 per cent on the domestic market.)

As a result of the dispute, the situation had become aggravated, as 1,200 Ikarus workers were left without work on Friday [7 April], and 1,068 of the works' 2,838 blue-collar workers, and 97 of their 769 white-collar workers were sent on an emergency holiday on Tuesday, because production had been stopped.

The conflict between the two works, which involves the representatives of the Ministry of Industry and of the Ministry of Finance, acts as a precedent in Hungary.

Now it is clear that Ikarus is openly blackmailing the Hungarian government, and wants to force it to grant budget support by suspending production. Ikarus is backed by the Ministry of Industry in this.

Since, according to Mr Gyula Sos, deputy minister of industry, the government would have to open its purse again, and should acknowledge that in the case of fixed-price exports, domestic inflation makes it impossible for the companies to operate efficiently. Therefore, the Ministry of Industry urges that some of the production taxes be lifted.

The slow increase of Comecon market prices has caused problems for some time now, but last year, to counterbalance price losses on the Comecon market, Ikarus was granted 940 million forints (USD 18 million) from the state budet, of which it passed on 700 million forints to Csepel car. This year, the government has not promised Ikarus any "smart money".

A number of government experts fear that in case the Ministry of Finance concedes, this would further weaken the state budget, and fail to slow down inflation.

Some experts believe that in case the requested support is not granted, the bus-building works and the subcontractors will be forced to come to an agreement between themselves, since the subcontractors cannot sell their products to other markets either.

Such approach would help carry out a consistent anti-inflationary policy. Otherwise, there is no hope whatever for keeping inflation around the planned 15 per cent in the coming years.

Currently, nothing restrains Hungarian companies to transfer costs which derive from inefficient business and labour management onto higher prices.

### Politburo Discusses Roundtable, Farmers Congress

*LD1104213889 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] The Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Central Committee Politburo has held a meeting. This is the content of its communique:

The Politburo has assessed the sociopolitical situation after the conclusion of the roundtable debates. The party leadership heard a report on the financial situation of elderly and disabled pensioners and on beneficial changes being prepared concerning the benefits for work veterans.

The Politburo acquainted itself with the course of the National Congress of Delegates of Agricultural Circles and Organizations, emphasizing the role of the Polish countryside and the economic and social significance of farmers' labor. The participants in the meeting expressed the conviction that decisions being prepared by the government will contribute to the development of agricultural production and to an improvement in the living and working conditions in the countryside.

The Politburo acquainted itself with preparations for the National Conference of Delegates, as well as with draft documents for this forum. Programmatic guidelines for the 12th PZPR Central Committee Plenum, which will convene this coming Saturday, were examined.

### Opposition Newspaper To Appear Beginning 1 May

*AU1204070589 Paris AFP in English 0615 GMT 12 Apr 89*

[text] Warsaw, April 12 (AFP)—The East bloc's first officially-sanctioned opposition newspaper is due to go on sale in Poland on May 1, informed sources said here.

The appearance of the newspaper, "Gazeta," is among the first tangible results of the broad-based mandate for social and political change in Poland agreed by government and opposition groups at the "roundtable" negotiations which ended last week.

The new tabloid will appear twice weekly for the first two weeks and will subsequently be published each weekday.

Adam Michnik, a Polish historian and a close advisor to the leader of the Solidarity trade union, Lech Walesa, has been placed in charge of the newspaper, which is expected to have an initial circulation of 200,000 and a targeted circulation of around 500,000 within three months.

The paper, which is expected to give strong backing to opposition candidates in legislative elections, due to be held in June, will initially have a staff of about 30 journalists.

"This is the start of a great adventure," Mr Michnik said. He also called for financial and technical contributions from the West to help the paper get started.

### Walesa Holds Gdansk News Conference 6 April

*AU1204065489 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Apr 89 p 5*

[Report by Zbigniew Wrobel on a press conference given by Lech Walesa at St Brygida's Church in Gdansk on 6 April: "And in Gdansk"]

[Text] Immediately after his return from Warsaw, Lech Walesa met journalists for a second time at a press conference in the parish hall of St Brygida's Church in Gdansk.

Replying to questions from people working for underground journals, Lech Walesa resolutely rejected the suggestion that the agreements should be regarded as a victory for his group. He said: "It is a victory for all of Poland and does not involve divisions. For the first time and without using of coercion, Poles have reached an agreement solely by exchanging opinions. These agreements now have to be given substance and have been implemented."

During the final part of the conference, L. Walesa indirectly withdrew the statement that he made about voluntarily giving up his active role in public life.

He announced that a meeting of the Citizens' Committee would take place on 8 April, during which the tactics and program of Solidarity-opposition circles for the Sejm and senate election campaign would be established. He said that Solidarity-opposition candidates in all voivodships would have the support of his name.

### Solidarity Leaders Hold Warsaw News Conference

*AU1204065589 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Apr 89 p 5*

[Report by Andrzej Miklaszewicz on a press conference given by Solidarity leaders at Warsaw University on 6 April: "No One Has Defeated Anyone"]

[Text] On several occasions during the press conference Lech Walesa said that no power struggle had taken place at the "roundtable."

He said: "No one defeated anyone, and no one wanted to defeat anyone. We also will not seek to make our trade union a political organization."

Replying to a question, he said: "I would like there to be three trade unions in Poland of more or less equal strength so that one union will not be able to crush another one. I shall seek to prevent Solidarity from acquiring a monopoly, which would guarantee against the repetition of past mistakes."

L. Walesa estimated that Solidarity would have between 5 and 7 million members once registration was completed.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki answered a question about when Solidarity would be registered. He said: "Soon the Sejm will pass a law that will amend the current law on trade unions. We are in the process of filing an application for registration with a court. We expect the registration to take place at some stage during the next 2 weeks."

Commenting on the conflict that occurred at the last "roundtable" meeting, L. Walesa said: "We are entering the period of pluralism. These kinds of scenes will take place under democracy. This is the normal course of affairs when there are various kinds of interests. It is perhaps unfortunate that it happened at that particular time."

Asked by TRYBUNA LUDU about the powers that the consultative commission would have, Bronislaw Geremek recalled the three aims of the commission that were described in the "roundtable" final communique, adding that the commission would continue the work of the "roundtable" in another way and that access to all sources of information and to public opinion would be an essential condition for its functioning.

One Western journalist expressed fears that the need for a more offensive approach by the party which was stressed in TRYBUNA LUDU might signify a turning back on the new political situation. L. Walesa replied: "If we need an offensive to proceed in the directions that were agreed on at the 'roundtable,' then we welcome it."

A representative of the Independent Association of University Students expressed the criticism that youth, instead of being a third leg of the "roundtable," had been treated more as a spare tire. Janusz Onyszkiewicz retorted that the issues that had not been settled at the "roundtable," including a reduction in the length of military service, would be the subject of further efforts. L. Walesa added: "It was my job to see to it that you could organize yourselves in the way that we can, and we have achieved that."

After an hour Lech Walesa left the hall in Warsaw University's Kazimierzowski Palace to fly to Gdansk. The conference continued.

TRYBUNA LUDU asked: "Why did Grazyna Staniszewska have a place at the 'roundtable' although she had not taken part in earlier meetings, and had the Solidarity-opposition side discussed her speech beforehand in any way?"

Janusz Onyszkiewicz said: "She stepped in for Klemens Szaniawski, who is abroad. The speech was neither censored by the executive commission nor by me. It was her speech. As for the thrust of the speech, it was in keeping with the statement that we issued earlier, following the dispute over indexation...."

## Ciosek, Baka View Roundtable at News Conference

*AU1104141689 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Apr 89 pp 1, 2*

[Report attributed to Wanda Zagawa and PAP: "The Party Will Work in the Spirit of the Principles That Have Been Agreed"]

[Text] At the INTERPRESS Center on 6 April Polish and foreign journalists met representatives of the coalition-government side that took part in the "roundtable" session. The representatives were Wladyslaw Baka, Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, Stanislaw Ciosek, PZPR Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, Janusz Reykowski, PZPR Politburo member, and Minister Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of the Council of Ministers Sociopolitical Committee. The conference was chaired by Jan Grzelak, director and editor in chief of INTERPRESS.

At the beginning of the conference, Stanislaw Ciosek made a statement. He said: "I would like to stress that the 'roundtable' meetings were one of the steps on the road toward implementing the reform program that our party has taken since the ninth congress. I think that one can go back far into the past, into history. This process that we have initiated at the 'roundtable' can be traced back to the times when, at the beginning of the existence of our new people's fatherland following the end of World War II, the Polish left put forward a program of national unity. These reforms have markedly increased the possibility of fully realizing the aspirations of working people in Poland. The agreement that has been reached cannot be viewed in terms of the interests of any one of the sides that took part in the session. That is why it does not represent a victory for a particular side. The agreement is the property of all Poles. It was reached in the interests of the nation and the socialist state. It set out new principles according to which social life will now proceed. All the participants agreed on these principles. We also hope that everyone will respect these principles. The party that I represent is fully prepared to respect them and to act in accordance with their spirit."

The PZPR Central Committee secretary said: "Nevertheless, one cannot expect the attainment of agreement to result in the immediate disappearance of worries and problems. However, there is no doubt that the agreement creates an opportunity and paves the way for gradual, genuine, and tangible progress. This situation accords with the wishes of the majority in the world of work.

"How does the opportunity that I have mentioned manifest itself? It is reflected in the rationalization of the economy, increasing its efficiency by implementing the economic reform, and gradually attaining the market equilibrium that all of us in Poland need. Thus, it is reflected in the elimination of all the shortcomings that are felt by working people the most acutely. This opportunity is also reflected in the construction of a reformed, democratic sociopolitical system that ensures greater civic sovereignty, the extensive development of pluralism in all areas of public life, the possibility of fully expressing various views, and observance of civil rights and the rule of law."

S. Ciosek continued: "We realize that differences between various political forces and groups will not disappear after the 'roundtable.' They will have different ideas about the ways in which the problems that the country faces can be solved. After all, that is the essence of pluralism. Everyone will be seeking to convince society that they are right and everyone will have a right to do so, and our party will try to use this right. In reaching agreement, we did not, of course, because we could not, deprive anyone of their own identity. Taking this into consideration, we do, nevertheless, stress that the set of principles agreed at the 'roundtable,' which everyone involved in political life should use as a guide for their activity, will ensure that all differences are resolved in a way that does not disrupt public order. In short, differences should be resolved in a civilized fashion that accords with the norms of political behavior in a society that functions normally. This is also something that the great majority of the people hope for: They want to live in a country that functions normally, without the specter of great upheavals and conflicts hanging over it."

"Next, at the 'roundtable' we opened and, at the same time, closed a certain stage. This is necessary in order to implement the 'roundtable' decisions as fully as possible. We have to break with the past, with old prejudices and animosities. We must all act in a new way and leave the past to those who are engaged in historical research so that they can calmly produce various arguments. The basic instruction to those who want to act for Poland's present and its near and more distant future is to think about things as they are at present and about what has to be done. In this context, I would like to stress the two levels and stages of our road. At our party's 10th plenum we stressed that, as progress is made in building the framework of the future sociopolitical and economic order, we will continue to shape, develop, and improve the model of the socialist state. Further stages will, of course, depend on the progress made in realizing this intention. I profoundly believe that the issues that were dealt with at the 'roundtable,' and there were very many of them, will not be of a temporary nature and that they will be a lasting solution that will shape people's lives in Poland. At this point, it is hard predict which of the solutions are the more modern, which are less modern, which of them will last and which of them will disappear, and which of them are more democratic and which of them are less democratic. It seems to me that we should begin by testing all the solutions that we agreed on together and implement them in good faith without assuming in advance that they are something temporary or transitory. Undoubtedly, many of them will be of this kind, but, at the same time, many of the decisions that we made will turn out to be good and appropriate ones. This will be something that will be determined by society, the people, and the course of events. So, I suggest that we should not make premature judgments about what has been agreed: History and the course of events will be the judge. In conclusion, I would like to express respect for all those whose realism and feeling of responsibility for Poland resulted in the completion of the 'roundtable.' I am also referring to the role of the church in the maturing of dialogue. At the same time, we cannot fail to feel pride and satisfaction at being the initiators of this process and those who stubbornly continued it, even at times when doubts appeared and hopes faded. I am thinking of my party."

Most of the questions were addressed to Stanislaw Ciosek, the most frequent topic being the present and future role of the National Trade Union Confederation [OPZZ].

S. Ciosek: "I swore in this hall that the unions that were set up in 1982 were not the 'regime's invention.' Today, surely, none of you doubt that I was telling the truth. We have a Polish version of pluralism. Alfred Miodowicz has a 7-million-strong base: If only we could apply party discipline to this base of 7 million.... In reaching an agreement at the 'roundtable,' we put to one side many issues on which we differ and are divided. That is what pluralism is like. What is important is that we achieved unity on issues that are of the greatest importance to Poles."

Wladyslaw Baka added to this statement: "One does not have to overtake events. I do not agree that there is a mass of differences. In the list of 80 points drawn up by the team of which I was cochairman, we noted a difference of opinion with respect to eight points, and those are issues of a secondary nature. The OPZZ indicated its different position on the question of indexation. I personally am firmly opposed to indexation and support a program for combating inflation, but a politician cannot be guided solely by personal conviction. The indexation option that was agreed on at the 'roundtable' could 'boost' inflation. We will continue working with the OPZZ, because we all agreed that the indexation system must be universal and just, and be decided about in enterprises. The only difference that exists concerns the 0.8 index."

Asked what aspects of the "roundtable" pleased him now that the session was over, Minister A. Kwasiniewski said: "Through evolution we have achieved what many countries achieve through revolution. There is also some anxiety in what I feel today, because the 'roundtable' marks the beginning of everything. It will be a test for all those who were involved in reaching an agreement. We have to display loyalty, wisdom, and consistency. I hope that the 'roundtable' and what will happen in Poland over the next weeks will create a 'critical mass' of support for reform."

One person asked whether the conflict between authorities and the OPZZ was not also a conflict within the Politburo.

Prof Reykowski replied: "Let us not exaggerate these conflicts for the time being. The only issue involved is indexation. Very many people in Poland live under difficult conditions, and they fear that the indexation principle proposed by the 'roundtable' will prove to be inadequate. In view of this, the OPZZ is campaigning to have this principle changed—and it has a right to do so. This one issue can provide no basis for creating visions of splits within the party and the Politburo."

One of the more interesting question was: "Do you think that there will be a meeting between Jaruzelski and Walesa in the near future?"

S. Ciosek replied: "I cannot exclude or confirm this. Such a meeting will undoubtedly have to take place at some point." Someone else asked whether members of the party would be able to join Solidarity.

S. Ciosek replied: "The party will set out its position on this issue once Solidarity's ideological character has been clearly defined."

Another question asked was: "What does the 'roundtable' represent for the party—a triumph or a defeat?" The short and resolute answer was: "The triumph of reason."

## Statistics Office To Lift Ban, Release Reports

*LD1104193189 Warsaw PAP in English
1609 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Warsaw, April 11—Following the plea by the "GUS" main statistical office's representatives at the roundtable to the effect that their office would prefer to be a public institution providing broad access to information, "GUS" President Franciszek Kubiczek has lifted the ban on access to seven thousand reports written after 1950 but so far kept unpublished in the "GUS" central statistical library.

The office has also reviewed the procedures under which 10 out of 138 yearly reports were being labelled "confidential." At least 50 per cent of them will not be classified any longer. In the past, many statistical materials, not necessarily state secrets, were never published by "GUS."

## New Terms Outlined for Obtaining Visas to FRG

*LD1004170689 Warsaw PAP in English
1620 GMT 10 Apr 89*

[Text] Warsaw, April 10—Starting Monday, April 17, Polish citizens wanting to make tourist trips to the FRG will have to obtain visas by proving that they have at least DM50 for each day of their visit.

As concerns trips made at invitations, one has to add to the visa application a notification of competent West German authorities dealing with foreigners. Such notifications will be issued at the request of the inviting person after it is proven that he or she is able to accomodate the guest.

Justifying the introduction of new terms for issuing visas for Polish citizens, representatives of the FRG's Embassy in Warsaw stated, among other things, that the number of visa applications has been growing with each year. 130 thousand visas were issued in 1982 while the number went up to 725 thousand last year. The embassy currently estimates the backlog in visa issuance to total 30 thousand applications.

Referring to the number of 46.6 thousand people who in the first quarter of this year applied for permanent residence in the FRG and the 8 thousand Poles applying for political asylum in the same period, the embassy announced that in the opinion of the West German authorities, Polish citizens at present have no reasons to apply for political asylum status. Talking about persecution in Poland in the understanding of international law is out of the question, they pointed out.

The FRG Government does not strive to limit the freedom to travel but wants to prevent abuse of the FRG's visa regulations, at the same time facilitating trips for scientific, economic and cultural purposes to that country. In connection with this it will be possible for the people concerned to receive visas valid for one year with the right to cross the FRG's border many times, the embassy officials revealed.

### 'Brady Plan' To Reduce Third World Debt Viewed

*AU1104165889 Bucharest LUMEA in Romanian No 14, 6 Apr 89 pp 8, 9*

[Dr Ilie Serbanescu article: "Confrontations of Stands on the Issue of Debt Reductions"]

[Excerpts] Proceedings of the IMF Interim Committee and the World Bank Development Committee, two bodies which meet every spring to examine the overall situation and to conduct consultations and adopt decisions on international monetary-financial problems, recently took place in Washington. As on similar occasions in recent years, the agenda of the meetings was dominated by the problem of the developing countries' foreign debt, whose tackling has acquired new facets, in view of the broad recognition of the need to reduce the debts as a means to solving this problem, which may be the most serious one currently facing the world economy. [passage omitted]

In the middle of March, the United States announced its new approach, also known as the "Brady Plan," which stipulates, among other ways and means of settling this problem, a reduction of debts by creditors through the application of market mechanisms (buying off old debts or converting debts into investments).

As was to be expected, due to its own provisions, the so-called "Brady Plan" aroused many controversies connected with some of the main problems broached and with various concrete aspects of its implementation. Although this plan requires, for the first time ever, an effort on the part of creditors in solving the problem of debts (through the debt cuts envisaged), the developing countries claim that quite of few of its provisions do not go far enough to settle the issue. Thus, the maintenance of the clause of the so-called tackling of the issue "by cases" means that the debtors will further have to deal individually with the common front of creditors and, since the debt cuts are to be made only through the so-called "market mechanisms," the plan limits the number of eventual beneficiaries to those debtor countries which will accept programs within the sphere of the "market mechanism." [passage omitted] However, the "Brady Plan" is mainly criticized for the fact that the debt reductions will occur only if the debtor countries proceed to implement such economic adjustments as are requested by the creditors, through the international financial institutions, although the debtor countries themselves may not consider these adjustments necessary. [passage omitted]

According to certain unofficial data, released by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, the "Brady Plan" will be applied to 39 countries with an overall debt to private banks of more than $340 billion; through the application of market mechanisms, within 3 years this debt will be reduced by about 20 percent. [passage omitted]

The joint committee set up by the IMF and the World Bank will establish the form of participation in the operations to reduce debts and debt servicing. The statements made by some participants in these meetings show that such operations can be negotiated as of the last part of the current year.

### Daily on Socialist Legality, Ownership

*AU1104121589 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 9 Apr 89 pp 1, 5*

[S. Andon article: "Revolutionary Militancy in Protecting Socialist Legality, Ownership"]

[Excerpts] The construction of the new system, of socialism and communism in our country, has clearly demonstrated the creative potential and energy of our people, who are jointly and firmly involved in forging their own destiny. Along with the vigorous development of the national economy, which influenced the standard of living of all working people favorably, social awareness went through a truly revolutionary process throughout the country, permitting a better understanding of the objective requirements and targets of progress and leading to the assumption of greater civic responsibility by each member of our society. [passage omitted]

In accordance with firmly established practice, a few days ago the Political Executive Committee [PEC] of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party examined aspects directly linked to the concrete affirmation—at the mass level—of the sense of social responsibility. The law on monitoring the origin of persons' illicitly acquired assets was discussed. [passage omitted]

The unflinching application of the principle of establishing an existence exclusively through honest work, while firmly rejecting any tendency toward parasitism and getting rich without work, is a priority of the offensive of progressive awareness against reactionary thinking and interests, which, as is known, do not disappear all by themselves; nor do they capitulate of their own accord, but require a firm attitude and militant conduct in order to eradicate them. [passage omitted]

Even now the path to progress is not free from obstacles. The process of renewal will never be smooth. Preserving and strengthening the ability to overcome difficulties and eliminate obstacles—whether objective or subjective—in the progress of society requires skill, boldness, and greater competence and militancy. [passage omitted]

According to the report examined by the PEC meeting on 7 April, violations—even though their number is decreasing—of the general rules of life and honest work, honest existence, and respect for the norms and principles of the whole society can still be noted, as can tendencies toward getting rich without work and other signs of harsh selfishness. It would be completely wrong to view them only as violations of work requirements or of financial discipline. In essence, they are profoundly antisocial manifestations, which are identical with everything that is outdated and with social rottenness. No matter how much social awareness has progressed, one cannot say that we have reached the level at which backward mentality and attitudes belong exclusively to the past. On the other hand, one can never forget the truth that there are still imperialist circles, and there are reactionary and slanderous tendencies toward socialism. This precisely is why neglect, parasitism, pilfering, violations, and any departure from the common cause and path must find their prompt, direct, militant, and proper response. [passage omitted]

The lack or insufficiency of an effective exactingness and the prolonged tolerance of the working collectives explains why in some areas of the greatest importance for our citizens, such as trade, public services, and so forth, which are directly linked to the quality of life, sometimes there are serious violations of the law, profiteering is still practiced, and often there are cases of theft of public assets. In short, this is why acquiring personal riches at the expense of social interests in general still persists. Are those who commit such deeds the only guilty ones? Of course not! At least from the ethical and social viewpoint, but often also from the legal viewpoint, those are also guilty—and, we can say, with the passing of time more and more guilty! —who close their eyes to all this and do not note when people slide into dishonesty, who turn their backs and do not adopt the preventive measures firmly stipulated by law, and who keep quiet or forget or do not care to put a stop to such acts through a responsible attitude and militant spirit.

It goes without saying that the institutionalized bodies for protecting public wealth—the financial control, penal, and judicial bodies—play an important role and bear particular responsibility, which has been outlined to the finest detail. However, the members of the working collectives themselves must always be in the forefront and must constantly set an example of paying attention to and being concerned with protecting public wealth.

We should bear in mind that the shortfalls still obvious in the attitude and conduct of one or another working collective or sector also prove faults in the political-educational work. It is the duty of party bodies and organizations in units and sectors to examine, very seriously and with great responsibility, not only what action they have taken to strengthen order and legality, and to increase exactingness and militancy, but, above all, what are the results of measures taken and what is the explanation for the fact that they do not always and everywhere generate a positive effect. Only thus will we be able to bring about a truly revolutionary reconsideration in the spirit of the working style and only thus may we view the important social duties of protecting and developing public wealth and of constantly strengthening socialist legality as fulfilled.

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## LUMEA on European Security Process

*AU0604194889 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1753 GMT 6 Apr 89*

["Evolutions and Involutions in the All-European Security and Cooperation Process"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES, 6/4/1989—Well-known Romanian diplomat Valentin Lipati contributes the article "Evolutions and Involutions in the All-European Security and Cooperation Process" to the 6 April issue of weekly "LUMEA" which shows among other things:

As it has often been stressed, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held over 1973-1975 to the unfolding of which Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu made an outstanding contribution was undoubtedly a historically significant moment in the political life of our continent. Such an assessment relies on several basic elements which defined the conference. First, it is the new, democratic model of negotiations the conference conceived and consecrated in accordance with the principle of the states' equality of rights which found a reflection in the rules of procedures suggested by Romania and acquired by the other participating countries. Second, it is the fact that, for the first time in the diplomatic history of post-war Europe, one can rather speak about a conference which included in its agenda the continent's major problems in the political, juridical, military, economic technical, scientific, ecological, cultural, humanitarian and other spheres than about a multilateral meeting specialized in one domain or another. The conference worked out a code of conduct including ten principles apt to govern mutual relations among the participating states. It also covenanted a comprehensive programme of action in the domains approached, setting the priorities and ways needed to translate it into fact. Finally, unlike other international meetings, the Helsinki conference was not an aim in itself but the beginning of a process apt to acquire in time ever broader and better articulated institutional structures.

The development of such a process which postulates the building of a Europe united in its diversity has never implied, in the spirit of those who worked out the CSCE Final Act, the violation or disregard of any participating state's interests and positions but, on the contrary, the finding of those ways of action apt to take them into due account. So, the conference stated that all interstate principles, as they were stipulated in the Final Act, are of utmost importance and that, while interpreting each one of them, account should be taken of all the others.

The remarkable results with which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded on 1 August 1975 made some believe that detente was irreversible. Unfortunately, it proved to be a fragile process susceptible to be brought to question again and negated. Shortly after the signing of the Final Act we were witnesses of a growing tension in the world, more particularly in Europe, of the frantic escalation of the arms race, especially of the nuclear one, of growing mistrust and rivalry between the great powers, the multiplication of discriminatory and protectionist measures in the economic field, the prevalence of the policy of force and interference in the internal affairs of other countries just as of the recrudescence of ideological antagonisms. Such a complex and contradictory situation prejudiced the application on the Final Act, the signatory states making too little efforts to translate their pledges into fact. But beyond the fact that it was little applied, the Final Act started to make the object of abusive interpretations, which run counter to its letter and spirit, that is a still more serious drawback. Doubtlessly, a major erroneous tendency was the East-West perspective approach to the Final Act, from a bloc position. Furthermore, it was the emergence of an internal imbalance of the provisions agreed upon owing to the Western countries which consider that humanitarian questions should prevail over the other problems examined at the CSCE and even make the former conditional upon the latter. Concurrently with the assertion of the "Carter theory" of human rights, one could also witness a fast degradation of the diplomatic spirit of mutual respect and rational compromise which defined the CSCE negotiations.

The first victim of such negative tendencies was the Belgrade meeting (1977-1978) where the confrontation between the great powers, especially the U.S.A. and the USSR, made the final document of the meeting empty of content, as it limited itself to the establishment of the programme of multilateral meetings in an immediately ensuing period. In its turn, the Madrid meeting (1980-1983) saw long moments of crisis and had to suffer from the same drawbacks though it ended with a rather balanced final document. On the other hand, the expert meetings just as the meetings in Ottawa (1985), Budapest (1985) and Berne (1986) could not adopt any document for the same reasons. A happy exception from such involutions was the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, with its first phase in Stockholm between 1984 and 1986.

The Vienna meeting [word indistinct] also gave a highly worrisome expression to tendencies contrary to the spirit which defined the CSCE negotiations. Systematic confrontations, defamatory allegations, the predominance of ideological and propagandistic arguments on political and diplomatic motivations, the refusal to negotiate and consider the positions of one or another participant, the exercise of menace and pressures were characteristic of the meeting especially in its last part. All these negative approaches naturally reflected in the its final document which contains a number of provisions which run counter the CSCE Final Act and on which, as is known, Romania made a statement of reservations and interpretations in compliance with the rules in force. Undoubtedly, the final document covenanted in Vienna comprises several positive resolutions like the beginning, in Vienna too, of the two series of negotiations on conventional disarmament and the adoption of new confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, or the development of cooperation in the economic, technical, scientific, ecological, cultural and other spheres and the programme—richer in content and better diversified—of the multilateral meeting due till the next all-European meeting in Helsinki in 1992. However, one cannot disregard the anomalies of the post-Helsinki process.

More than the Belgrade and Madrid meetings, the Vienna meeting meant a crisis of the very essence of the CSCE process viewed in its more lasting modality, namely the new, democratic model of negotiations based on consensus, respectively on the full exercise of the participating states' sovereign equality. And this thing must offer food for thought as, in certain aspects, it is a more serious phenomenon than the adoption of unjustified or inapplicable provisions.

Nevertheless, it should be also said that such negative phenomena which affected the CSCE process were manifest not only in a multilateral framework but also in the sphere of bilateral relations, and "coloured" the unilateral measures taken by some participating states. And this, as a paradoxical and absurd reply to the Final Act's urge for further unilateral, bi- and multilateral efforts toward attaining the goals pursued by the conference... Violating the unwritten fundamental understanding which allowed for the holding of the Helsinki conference with the well-known results, namely the observance of the diversity of socio-political systems extant in Europe, numerous Western countries began campaigns, ever more vehemently in the last few years, of denigrating realities in one socialist country or another. So, human rights are steadily invoked by political circles and even governments to legitimate in fact their action against socialism as it is built in one country or another. Ideology and propaganda, more often than not indecent, replaced the political and diplomatic demarche to a great extent, violating the elementary norms of international conduct. Confrontation, calumny, vexing epithets, boycott and retaliatory measures are part and parcel of the panoply of an irresponsible and short-sighted policy, harmful over a long period of time even to those who practice it, and able to prejudice a smooth run of interstate relations, mutual understanding and respect as well as cooperation. Such an equivocal messianism can but run counter to the manysided efforts for the building of security and the development of cooperation on the continent. And it is all the more regrettable to see how the countries which consented precautiously to take part in the Helsinki conference, proposed and promoted by the socialist countries, pose as the holders of the absolute truth of the CSCE process and attempt to turn it into an instrument of cold war at a time when detente should prevail and assert itself in Europe and the world over.

As time passes by, it is all the more clear that, like all the great constructions of the human spirit, the building of a lasting system of security and cooperation in Europe generated correct and encouraging applications as well as deviations, misinterpretations, "heresy." Let us hope that they are only temporary. In any case, for the future political process which proved its viability, it is indispensable to respect the balance of interests of all the participating states as an instrument of negotiation apt to promote all-European cooperation and not to sow hatemongering among participants, to observe the principles governing the mutual relations among the participating states, as they are stipulated and explained in the Final Act, to promote an all-European cooperation as a political, not as a legislative process, of mutually acceptable terms and in consideration of the diversity of social and economic systems, to reject any bloc approach (the CSCE process being outside military alliances and other bodies which perpetuate the division of Europe) just as any other supernational approach, to re-establish the diplomatic style of negotiations (which does not exclude critical standtakings) and to give up a conduct based, at any cost, on confrontation and slander.

Moreover, it is obvious that the building of a durable system of security and cooperation in Europe postulates an ever better structured continuity of the multilateral efforts initiated by the CSCE, apt to favour the spirit of understanding and cooperation and not dispute, mistrust or hostility among the participants. Such a continuity would enable cooperation to diversify and deepen, would consolidate the bases of security, would build up confidence and strengthen friendship among the peoples on the continent. But such a perspective cannot be attained unless intolerance and invectives are eliminated from bi- and multilateral European relations and the export of revolution and counterrevolution is completely given up. A Europe united in its diversity cannot make an authentic future for itself but by constantly applying the new principles of interstate relations and significant measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, by promoting broad and unhampered cooperation in all the fields envisaged by the Final Act and other pertinent documents within the CSCE process.

Finally, it is clear that the CSCE process, even endowed with improved institution structures, could not include all activities to be carried on in Europe in one sphere or other of mutual interest that can stimulate ties of collaboration, build up confidence and security. Despite all this, the CSCE process will undoubtedly continue to be the dynamic component element of a future system of European security conceived as the only rational alternative to an international system of relations underlain by strength, by the spheres-of influence and bloc-logic policies. The CSCE process must keep its identity and avoid to enter a narrow regionalism or an inefficient "mondialism." It must preserve, more particularly, fundamental options and avoid everything able to harm.

## U.S. Congress Considers 'Anti-SFRY' Draft

*LD1104182589 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1545 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[By Dusan Zupan]

[Text] Washington, April 11 (TANJUG)—The "draft" of the new anti-Yugoslav resolution has been presented in the U.S. Congress.

Congressman Broomfield has submitted a draft resolution asking the President of the United States to review all relations, including economic ones, with Yugoslavia, in case the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia "continues to curb the human rights of ethnic Albanians in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo."

This is not the first anti-Yugoslav "resolution" Broomfield has put before the U.S. Congress. Neither is it the first time he uses misinformation and warped logic in drawing conclusions, although he is regarded as one of the U.S. Congress's better-informed members.

Broomfield claims that Kosovo, where ethnic Albanian separatists are acting with the aim of breaking the province away from Yugoslavia, is characterized by "economic stagnation, educational indifference and social discrimination, caused to a major extent by the policies of the Republic of Serbia."

According to him, on account of this Kosovo has "become Yugoslavia's poorest region."

Even the most extreme ethnic Albanian separatists would find it difficult to claim that Kosovo had "become" the country's most impoverished region, as it has always been that—in spite of all the money poured into it—the one million dollars injected into the province daily by the rest of the country to stimulate its development. The reason for this state of affairs stands open for discussion, but Broomfield seems to find everything crystal-clear.

Also very interesting is Broomfield's claim about "educational indifference" in Kosovo, where the majority of the population is made up by ethnic Albanians (1.7 million). The U.S. congressman "does not know" that Yugoslavia's ethnic Albanian population has at its disposal the fullest possible range of educational institutions in its own language, starting from kindergartens all the way up to a university. There is also a Kosovo academy of sciences.

Does Broomfield know that ethnic Albanians, a national minority, have educational rights which ethnic minorities in the United States can only dream about.

Has there ever been anyone in Yugoslavia's National Assembly who has thought of criticizing the United States for failing to provide its national minorities, say the Hispanics (of whom there are at least 15 million there), with schools and a university in the Spanish language, although there are already many communities in the southern United States whose Spanish-speaking populations surpass their English-speaking ones.

As far as Broomfield's "social discrimination" is concerned, in Kosovo it could relate to a far greater extent to any other population except the Albanian one. Talking at cross purposes, one would say...

The congressman is not worried at all about the enforced emigration of other peoples from Kosovo, including an exodus of the majority Serbian people in their own country.

Broomfield finds objectionable the fact that former high Kosovo official Azem Vlasi and some others were "pressured into resigning" and that they have been, as he says, replaced with ethnic Albanian functionaries leaning more towards Serbia. The congressman probably has more affection for those leaning towards Albania, i.e., those not inclined towards Yugoslavia and thus also not towards the ethnic Albanian nationality in it.

In the best possible case, what we have here is hypocrisy by a man who dislikes the fact that in the fight for its own survival and internal unity Yugoslavia resolves its conflicts with its own laws—and at the same time forgets the fact that the United States, as there is ample historical evidence, has often toppled and set up entire regimes in other countries in accordance with its own interests, mounted armed interventions, etc.

Broomfield also has objections about changes in Yugoslavia's 1974 Constitution and the recent alteration of the Constitution of Serbia, under which the republic has recovered its basic state functions on its entire territory and established full equality with all other Yugoslav republics. The congressman says that the new Constitution has "increased the authority of Serbia over the Province of Kosovo and enabled it to take over the control of its police, judiciary, civil defence and the appointment of officials."

One wonders whether Broomfield has ever asked himself what would happen if, for example, the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) did not have the right to intervene in Masschusetts, Virginia or any other of the United State's 50 states.

Has Broomfield ever considered what his country would be like if an extraordinary American citizen were deprived of the right to appeal to the supreme courts of his own state or that of the United States.

Does he know that his government supports the "independence, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia."

Congressman Broomfield probably thinks that he lives in the "best of all possible worlds."

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, he has a right to all his illusions and mistakes. However, what offends is his ambition to damage relations between the two countries by uttering and writing lies.

## Dizdarevic Interviewed Prior to CSSR Trip

*LD1004214489 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 10 Apr 89*

[Interview with Raif Dizdarevic, president of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Presidium, by special correspondent Juri Halousek at a meeting in the SFRY attended by CSSR journalists, "prior to his official friendly visit to Czechoslovakia"—recorded; Dizdarevic in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed Czech translation]

[Text] [Halousek] Comrade chairman, a number of important changes are taking place in Yugoslavia. What is their main aim and what forms do they take?

[Dizdarevic] As you know, we are in a really great difficulty and are looking for a way out. There are economic and social problems. On the other hand, even if these problems did not exist, Yugoslavia could not stop where it is. We would have to look for new ways of further democratic development of society and new ways of economic advancement. Even someone with very progressive ideas and a rich and fruitful path of internal development would stagnate if he stopped, and his overall standard would decline. This is what is happening to us now. Can we get out of these difficulties, can we assure an overall fruitful development of Yugoslavia in the future by only making some small repairs and patching up what we have? It is obvious that this is not possible. Yugoslavia's situation today, as well as its current problems, require firm and radical overall reforms—mainly economic and social reforms, but I would also like to underline reforms in the League of Communists.

[Halousek] The general public, not only in our country but elsewhere as well, have very carefully followed the events in Kosovo in the last few weeks. What is actually happening in this autonomous area?

[Dizdarevic] Vojvodina and Kosovo are autonomous areas within the Serbian Socialist Republic. In the last 20 years, these areas, however, developed more like separate territories with a special position in a Yugoslav federation than a part of Serbia. This was naturally a source of great disagreements in the Serbian Socialist Republic and also represented a real problem in relations within Yugoslavia. We have now carried out necessary corrections through constitutional changes, by reinforcing the functions and, naturally the responsibility of the Serbian Socialist Republic as a unit, while preserving the existing autonomy. Unfortunately, a proper political explanatory action about the meaning of these changes was not carried out promptly, and the very organized militant separatists misused this. I would say that it was a desparate attempt to halt or prevent changes by which things return to their own place.

Naturally, the Presidency of our country is responsible for the peace, order, and safety of every citizen. Therefore, we had to react to the destructive demonstrations, so we introduced a state of emergency in Kosovo. We are aware that nobody solves political problems with force, and our declaration of the state of emergency was a necessary measure, by which we want to create conditions for dealing with political problems by political means.

Naturally, we were most upset by the fact that there were casualties in the process. My personal conviction is—and the Presidency of Yugoslavia has also said this—that if special measures had not been taken, a much greater tragedy would have happened in Kosovo.

[Halousek] How do relations with Czechoslovakia stand in the SFRY's foreign policy, and where do you see the greatest possibilities for further development of mutual cooperation between our two countries?

[Dizdarevic] In some forms of cooperation, we have achieved a very high standard. For many years, Czechoslovakia has been one of the most important economic partners of Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia was in the same period an important partner of the Czechoslovak economy. We have a very rich and developed cooperation in almost all areas of our relations and, above all, we have a very long tradition of this cooperation. I know that this is often said on occasions like this about relations between two countries, but in relations between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, this is really the case. I see the greatest possibilities for further development where there are the greatest possibilities of development on both sides. This is in the area of economic development-—that is, economic relations which would not be limited only to trade, but would also include new forms, above all joint projects, enterprises, and much greater technological cooperation of our [words indistinct].

I also see great possibilities for our advancement in other areas, among other things in the reinforcement of direct contacts between people, ranging from tourism to further possibilities of residence by our citizens in each other's country. These direct contacts of people have played an important part in the history of Yugoslav-Czechoslovak relations. I am sure that this will be the case in the future as well.

## DPRK's Kim Yong-nam Continues State Visit

### Received by Markovic

*LD1104174989 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1407 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Belgrade, 11 Apr (TANJUG)—Ante Markovic, president of the Federal Executive Council, today received Kim Yong-nam, vice premier in the Administration Council and minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK, who is on a visit to Yugoslavia.

Talks which took place on this occasion were also attended by Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs. Ante Markovic and Kim Yong-man agreed that political relations between Yugoslavia and the DPRK are good. The noted, however, that the results of bilateral economic cooperation have been negligible and expressed readiness to advance and expand it in the interest of both countries. During the talks, reference was also made to activities of the Nonaligned Movement prior to the summit in Belgrade. The DPRK vice premier informed the president of the Federal Executive Council of the current situation on the Korean peninsula.

### Exchanges Toasts With Loncar

*LD1104181589 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1603 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Belgrade, 11 Apr (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia and the DPRK wish to continue to promote both their relations and cooperation based on the traditional friendship between the two countries, mutual understanding, and trust.

This is a common idea which featured prominently in the toasts the two countries' foreign ministers, Budimir Loncar and Kim Yong-Nam, exchanged at a luncheon in the Palace of the Federation today.

Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, as the host, delivered his toast first. He stressed that the visit by Kim Yong-nam is taking place at the right moment and that during their talks yesterday, their agreement on "many priorities" in current international trends and on the need to comprehensively develop bilateral links have emerged, together with "some minor differences." For this reason, the current visit by the DPRK's vice premier is all the more useful. The head of the Yugoslav diplomatic service went on to speak about the favorable developments in the part of Asia to which the DPRK belongs. He made reference to the rapprochements between the USSR and China, China and India, and India and Pakistan, describing them as an important encouraging factor in the efforts to find a positive solution to the Korean issue. He immediately added in clear terms: Yugoslavia is convinced that Kim Il-song's plan concerning the peaceful unification of the Korean people will have the desired effect.

In reference to "positive radiation" in world relations, Loncar mentioned the improved trends in Europe, in the Middle East, in Central America, Afghanistan, Cambodia.... He stressed that North-South relations "deviate" from these positive trends, however.

The Yugoslav federal secretary for foreign affairs spoke with utmost attention about the lasting values of the policy of nonalignement and about the Nonaligned Movement's enormous contribution to the efforts to change the world for the better. He also spoke about intensive political preparations by and the main tasks of the movement prior to and after the ninth summit to be held in Belgrade in September. "Our views about the need to modernize and the functioning of the movement are identical. Rest assured that the changes we have to carry out are yet another reason for a deeper and more intensive cooperation between Yugoslavia and the DPRK," Budimir Loncar said, bringing his toast to a conclusion.

Kim Yong-nam, the DPRK's vice premier and the foreign minister, responded by stressing his country's desire to see relations between the two countries advance further in all spheres of cooperation. He reinforced his view by stressing that "all that we talked about was for the benefit of the spirit of cooperation which adorns relations between the DPRK and the SFRY. Like Loncar, Kim Yong-nam used his skills as an experienced diplomat to refer to some of the issues on which the views of Belgrade and Pyongyang are not necessarily compatible: "Changes in the epoch are accompanied by an evolution in people's thinkings. Some of the topical issues are seen in different lights by all of us." Guests at the luncheon noted as a welcoming statement the fact that today the two ministers decided not to raise the issue of the possibility of opening the process and contacts between Yugoslavia and South Korea. This was discussed yesterday. A realistic approach was thus in evidence as a guiding idea in the ministerial toasts. The DPRK foreign minister went on to stress that relations between the SFRY and the DPRK have always followed an ascending line, stimulated by the two countries' commitment to socialism and nonalignment.

Kim Yong-nam focused his attention on the forthcoming nonaligned summit in Belgrade. In his view, it is in fact the nonaligned countries and not primarily great powers who deserve credit for the positive global changes in the world." We think the Nonaligned Movement is the most powerful political factor of this period, in which every country is striving toward its own independence," he said. He spoke in favor of the movement acting in the future in such a way as to consolidate "its action unity and close its ranks." On behalf of the DPR,K he promised Pyongyang's full contribution to this end. [Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian at 1510 GMT on 11 April reports that "the planned talks between Budimir Loncar, the federal secretary for foreign affairs, and Kim Yong-nam, his counterpart from the DPRK, will not be resumed since all topics were exhausted during yesterday's talks and at a luncheon today."]

### Meets With Dizdarevic

*LD1104201489 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1816 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Belgrade, April 11 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia fully supports efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea aimed at peaceful reunification and its resolve to find modes for a dialogue on peace and security on the

Korean peninsula, president of the Yugoslav state Presidency Raif Dizdarevic said during today's talks with vice-president of the Administration Council and foreign minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Yong-nam.

Dizdarevic said that significant positive changes are taking place in the world, creating room for broad contacts and cooperation, while at the same time taking into account the existing realities. He said that in Yugoslavia the interest of domestic enterprises to establish business ties and economic cooperation with partners in South Korea is being respected despite the fact that there are no political relations between the two countries.

It was assessed that relations between Yugoslavia and the DPR of Korea are good and that they are developing in an atmosphere characterized by friendship and mutual understanding, contributed to by contacts and political dialogue at various levels. It was noted however, that the economic cooperation is not satisfactory and that mutual efforts should be made in order to promote it in terms of both volume and content.

This assessment was reiterated during today's Kim Yong-nam's meeting with Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

Kim Yong-nam stated the assessments and stands concerning the development of the situation on the Korean peninsula and relations between the two Korean states.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar today gave a luncheon for his guest and the two countries' foreign ministers exchanged toasts.

In his toast, Kim Yong-nam stressed that the credit for positive global changes is not due primarily to the big powers, but precisely to the nonaligned countries. "We hold that the movement of nonalignment is the most powerful political factor of our time in which every country seeks its own independence," said Kim.

He said that the objective of the movement's future activity should be to enhance "its action unity and cohesion," adding that his country would do all it could to that end.

Budimir Loncar said in his toast that Yugoslavia and the DPR of Korea hold identical views on the movement's modernization and functioning. "You can rest assured that the changes we must pursue can be an additional reason for a more profound and intensive cooperation between our two countries," he said.

## Gorbachev's Visit to Cuba, Stands Examined

*AU1004194789 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Apr 89*

[Branislav Canak commentary]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev has been in the focus of photographers, television, and movie cameras almost since his first visit to Great Britain 5 years ago, when very few believed that he was soon to become the head of the Soviet party and then the head of state.

The reason for this lies partly in his innate ability to communicate via the modern media, and especially in the fact that this is extremely unusual for a statesman from this part of the world. Gorbachev instantly won over the media and their consumers. It happened on this occasion again. Perhaps this was particularly marked this time because Gorbachev visited Cuba, at the very edge of the United States, where the memory remains fresh that a third world war was avoided by a hairsbreadth less than 3 decades ago, just because of the presence of Soviet missiles on this beautiful island. The missiles were removed, but deep suspicion and mistrust of the USSR's intentions for staying in this part of the world remained.

Regardless of the composition of the White House team, one thing has remained unchanged throughout all these years: to put it mildly, an uneasiness concerning what final outcome the thesis on the export of the revolution—which is the basis of Cuban policy toward the region and which enjoyed the clear support of Moscow until fairly recently—would have in practice.

In his speech to the Cuban parliament 2 days ago [as heard], Gorbachev categorically rejected this thesis, and it is this, it seems, which has had the strongest appeal, and not only to political America. In fact, one could not have expected any other statement, despite Cuba's hopes.

However, in the same sentence Gorbachev expressed his disagreement with the export of the counterrevolution and the policy of hegemony, and in this way rounded off a realistic picture of Latin America.

It is certain that the USSR would like to retain Cuba in the family of socialist countries and CEMA members, but it is inevitable that this should be accomplished on a new basis which would be more in the spirit of everything that has been done in the last 3 years in relations with the other superpower and indirectly with other countries in the world.

This is why Gorbachev, besides opposing the export of revolution, also opposed another export—narcotics to the U.S. market—which is otherwise one of the main economic activities of some Latin American countries, in some even a legal activity. However, Gorbachev, during his visit to Cuba, did not forget to remind the world and the United States of the extremely difficult position of the countries of that region, which bear the burden of about one- third of the developing countries' debts, debts that have already exceeded $1,200 billion.

If all this was yet another reason for Gorbachev's media star to shine, then it is certain that what in fact was the most difficult part of the work for both guest and host remained in the shadows. This refers to future bilateral relations which, regardless of everything, have not changed in nature since the victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959.

Bearing in mind the incipient and forthcoming changes in the USSR and CEMA, it is clear that relations between the two countries and the Cuban position within the context of socialist integration cannot remain the same. The Cuban leadership is not well-inclined toward Soviet perestroyka, and it overlooks the fact that the world economy is not the same as it was a decade or two ago. An economic system based more on ideological than economic elements cannot be compatible with the processes in the world economy and, as one can see, with the process of integration in socialist countries.

Therefore, if Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Havana yields some results in the sense of a certain degree of adaptation on the part of Cuba to objective circumstances, then this would be much more important than the things for which the Soviet leader has been pronounced a media star.

## Next LCY Congress 'Probably Extraordinary'

*AU1104193289 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Zivojin Jerotijevic commentary]

[Text] In the last few years, the decisions of the organs of the League of Communists [LC] of Serbia have assessed, to the greatest possible extent, the dissatisfaction of the party membership. This is an important political fact which allows the assumption that at its session tomorrow, the Central Committee will take the stand that the next congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] should be extraordinary.

The wider implications of such an orientation are contained in the demand of the Serbian Communists that at an extraordinary congress a new leadership be elected, that necessary changes be made in the LCY Statute, and that delegates not be chosen according to the system of representation [po kljucu] as they are chosen at a [word indistinct] congress, but that the direct and crucial influence of the membership on establishing the policy of the LCY in implementing the social reform be assured.

If we are interpreting the statutory provisions correctly, an extraordinary congress implies the obligatory election of a new leadership. However, this time the party membership in Serbia is insisting on this proceeding from the fact that the present leadership has lost its standing, authority, and trust, both because of disunity and the failure to implement its own conclusions and stands and because many of the party officials have lost their personal standing.

Judging by the mood of not just the Serbian party membership, changes in the whole organization of society, deep reforms of the political organization, and the reforms of the economic and political system should be unavoidable themes of the forthcoming congress. Such an approach [word indistinct] a broad spectrum of views on the three reforms, whose size and scope do not guarantee the prosperity of Yugoslav society. The concept of the three reforms does not include, for example, a reform of education in which the system of spiritual leveling out is reproduced, which is only applauded by ideologues of primitive communism.

It is increasingly obvious that we need radical social changes which cannot be encompassed only by the reforms, as these represent activity in the framework of existing solutions. These solutions are not, however, the whole answer to the present level of the historic development of Yugoslav society, and particularly not to the question of what socialism could be built on in an economically rich, politically just, and culturally developed society. In other words, the reform is not a sufficient social and spiritual opportunity for preserving and developing the most important of all orientations: the orientation toward a society without exploitation and humiliation.

Such an approach has unfortunately been exposed to numerous obstacles. These are manifested as more or less concealed attempts to act in a retrograde way, that is, to return the present Yugoslav society to an earlier form of social organization or to an earlier variant of socialist society. Indeed, these attempts at restoring the past are not the only resistance to change. They are joined by attempts to maintain the existing situation in every aspect, and are based on a quite visible and pragmatic need to preserve the status and material interests of the bureaucratic leaderships at all levels.

The cumulative effect of all these obstacles to change, regardless of whether they come from forces for restoring the past or from the forces which would preserve the present, is that they frequently act in a united way, although in a combined and confused way, which hinders even more the progressive economic, political, and cultural ideas about the changes being formulated and affirmed as a united social program.

Whether such a concept on the contents of the forthcoming, most probably, extraordinary LCY congress will have wider ramifications will also depend to a great extent on our famous procedures. The conflict between our current procedures and our present antibureaucratic revolution has introduced into the rules of the game some elements which are not exactly inclined toward a positive outcome, an outcome that includes us having a political party without supporters, an ideology without opponents, [words indistinct] and especially at a democratic price. It remains to be seen whether our political and theoretical thought will succeed in eliminating these and similar disagreements prior to the congress.

## Serbian LC Central Committee Plenum Opens

*AU1204082489 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 12 Apr 89*

[Text] The 15th session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists [LC] of Serbia is being held in Belgrade. The session is discussing the preparations and content of the republican LC's extraordinary congress and the situation in Kosovo.

In his opening speech on the forthcoming congress of the Serbian LC, Ratomir Vico, member of the Presidium, stressed that the delegates of the extraordinary conference of the Vojvodina LC justifiably and in accordance with the statute demanded that an extraordinary congress be held, and that discussions on the name of the congress are difficult to comprehend. This is difficult to comprehend, Vico said, but the opposition to calling the congress extraordinary can be explained because it comes from those parts of the LC which want to hush up differences and retain the existing state of affairs.

At today's session, the members of the Central Committee will also discuss some cadre issues.

### Milosevic Gives Speech

*AU1204103989 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 12 Apr 89*

[Text] A session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists [LC] of Serbia is being held in Belgrade. The session is discussing the preparations and content of the next congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY]. Ratomir Vico, member of the Serbian LC Central Committee Presidium, made the opening speech on this topic. At present, the delegates are holding a discussion. Here is our reporter Momcilo Boskovic:

The Serbian LC Central Committee ended the discussion on the first topic of the agenda: the preparations for the next LCY congress. The membership of the Serbian LC Central Committee was not in any doubt at any time. The next LCY congress must be an extraordinary congress. The shortest answer to the question why is that the extraordinary conference of the Vojvodina LC justifiably demanded this on the basis of the LCY Statute. Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Serbian LC Central Committee Presidium, made the closing speech.

The Central Committee accepted the request of Petar Gracanin to be relieved of his membership in the Central Committee in view of the fact that he has taken up the post of the federal secretary for internal affairs. Expressing his gratitude to Petar Gracanin on his impeccable work in the Central Committee, Slobodan Milosevic said that Gracanin has made a great contribution to the fight against the counterrevolution in Kosovo and the realization of constitutional changes in Serbia.

The Central Committee accepted the resignations tendered by Central Committee members Gizela Varga, Emil Lukacevic, and Novica Paunovic. The Central Committee has also established a working group to prepare a proposal, which was initiated by the Kosovska Kamenica Communal Committee, that Sadik Sadiku be relieved of his membership in the Serbian LC Central Committee because of his behavior, which is in contradiction with the conclusions of the Serbian LC and LCY Central Committees on Kosovo.

After a brief break given to carry out a vote on the new members of the Central Committee and Presidium, the Central Committee resumed its work about 10 minutes ago. The delegates are discussing the political and security situation in Kosovo. The introductory speech is being delivered by Zoran Andjelkovic, member of the Serbian LC Central Committee.

## Bosnia Still Lacking Presidency Candidate

### Explanation Demanded

*LD1104124189 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0827 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Sarajevo, 11 April (TANJUG)—At a joint session of all three chambers of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Assembly, prior to the election of the member of the SFRY Presidency from this republic, delegate Vlasta Joksimovic demanded that the competent organs be requested to approve of the public being informed concerning why Dr Nenad Kecmanovic withdrew as a candidate for member of the SFRY Presidency.

If this continues under a veil of secrecy, said Vlasta Joksimovic, I am afraid that there will be increasing speculation as well as justified demands for the truth to be made known.

Zlatan Karavdic, president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Assembly, answered that the delegates would agree on this when the second item on the agenda—the election of a member of the SFRY Presidency from this republic—is considered. The candidates, as is known, are Milan Skoro and Dr Stevo Mirjanic.

### Re-Vote Proves Unsuccessful

*LD1104124589 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1055 GMT 11 Apr 89*

[Text] Sarajevo, 11 Apr (TANJUG)—Neither of the two candidates for member of the SFRY Presidency from Bosnia-Hercegovina at today's joint session of all three chambers of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Assembly, in a revote, received the necessary majority of votes. Thus, the whole electoral procedure will be renewed and the Republican Conference of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP] will be informed of this.

In a revote, 9 of the 262 delegates did not vote at all. Milan Skoro received 121 votes and Dr Stevo Mirjanic received 25.

This time, however, in contrast to the original vote, there were as many as 107 abstentions, which unambiguously testifies to the opinion of the delegates about the electoral procedure.

The assembly also accepted the proposal of delegate Vlasta Joksimovic that the competent organs be asked for full information about Dr Nenad Kecmanovic and that the public be informed of this.

If the electoral procedure in this republic is not completed by 15 May, the function of member of the SFRY Presidency will be carried out temporarily by the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

## Bosnian LC Member Criticizes Leadership

*AU1104175789 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Apr 89 p 5*

[E. Demirovic and M. Lucic report on the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina held on 5 April: "A Red Card to the Policy of Disunity"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Participating in the discussion at the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Mladen Oljaca said that despite all the revolutionary victories, the basic perpetrator of the crisis in society and in its own organization, in the state and in its own vision of socialism, and in its own self-managing Yugoslavia was not a class perpetrator. No foreign enemy caused this crisis, but we did, the arrogant victors. When I say arrogant victors, I mean above all the arrogance of the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] and the leadership of which I am a member, the Central Committee of the League of Communists [LC] of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

We are totally ignorant, even to this very day, when it comes to what our membership is thinking. Do they want an LCY congress to stop factions and struggles between factions, not among Communists, but in the leadership of the LCY and everywhere where these struggles are becoming worse, coming into conflict, and manifesting themselves in a noncommunist way? This is happening, to the disgust of every educational worker, every honest person, every young person, every veteran, and I will not say every real Communist, as perhaps they have disappeared somewhere, gone off into space or to some other planet, but every honest, thinking Communist said Mladen Oljaca. Josip Vrhovec cannot be driven out, except with a police baton. I support revolutionary meetings, that is, those which took place during the war, which are a basic form of linkage between the people and the party. You see, even in the serious conditions in Kosovo, a wonderful link between the Army and the people has been established and, seen in this way, the old way of thinking undermines the numerous conclusions of this Presidium and this renovated Presidium.

The method of selecting who will be in the LCY Central Committee, in the leadership, incorporates the basic stand of the entire Bosnia-Hercegovina LC. Neither the president nor the Presidium of this LC will decide who will represent us at the congress in Belgrade. I suggest to them that we ban this. Belgrade will decide this, or the list of those who should enter the Yugoslav party leadership—above all the list of Yugoslavs, of Yugoslav-oriented Communists will fail. In this respect, I accept no regional, folkloric, or other arguments whatsoever.

We were not specific, to put it mildly, said Oljaca, in our assessments of the numerous events when we negated pure interethnic and other meetings by saying that we were against single-nationality gatherings. Not that we were against single-nationality gatherings, but that they should not be held, and we did not hold any. I am not sure whether the meetings in Vojvodina and the meetings in Montenegro were single-nationality meetings. However, to condemn them as the mob, the street, as a struggle against institutions, is absolutely unacceptable from the standpoint of a revolutionary party. The party must welcome these and not condemn them. When an institution fails, we must overturn it—I do not know with what—with a strike.

Speaking further, Oljaca said: "I think that we must express ourselves in a more aggressive way at sessions and also express what the Communists in the LC of Bosnia-Hercegovina and their leadership think. I think that the comrade president owes us an answer to the question of what was happening in Belgrade on a particular day, what sort of debates were held in the LCY Central Committee Presidium, what was discussed, and how it ended. I do not want to find out on a bus that they took a vote of confidence on in Comrade Suvar. I want to know how this matter was justified and how it was defended."

[The following passage appears boxed within the body of the item]

### Leaders

I have already seen a string of former national, single-nationality, and other leaders outside this Central Committee. They cannot have a place in this Central Committee. They are staying there. They cannot do so because Milan Kucan represents me, a Yugoslav Communist from Kozara, there, just as Slobodan Milosevic represents the Albanians from Kosovo and the Hungarians from Vojvodina, if he is a member of this leadership then he is. [sentence as published] This means that one should prohibit what has happened in past years, that is the logic of "keeping one's own threshold clean" just as Mika Tripola, for example, conducted the separatist policy of the secession of Croatia. I want to know what the Communists in Croatia, Serbia, Ljubljana, Kosovo, and Vojvodina are doing and, in saying this, I am criticizing myself, us, and others. Mladen Oljaca

## Bosnia LC Session Proof of 'Polarization'

*AU1104163589 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8-9 Apr p 2*

[Zeljko Vukovic commentary: "Caught Between National Leaders"]

[Text] Current events in the country and the specific position of Bosnia-Hercegovina (a miniature Yugoslavia) have made the Bosnian public demand that its leadership do something concerning all the federal units or, to be more precise, come up with an objective explanation of the policies carried out by some leaderships, the speeches of some politicians....The reasons for this are understandable. The clashes and quarrels between the country's leaderships and the "war between the peoples" arising from them, primarily because of their national aspect, have contributed to the increasingly noticeable divisions among the people in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The latest proof that we are talking about a serious and, above all, dangerous process for interethnic relations is the polarization caused by the speeches of Muhamed Abdic and Fuad Muhic at a session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists [LC] of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Even as many as 20 communal LC committees in Bosnia demanded that the Central Committee either approve or reject their condemnation of Abdic's and Muhic's speeches. Faced with the incorruptible reality and even open pressure for the nationality-based fission in the Central Committee itself, the republican party leadership reacted at its plenum this week.

It produced a document entitled, "What Is the Bosnian LC Striving For?" with the intention of presenting it to the membership and public as proof that the republican party leadership had already adopted clear stands on all controversial questions, dilemmas, and events. The party leadership believes that not enough is known about these stands and assessments, which have now been put together in one place, mainly because of the lack of information, ideological confusion caused by a propaganda war, disinformation, half-truths....This is also caused by the fact that the stands were adopted over a long period of time, and that so far they have not been presented systematically.

Can and will the above-mentioned "collection of stands" remove the stigma of being "unsuitably neutral" from the Bosnian party ledership? Can and will this document remove the ideological reasons for divisions? The fact that on this occasion as well, the Bosnian party leadership did not take a clear and precise stand on all aspects of the policy conducted by the Serbian Communist leadership and on the speeches by Slobodan Milosevic is a warning that the main cause of or motive for divisions has not been explained. Only politically blind people fail to see that it is in fact the policy of the Serbian party and its leader that represents the chief dividing line of the people in Bosnia-Hercegovina—because the number of those who are a priori for or against is rising. Why has the Bosnian party leadership avoided speaking its mind about this?

Had it by any chance done that, it would have made a mistake, just as it would have made a mistake if it had not done so. The only question is which mistake would have been bigger and more dangerous. A destructive decision could not have been prevented in either case, especially because of the degree of unprincipled and emotional division for and against the policy of the SR of Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic. It is difficult to believe that the radical advocates of one or the other side would give up their ideas merely because they were not confirmed by the local leadership, especially in the situation in which the influence of various "propagandists" outside Bosnia-Hercegovina is becoming increasingly dominant.

In this kind of stalemate, only the federal leadership can produce solutions. The federal leadership is authorized and obliged to act as an arbitrator. However, the federal leadership is still not doing it, despite strong demands for this. What, then, is left for the leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina to do? Its collection of stands contains the following assessment:

"We are deeply convinced that we do not need any kind of national leaders, but we need people who are trusted, people who enjoy a good reputation among the members of all our peoples and nationalities, people who are Yugoslav-oriented, who know how to build bridges between people, and not people who will divide us and confine us within any borders, particularly national borders."

Can this kind of stand be the answer to the question that has been repeatedly asked, and that has been a cause of divisions among the people: Are Slobodan Milosevic and Milan Kucan national leaders, or strong and creative personalities? Those who oppose the two political leaders and their work will, no doubt, interpret the quoted passage in such a way that Milosevic and Kucan will be national leaders, while others will interpret this principled stand in such a way that it would apply to everyone, and not only to Milosevic and Kucan, or will ultimately ignore it because it is not specific.

The Bosnian political leadership's lack of willingness to evaluate and assess other leaderships and some individuals in them can easily become the reason for a new mass dissatisfaction, and not only among the party membership. Further trouble can be caused by the ever spreading thesis that insistence on preserving and protecting good interethnic relations and on the fight against nationalism conceals other real economic and social problems and the leadership's inability to find a way out of the crisis.

How can one save the Bosnian party leadership from being unjustifiably attacked by the membership and the public, and at the same time prevent the leadership from avoiding having to account for itself because of justified dissatisfaction with it? This should be done through democracy—and not through a policy of concessions or keeping quiet—which cannot be hidden, even by the incessant announcements that this is a matter of "democratic processes." Democracy either exists or it does not. If it existed, the opinion of the membership and the public would be inviolable and the leadership would only be an "executive organ."

"The influence of the membership has been reduced to zero, and without membership, the leadership also equals zero." This, perhaps a little bit too strong, assessment of Mladen Oljaca is proof of the symbolic contribution of the "democratic process" in Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as the increasingly prominent attempts to give things their proper name on the political scene in Bosnia-Hercegovina. There is no doubt that relations on this scene are more democratic than they were 2 years ago. The question is how objectively they can contribute to narrowing the gap between what the membership demands and what the leadership offers, and who should be given credit for this. The expiry date of the sedative called "Democratization has started, we are adapting to it together, and therefore more patience please," is also approaching.

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